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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the thesis is to identifY the pressures that contributed to the rise in international labour 
migration in Lesotho, and to investigate how these pressures are impacting upon the 
modernization process in the country, particularly at a time when employment opportunities are 
scarce in the southern African region . 
International labour migration has been used as a development tool throughout histol)', but 
especially in the 20 th centul)' by developing countries with dual labour markets. Newly 
independent developing countries with dual labour markets adapted the strategy of import 
substitution industrialization (lSI), with an emphasis on protecting infant industries and 
promoting pro-labour policies. In the post-colonial period the international demand for low-
skilled workers rose, particularly in the North (developed countries), and in mineral rich countries 
including the oil exporters and South Africa, and the newly industrialising countries in East Asia. 
International labour migration to these countries was adapted as an integral development tool by 
the govemments of the lSI countries. Most migrants were low-skilled and temporary workers in 
the destination countries. Although no multilateral institutional framework existed, usually both 
the sending and receiving countries adapted unilateral and bilateral migration policies to 
guarantee the gains from migration. Workers were thus "protected" to val)'ing degrees under such 
agreements. 
From the 1970s, the North experienced a slowdown in the growth in demand for unskilled 
workers. In the 1980s, many lSI countries experienced devastating economic crises that forced 
them to abandon the lSI policy and adapt the export-led industrialisation (EOI) policy with an 
emphasis on trade liberalization. The switch from lSI to EO! in developing countries with dual 
labour markets led to the downsizing of public sector employment, the removal of marketing 
boards fonnally used by small-scale agricultural fanners, and the expansion of export processing 
zones (EPZs). These outcomes resulted in a rise in push internal migration, and international 
migration from these countries especially to other developing countries. At the same time, since 
the late 1980s, capital has acquired greatly enhanced mobility at the global level. The adaptation 
of EOI and the full mobility of capital at the global level altered the institutional structure within 
which labour migration was governed both nationally, and internationally. At the national level 
stricter unilateral policies were reinforced by receiving countries for low-skilled labour, while less 
strict policies applied for skilled labour. These remain in operation in conjunction with the earlier 
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bilateral agreements. At the international level, there remains a lack of policy to regulate 
international labour migration. Under the current enhanced mobility of capital, international 
migrants are thus left vulnerable. 
Lesotho fits this pattern. Faced with a dual economy and an abundance of semi-skilled labour, 
Lesotho has been a principal supplier of labour to the South Africa's mining industry since its 
independence. Lesotho's industrial diversification thus mirrors South Africa's industrial 
diversification. In the lSI phase (1968 - 1987), international labour migration became the most 
important tool of economic welfare generation in Lesotho. Bilateral agreements were signed in 
the early 1970s between Lesotho and South Africa to guarantee the gains from migration. Since 
the late I 980s, the mining industry in South Africa began to downsize production and 
employment. Fewer novice miners from Lesotho were recruited to work in South Africa. The 
adaptation of the EO! policy in Lesotho in 1987 introduced EPZ industrialization and trade 
liberalization. Nevertheless, the retrenchment of mine workers from South Africa is occurring at a 
time when Lesotho is experiencing an employment crisis. The political independence of South 
Africa in 1994 was accompanied by stricter international migration policies by the new 
democratic government of South Africa. Most migrant workers in South Africa are thus now 
faced with a two-door policy (of the earlier bilateral agreements and the amendments to the 
Aliens Control Act). This system has left migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation by both 
employers and the law (police) in South Africa. Nevertheless, international migration from 
Lesotho to South Africa continues to expand, particularly of the new type of migration - semi-
skilled female workers in the services sector. At the same time, South Africa is also experiencing 
an employment crisis. 
The most important policy implications are, firstly, that migration is subject to the same 
"casualisation" as other work, with the effects made worse by the "statelessness" of migrants, 
who are most vulnerable to exploitation. Secondly, multilateralism is needed (e.g., SADC) and 
holistic, multilateral policies are required. It is clear that under the new global division of labour 
ad hoc policy towards international labour migration is ineffective. 
IV 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my incredible and wonderful family, particularly my 
parents, Professor and Mrs. Maro, in gratitude for their continuous support, their sacrifices, and 
their inspiration. In particular, I would like to thank them for their financial assistance for data 
collection and interviews in Lesotho, and writing up in South Africa; for providing 
encouragement when I doubted myself; and for helping me to keep the big picture in sight. It is 
through this framework that this vine is allowed to grow. 
I would also like to thank my supervisor, Mr. David Fryer, for his unconditional guidance and 
worthy encouragement in making the successful completion of this thesis possible, and his 
practical and useful advice on every step of this learning experience. I am particularly grateful for 
his pragmatic guidance in the challenges of presenting the thesis, especially his excellent 
recommendations on my theoretical and comparative analysis, and his leadership with respect to 
statistical computation for the empirical analysis. To Professor Antrobus, I wou ld like to extend 
my deepest gratitude for mentoring and supporting my research proposal. To Mrs. Brenda 
Erasmus, I would like to thank you for helping with printing and for keeping my spirits up during 
the fmal stages of the thesis. 
I am also deeply indebted to all of the people at the National University of Lesotho (NUL), the 
Bureau of Statistics, and the National Employment Services (NES) in Lesotho, who took time off 
their demanding schedules to grant me interviews. In particular, I would like to thank Professor 
G. Prasaad at NUL, Mrs Tsietsi and Mrs Tlhomola at the Bureau of Statistics, and Ms Morojele at 
NES, who collaborated in different ways but all helped me with data collection and interviews 
when they could. 
Finally, thank you God! 
Any errors contained in this thesis are solely my responsibility. 
v 
CONTENTS 
Abstract 
List of Tables 
List of Figures 
Acknowledgements 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Subject ofthe thesis 
1.2 Context 
1.3 Scope ofthe thesis 
1.4 Structure of the thesis (methodology) 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Macroeconomic overview 
2.2.1 The IS industrialisation phase, 1968-1985 
2.2.2 SAPs and EO industrialisation 
2.2.3 Recent economic developments 
2.3 The traditional sector 
2.3.1 The traditional sector labour profile 
2.3.2 The institutional structure 
2.3.3 Rural development 
2.4 The external sector 
2.4.1 Migrant mineworker remittances 
2.5 Lesotho's modem sector 
2.5.1 Industrial policy 
2.5.2 EPZ growth performance 
2.5.3 Industrial relations and exploitation 
2.5.4 Critique ofEOI growth path 
2.6 Conclusion 
CHAPTER 3: THEORY 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Orthodox economics and the functionalist approach 
3.2.1 The Lewisian model 
3.2.2 The Todaro model 
3.2.3 The new home economics 
3.2.4 The household theory 
3.3 Heterodox economics and the structuralist approach 
3.3.1 Dependency theory 
3.3.2 Old world systems theory 
3.3.3 New systems theory 
3.3.4 The modes of production theory 
3.3.5 The networks theory 
3.3.6 Migration institutions 
3.4 Conclusion 
VI 
Page 
iii 
IX 
X 
v 
1 
II 
12 
14 
14 
14 
14 
15 
17 
19 
24 
25 
27 
29 
36 
39 
40 
46 
48 
52 
58 
61 
61 
61 
62 
64 
69 
72 
78 
78 
80 
81 
89 
94 
99 
107 
I 
CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE COUNTRY STUDY ANALYSIS 110 
4.1 Introduction 110 
4.2 Early industrialisation phase, I 940-early 1980s III 
4.2.1 Labour migration during the early lSI phase 115 
4.3 The economic crisis of the 1980s 119 
4.4 EOI and structural adjustment programmes: late 1980s to present 128 
4.4.1 Labour migration during the EO! phase 138 
4.4.2 Institutional structure surrounding the changing pattern of international 
labour migration 149 
4.5 Conclusion 151 
CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EMERGING MIGRATION 155 
PATTERS: LESOTHO, 1986-1998 
5.1 Introduction 155 
5.2 Unemployment patterns 156 
5.2.1 Youth unemployment 161 
5.3 Internal migration and urbanisation 164 
5.3.1 Net and gross migration 164 
5.3.2 Place-to-place migration 170 
5.3.3 Urban poverty 174 
5.4 External migration 177 
5.5 Conclusion 184 
CHAPTER 6: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE SURROUNDING 188 
INTERNATIONAL MINE LABOUR MIGRATION BETWEEN 
LESOTHO AND SOUTH AFRICA 
6.1 Introduction 188 
6.2 Financial and recruitment institutions: the COM and TEBA institutions 189 
6.2.1 Recruitment structure 189 
6.2.2 Financial structure: the classical deferred pay scheme 193 
6.2.3 Financial practise of the deferred pay scheme in Lesotho 195 
6.2.4 Potential benefits of the deferred pay scheme in Lesotho 196 
6.2.5 Criticism of the classical deferred pay scheme 198 
6.2.6 New developments in the deferred pay scheme 20 I 
6.3 Legal structures 202 
6.3.1 The bilateral labour treaties 202 
6.3.2 The Aliens Control Act 205 
6.3.3 The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 21 I 
6.3.4 The SA DC protocol on the free movement of persons 214 
6.3.5 The 1996 SADC amnesty and permanent residence status 215 
6.3.6 The response ofBasotho migrant mineworkers to the permanent residence 
status 216 
6.3.7 Criticism of the SADC amnesty and SADC Protocol on the Free 
Movement of Persons 2 19 
6.4 Conclusion 220 
VlI 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 Summary of"deJacto" Lewisian and Todaran framework 
7.3 Structuralism and the new international division of labour 
7.4 International labour migration in post-apartheid southern Africa 
REFERENCES 
Vlll 
223 
223 
224 
228 
229 
233 
LIST OF TABLES 
2.1 Share of de jure population by ecological zones, 1976, 1 986 and 1996 
2.2 Share of de jure population by districts, 1976, 1986, 1996 
2.3 Manufactured exports in Lesotho 
2.4 Number of persons in activity by gender, 1997 
2.5 Companies supported through LNDC, 2000 
2.6 Summary profile on govemment policy impact on business in Lesotho 
4.1 Private unrequited transfers as share of imports and exports, 1970 - 1983 
5.1 In and out migration by district, 1986 and 1996 
5.2 Regressions performed on dependent variable: LnM",d 
5.3 Migration status, 1986 
5.4 External migrant population by gender and industry, 1996 
6.1 Size of the Deferred Pay Fund and interest rates, 1990-1994 
6.2 Repatriated illegal Basotho immigrants from South Africa: 1988-1995 
IX 
Page 
21 
22 
47 
54 
55(b) 
60 
154(b) 
165 
173 
178 
183 
197 
210 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
2.1 Growth sectors in Lesotho 17 
2.2 Black workers in the gold mines by nationality 30 
2.3 Employment growth rates: modem sector SA, 1973-1998 31 
2.4 Basoto employment in the South African mines: total and as a share of total 33 
2.5 Remittances and deferred payments: log scale 37 
4.1 Remittances: share of world 113 
4.2 Remittances: share of GOP 123 
5.1 Unemployment and NE/pop rates: 1996 districts 157 
5.2 Open and hidden unemployment: 1996 a) male and b) female 163 
5.3 Net migration between districts, 1986 and 1996 168 
5.4 Education status of wage earners inside and outside Lesotho: 1996 179 
5.5 Absenteeism: age and sex, 1996 180 
5.6 Sectoral employment of Basotho migrants in South Africa, 1984 and 1996 182 
x 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. 1. Subject ofthe thesis 
In order to understand the current situation of international labour migration in southern 
Africa, it is necessary to briefly review the history of labour migration in the region.1 
This thesis proposes that in southern Africa, international labour migration is best 
understood from a regional perspective. Here, it is taken that the southern African region 
has developed a regional labour system in which both a world (capitalism) system of 
production and individual operative actions influence the cross-border movement of 
labour, which in turn reinforces the existing regional labour market. 
1. 2. Context 
Historical analysis of the process of industrialization in southern Africa (e.g., Wellings, 
1985; Cobbe, 1982; Matlosa, 1995; Head, 1995) indicate that the growth of the gold 
mining industry in South Africa, in the late nineteenth century, fonned the heart of the 
regional labour market. The rapid expansion of the mining industry, accompanied by a 
swift unification of vast mining houses in South Africa witnessed the creation of the 
migrant labour system in southern Afiica (Santho and Sejanamane, 1991; Sachikonye, 
1998). The swift expansion of the mining industry also stimulated the growth of 
secondary industry and agriculture, each of which themselves required substantial labour 
forces. Thus a massive demand for labour to work in mining, agriculture and secondary 
industries arose in South Africa. These developments took place within the political 
context of colonial and apartheid rule in southern Africa. The creation of a regional 
I The focus ofthe thesis however is not to give an in-depth study ofthe historical accounting regarding 
international migration in southern Africa. The point of briefing into the history of international migration 
in southern Africa is so that we can get a holistic understanding of the processes and institutions that 
shaped the current migration process in the region. The focus of the thesis thus concentrates on the current 
migration process in the southern Africa and its impact on economic development in the region. Lesotho is 
chosen as the principle country study as it represents a classic case of migration in the region. 
1 
labour force and control of regional labour migration were central to the existing political 
structure within the region whose main objective was to extract resources. The South 
African mining system differed markedly from the experiences of other southern African 
mining systems, such as the copper belt area mining system of the former Rhodesian 
empire (Austen, 1987; Sachikonye, 1998). The deposits were high grade and allowed 
payment of higher wages to the indigenous labour force. Most of this labour force was 
also relocated to urban areas, which reduced transportation fees to the mines for the 
mining employers (Austen, 1987). In contrast, South African gold mines were low grade 
and only viable if wages were kept low. These mines were able to meet their production 
and labour demand by recruiting and maintaining their labour force in a rural setting. The 
migrant labour system provided for political and economic setting within which the 
recruitment of mine labour was to take place (Austen, 1987; Sachikonye, 1998; Head, 
2000). Thus in this regard, the classical migrant labour system provided for the partial 
separation of the producer from the land, which aided the objective of the existing 
regional political structure. Men were taken from the peasantry into wage labour and later 
sent back to the land when their contracts expired. In this manner the mining industry was 
thus able to pay their workers less than they would have had to pay a settled, urban labour 
force (Austen, 1987; Sachikonye, 1998). This happened mainly by restricting the 
movement of the remaining family members of the migrant labourers, particularly 
women and the elderly, to rural household responsibilities, such as reproduction 
(Sachikonye, 1998). Consequently a rural smallholder production system developed at 
the same time as the take-off of the regional industrial development (Wilson and 
Ramphele, 1989; Weyl, 1991; Matlosa, 1995). 
Although a traditional rural peasantry production had originally existed prior to the 
inception of the migrant labour system, the process of industrialization altered this 
production mode by mainly having the partial incorporation of the peasant workers into 
the capitalist production. Wages in the mining and industrial sectors assumed that the 
reproduction costs (child, elderly, disabled and sick care facilities and youth education 
support) were financed through the rural smallholder production system. Such costs 
became pushed on to the peasantry in the region (Austen, 1987). Thus by not facilitating 
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the reproduction costs ofthe peasant workers, the mining industry was able to maintain a 
rural labour force and a weaker mode of peasantry reproduction (Chapter 2). The extent 
of peasantry reproduction went beyond national borders of South Africa into Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe Zambia, and 
Tanzania. Labour wages could therefore be kept so low in the southern Africa region that 
they did not perform the normal functions of expenditure. Consequently, rural 
underdevelopment became a permanent feature accompanying the process of 
industrialization in southern Africa, and a major factor maintaining its progress. 
Another advantage of the migrant labour system to mine owners, commercial farmers, 
industrialists and the colonial states in southern Africa (including South Africa's 
apartheid regime) was the fuct that it allowed labour to be drawn into production during 
expansive phases of the economy and expelled from it during recessions. The migrant 
labour system thus fuelled the creation of a reserve labour force, located not in urban 
areas but in the rural settings of southern Africa. Most of the regional labour sending 
countries such as Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Malawi, and the former 
homelands of South Africa became identified as core labour reserves locations, 
principally for the mining industry and commercial (White furms) situated in South 
Africa. Thus, unemployment and its related social consequences were either exported to 
the regional labour sending countries or contained through the repressive apartheid 
regime in the core rural labour reserves (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989; Philip, 1991; 
Coetzee, 1992; Head, 1995; Matiosa, 1995; Sachikonye, 1998). 
The creation oflabour reserves, in the core labour supplying rural settings in the former 
Bantustans, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Malawi, and in the other labour sending 
countries in the southern African region, served a triple purpose. Firstly, through the 
process of commandeering, land, usually the most fertile land close to water, was made 
available for colonial settlers (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Head, 2000). Secondly, by 
depriving African farmers of adequate land and hence the means to secure their 
livelihood, a growing and permanent dependence on wage labour was formed. Thirdly, 
bolstered by a series of laws throughout the region that prevented the permanent 
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settlement of rural people (mostly a Black majority population) in towns and industrial 
areas, the process of urbanization was delayed in the southern Afiican region. Thus, 
massive and costly investment in public works (sanitation, water supply, road building, 
housing and education) associated with the growth of cities was also delayed in southern 
Afiica. Consequently, many social problems related to the process of industrialization, 
were, in the case of the southern African region, banished to the rural areas. As 
population increased, particularly in the mid- to late-twentieth century, accompanied by 
increased pressure on the available land, the labour reserves areas became increasingly 
unable to support workers' families (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). Overcrowding, soil 
degradation and land shortage, meant that gradually, peasant producers became 
increasingly less able to sustain production without access to cash wages. Over time 
unemployment, poverty, malnutrition and ill health increased. The still-prevailing late-
twentieth century phenomenon of underdevelopment of the reserve areas is thus a direct 
result of these historical processes. The classical labour migration system was thus 
largely administered by the economics of dependency. 
Lesotho's current underdevelopment is a culmination of socio-economic consequences of 
the classical migrant labour system and its socio-political setting that created a 
dependency of Lesotho's mainly rural economy on South Africa's urban industry. Up to 
about 48 to 65 percent of Lesotho 's active labour force was employed as contract flexible 
labour in the development of mining production in South Afiica between the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s (Sechaba Consultants, 1995: 170). South Afiican employers 
preferred foreign labour to local labour because, among other reasons, it was more 
readily available, less expensive, more skilled and less militant (Wilson and Ramphele, 
1989; Weyl, 1991; Matlosa, 1995). This created a mode of production organization 
between Lesotho and South Afiica whereby the labour from Lesotho formed part of a 
periphery to a core of producers in South Afiica (Matlosa, 1995). Institutions were set up 
in South Afiica to deal with the annual recruitment of Basotho migrant mineworkers 
(Wilson and Ramphele, 1989; Sechaba Consultants, 1997). None of the migrant workers 
were invited to apply for permanent residency at any point in their careers in South 
Afiica, until as recently as in 1996 (Foulo, 1996; Sechaba Consultants, 1997; Matlosa, 
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1998). Due to the long absent periods of husbands in South Afiica, rising dual families 
and a deepening dependency (of Lesotho on South Afiica) emerged as the new social 
organization between Lesotho and South Afiica (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Matlosa, 
1995; Sachikonye, 1998). In this social order, wives, children and relatives of the migrant 
mineworkers were not permitted to reside permanently with the migrant mineworkers in 
the destination's urban areas where the mines are located (Sechaba Consultants, 1995). 
Women, who were left in the margins of the migrant labour system, principally remain 
unable, under Basotho law, to obtain ownership of land (Matlosa, 1995; Matlosa and 
Pule, 2000). The household structure has thus become permanently altered in Lesotho. 
With the absence of the males in the mines, women have become the de facto heads and 
managers of the household organization (Matlosa and Pule, 2000). However, their 
inability to claim ownership to land restricts their economic empowerment in the country. 
Thus, Lesotho's reluctance to modernize, witnessed for example through the lack of 
constitutional recognition of women's leadership role in society, is currently confounding 
its development process (Sachikonye, 1998; Matlosa and Pule, 2000). However, the 
classical migrant labour system is presently in decline. 
One clear indication of the decline ofthe classical migrant labour system is seen through 
the change in the demand for labour in the region since the mid 1980s. From the mid-
1980s, the mining houses adopted the strategies of internalisation, mechanization and 
stabilization as a response to evolving political trends towards democratisation in South 
Africa, and the declining world price of gold (Sechaba Consultants, 1997). Intemalisation 
and mechanization has resulted in increased labour turnover (i.e., longer term contracts of 
older mineworkers) and reduced number of workers in the mines, following new 
developments in technology and the fall in world price of gold. Stabilization has resulted 
in increased preference of South Afiican workers over foreign workers (The Gold Crisis 
Team, 2000). The implementation of these strategies has resulted in large numbers of 
migrant mineworkers being laid-ojf and returned to their countries of origin. In 1993, for 
example, only 23 percent of previous Basotho miners were employed in the mines 
(Sechaba Consultants, 1995: 67). The sudden release ofa mass of retrenched migrant 
workers in the domestic economies of SADC countries has resulted in sudden increases 
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in the rates of unemployment in the labour sending economies in the southern African 
region. For example, the high unemployment rate in Lesotho, estimated at being between 
35 and 40 percent, has been worsened by the sudden return of retrenched migrant 
mineworkers from South Africa and the unfavourable terms of trade for primary exports 
(Monyau, 2000; Matlosa and Pule, 2000). 
Another indication of the decline of the migrant labour system in southern Africa is the 
development of large informal sectors in the former labour sending areas. By the mid-
1990s, for example, the informal sector in Lesotho had witnessed an unanticipated 
expansion (Sechaba Consultants, 1995: 161; Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998: 
28). It is also reported that traditional informal sector economic activities in the southern 
Africa region, included among other things, rural micro-enterprises, particularly the taxi 
business and ruraI beer brewing, which relied on the migrant labour system for their 
livelihood. However, with increased retrenchment of migrant mineworkers such informal 
sector economic activities are on the verge of collapse. At the same time, new forms of 
informal sector economic activities are developing in the region, mainly in the form of 
cross-border trade of mostly low-quality, illegal and sometimes immoral activities, such 
as drug trafficking, prostitution and the selling of child labour (Sachikonye, 1998). These 
activities are developing at a fuster rate than the "traditional" informal sector activities, 
and are absorbing most of the population that was formerly employed in the traditional 
informal activities (Sachikonye, 1998). This clearly indicates a survival strategy by the 
ruraI underemployed and unemployed population. Thus, the decline of the migrant labour 
system, seen by the increased retrenchment of migrant mine workers has adversely 
affected the livelihood of other workers reliant on the migrant labour system and 
remittances for employment. 
The persistence of "illegal" migration in southern Africa is yet another indication of the 
decline of the migrant labour system and the changing pattern oflabour migration in the 
southern African region (Carim, 1995). Foreign migrants and immigrants in South Africa 
more and more make up an increasing proportion of temporary work in agriculture, 
construction, service and tourism sectors (Crush, 1997; Gaidzanwa, 1998). Much of this 
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temporary work by non-South Afiicans however, takes place outside the formal 
regulatory framework of the declining migrant labour system. Such jobs are also 
primarily at the bottom of the job standard of these sectors, with no skill or education 
background requirements, such as menial work in agriculture as well as basic 
construction in mining and construction (Sechaba Consultants, 1997; Ministry of Labour 
and Employment, 1998c). Temporary employment of a daily, weekly, or seasonal kind is 
individualized and has minimum apparent monitoring or regulating by government, 
employers, organizations or unions (Crush, 1997). This is primarily because many 
temporary workers in South Africa are undocumented (due to the nature of the jobs they 
perform) and are thus considered as illegal within the official regulatory framework. 
Thus, with the exception of the classical mining system, South Afiica' s migration policy 
framework does not constitute "temporary employment" or "guest worker" schemes 
characteristic of migration policy frameworks of other parts of the world, such as the 
German guest worker scheme of post World War II (see Straubhaar, 1988 for further 
reading on the Germany case). The unregulated character offoreign worker involvement 
in temporary employment poses a particular challenge for regional governments, 
organized labour, and non-government organizations seeking to improve working 
conditions and to establish a more human rights approach towards temporary 
employment (Solomon, 1994; Crush, 1997; Fontana, 1997; Reitzes, 1997). Clandestine 
migrant workers are even more vulnerable than legal migrant workers because employers 
exploit their illegal status. This category of workers tends to accept employment 
whatever the payment, risk, physical demand or working hours involved (Crush, 1997; 
Sachikonye, 1998; Rogerson, 1999). Moreover, employers tend to exercise full control of 
illegal migrant workers principally because of their illegal status. Obviously clandestine 
migrants cannot approach authorities for the redress of their grievances (Crush, 1997; 
Fontana, 1997; Sachikonye, 1998). Some of the more vulnerable groups of illegal 
migrant labourers include Mozambican child workers employed on South African and 
Zimbabwean farms (Sachikonye, 1998: v). The changing pattern of Lesotho's migration 
is likely to be associated with increased vulnerability. 
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The challenge of regulating the temporary employment regime is significantly influenced 
by the existence of a region social capital, particularly migrant networks. A significant 
proportion of the temporary labour force is mobilized through labour brokers and is 
involved in sub-contracting employment arrangements (Crush, 1997; Fontana, 1997). 
Sub-contracting which has been growing rapidly in all the major sectors in which foreign 
workers are employed, largely relies on informal social networks, of kin, neighbour, 
language, religion and gender, to function (Fenyes, 1988; Davidson, 1992; Gaidzanwa, 
1998; Gwaunza, 1998). The mobilization networks of South Africa's brokers and sub-
contractors (mostly immigrants) extend well beyond South Africa's borders into the 
borders of the former labour reserve countries (Crush, 1997; Rogerson, 1999). The 
suppliers of temporary labour are especially well integrated into local rural and semi-
urban labour markets, where current and former migrant worker families particularly 
reside (see Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c for the case of Lesotho). 
Foreign-worker recruiters are then able to tap the informal, underemployed labour pool of 
unskilled and semi-skilled non-South Africans and South Africans who mostly are 
without employment and are located on the margins of the formal urban labour market in 
the region (Head, 1995; Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Ministry of Labour and 
Employment, 1998c; Crush, 1997; Chirwa, 1997). The omnipresent pick-up points for 
day labour in virtually all South African towns and cities are merely the most visible 
manifestation of a vast informal network of information, labour mobilization and 
exploitation (Crush, 1997; Rogerson, 1999). The existence of migrant networks and a 
regional social capital implies a challenge to the issue of citizenship status in the region 
witnessed in the new pattern of cross-border labour movement. The classical migrant 
labour system derived under colonial and apartheid regimes, which shaped the 
development of the new cross-border labour flows in southern Africa, assumed 
international labour migration to be a long-term arrangement. However, the rise of 
independent nation-states in the region and of majority rule in South Africa introduced 
issues of ''us versus them," dramatised by concerns of citizenship and a growing 
xenophobia of "foreigners" in both formal and informal circles towards migrants 
(Thompson, 1991; Crush, 1997; Sachikonye, 1998). 
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Thus, in terms of policy direction, the whole issue of undocumented migration and 
temporary employment in southern Africa points towards the broader concept of the 
existence of a regional social capital with both formal, regulated (i.e., the migrant labour 
system and its legal framework) and informal, unregulated labour networks being in 
operation simultaneously (Thompson, 1991). How the regional governments respond to 
this broader challenge of a regional social capital is a critical fuctor in determining the 
status and security of individual decision-makers (i.e., migrant workers and the informal 
labour-recruiting network). An important observation of the current situation is that 
migrant workers are becoming further marginalized and exploited in the regional labour 
market. Current research on temporary migration cannot come to a consensus on how to 
manage the temporary work regime and the prevailing undocumented labour crisis. This 
uncertainty contributed to the manner in which the regional governments have responded 
to the increase in temporary work and illegal migration. Regional governments 
principally resort to unilateral and ad hoc decision-making regarding the management of 
the temporary work regime and the issue of illegal migration (Crush, 1997; Matlosa, 
1998). 
Normally, but not always, these policy changes impose further restriction on mobility. 
The decision by the South African government in 1996 to extend permanent residence 
status to migrant mineworkers who had served in South African mines for more than ten 
years reflects one of the current attempts by a regional nation-state to regulate the new 
intemationallabour flows. The decision to extend permanent residence status to migrant 
workers in the land of destination was made unilaterally by the South African 
government without prior negotiations with the governments of the migrant mineworkers 
(Matlosa and Pule, 2000). The result of this unilateral action by South African officials 
has been the creation of antagonistic "sovereignty" -reinforcing responses by the labour 
sending countries in the region. The general response in Lesotho to the permanent 
residence status being extended to migrant miners has been met by a feeling of being 
"cheated out" of its welfure share by the South African government (see for example, 
Sachikonye, 1998; Matlosa and Pule, 2000). Lesotho's current policy options for "the 
way forward" in the twenty-first century, proposed by academia and government officials 
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involve such choices as either maintaining the status quo (i.e. , continue with an 
underdeveloped Lesotho), joining the larger South African constitution as the twelfth 
province of South Africa; or entering into bilateral agreements with South Africa, mainly 
within the Southern African Development Community framework (Matlosa and Pule, 
2000). Such proposed development options for the former labour reserve area, by 
academia and govemment official, are also reflected in other former core labour reserve 
countries, such as Swaziland, and clearly indicate the sense of antagonism and threat 
being felt by the other regional countries about South Africa's current method of 
interaction with its regional economies (Crush, 1997; Molapo, 1998). Even though in 
theory it is possible to have both policy options in operations at once, in practise 
governments have chosen the last option over the others (Sechaba Consultants, 1995). 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) model provides for long-term 
opportunities in several areas of policy concerns, which are of particular relevance to the 
development of the regional labour market. These opportunities include among other 
things the free movement oflabour; skill building; infrastructure development; free-trade 
area creation; and a political commitment to democratisation, human rights, rule of law 
and privatisation. However such opportunities are currently visionary long-term regional 
goals that still need to meet complete implementation at the national level. The issue of 
citizenship, for example, continues to be a persistence challenge to the possibility of 
arriving at an agreement on the protocol on the Free Movement of Persons (Crush, 1997; 
Sachikonye, 1998). The inconsistent response by regional government on the issue of 
citizenship and workers rights at the regional level is itselfa reflection of the inconsistent 
response to the issue of workers' rights at the national level. This is evident for example, 
in Lesotho's lack of a women leadership role in the country, and the on-going political 
instability, which culminates to uncontrolled looting and violent crimes directed mostly 
towards foreigners and local business (The Gold Crisis Team, 2000). This is an important 
observation for the regional labour market development plan, particularly if the southern 
African region is ever to attain effective regulation of international labour migration. 
Nevertheless, clearly the changing pattern of international labour migration in the region 
is bound to outline the southern Africa's development path. Whether such developments 
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will shape or limit the growth path of the region will depend largely on the willingness of 
the regional people, particularly the governments to adapt to the new labour market 
developments that are not only sweeping the southern Afiican region, but are also 
witnessed in other international countries? 
1. 3. Scope of the thesis 
Generally, migration has four broad categories; refugees, undocumented (illegal), brain 
drain and contract migration (Skeldon, 1997; Matlosa and Pule, 2000). The thesis is 
limited to the study of contract or oscillatory migration, using Lesotho as the main case 
study. The process of out-migration is viewed here from a regional perspective on labour 
market adjustments. 
Beyond the background provided in this introduction, the thesis is not concerned with the 
development of the South Afiican labour empire (i.e., historical analysis of labour 
migration in southern Afiica), or about the perspective oflabour receiving countries; a lot 
has already been written on both subjects.3 The main tasks of the thesis are first to 
investigate the relationship between changing labour migration patterns in the southern 
Afiican region and the development prospects of the labour sending areas. Secondly, the 
thesis aims to investigate the evolution, role and prospects of the institutions surrounding 
international labour migration in the southern Afiican region. The particular focus is on 
Lesotho, which is regarded as the archetype of the labour sending economy. Recent 
research on international labour migration in southern Afiica (for example, Crush, 1997; 
Foulo, 1996; Gaidzanwa, 1998; Reitzes, 1997; Rogerson, 1999; Sachikonye, 1998) has so 
far failed to come up with a coherent proposal on ways to regulate the new patterns of 
international labour flow in the region. The second goal of the thesis is thus to provide 
2 See for example, Lemarcband, 1992 on the issue of Africa's transition to democracy. 
3 See for example, Greenwood, 1975; Bundy, 1979; Gordon, 1981; Cobbe, 1982; Mkandawire, 1985 ; 
Wellings, 1985; Lucas and Stark, 1985; Austen, 1987; Lucas, 1987; POnyes, 1988; Kriedge, 1989; Weyl, 
1990; Philip, 1991; Santho and Sejanamane, 1991; Thompson, 1991; Coetzee, 1992; Davidson, 1992; 
Secbaba Consultants, 1994, 1995, 1997; Head, 1995; Matlosa, 1995, 1998; Chirwa, 1997; Fontana, 1997; 
Bartram, 1998; Gwaunza, 1998; Molapo, 1998; Wood, 1998; Keel, 1999; Mokoena, 1999; Rogerson, 1999; 
Gay, 2000; Matlosa and Pule, 2000; Monyau, 2000. 
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the basis for coherent guidelines for the regulation of international labour migration in the 
southern African region, given the account of the Lesotho experience with international 
labour migration. Whether governments choose to follow what academics suggest is 
another matter entirely. 
1. 4. Structure of the thesis (methodology) 
Chapter 2 will give the background analysis of Lesotho's labour force by industrial 
sectors4• Here the thesis considers the performance of the modern and "subsistence" 
sectors within Lesotho, and the mining sector in South Africa upon which Lesotho is so 
dependent. The main conclusion of this chapter is that internal sectoral and structural 
imbalances within the Lesotho economy are contributing to a push migration, of which 
external migration is a part. 
The main theoretical work to be used in the thesis will be a cumulative approach of the 
dual labour market theory (Chapter 3). This will entail analysing the principle literature 
on dualism from the orthodox school of thought, mainly the ''functionalist'' theories 
associated with Lewis and Todaro; as well as reviewing literature from the heterodox 
school of thought, which includes the structuralist theory, classical dependency and the 
political analyses to state theory, and the interdependency approaches, the world systems 
theory and the systems approach, and the social networks theory. 
The purpose of the theory is to show how the research question is to be approached. It is 
thus important to note that the lack of employment opportunities (the unemployment 
problem) in labour sending countries in southern Africa is comparable to unemployment 
problems faced by other countries with abundant labour. This means that case study 
evidence and applied theory, which was largely developed for other regions, can a priori 
cast some light on the problem and help us refine and detail the hypothesis that will allow 
us to explore the research question. Chapter 4 is thus a comparative analysis based on 
4 The point of Chapter 2 is to provide information on past economic developments within Lesotho, and also 
to indicate past social and political ties that resulted between Lesotho and South Africa due to oscillation 
migration from Lesotho. The focus of the thesis is however not on these findings alone. 
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selected five developing countries (Egypt, Ghana, Sudan, the Philippines, and Costa 
Rica). The reason for choosing these five countries is that they all share similar industrial 
diversification paths as Lesotho and southern Africa5, and thus can offer valuable lessons 
for the southern Africa region. The Philippines, Egypt and Sudan all rely heavily on 
external migration. Costa Rica and Ghana provide good studies of the difficulties old 
import-substitution industrialisation (lSI) countries face in adapting export-oriented 
industrialisation (EOI). 
Obviously although theory and comparative evidence are useful a priori, there remains 
the need to test the hypotheses suggested by the methodology of the research. To attain 
this end, Chapter 5 analyses data from population censuses; household surveys, statistical 
yearbooks, labour surveys, etc., compiled by various ministries in Lesotho and 
international organizations to test and modifY the a priori expectations for the southern 
African setting.6 The principal proposition of this chapter is that external and internal 
migration in post-1986 Lesotho is a push migration with a Third World development 
path. In particular, the Chapter finds that a massive unemployment problem is emerging 
in Lesotho, and this is associated with changing patterns of migration. 
Chapter 6 exammes the institutional arrangements surrounding international labour 
migration. Here it is argued given the fact that migrants are part of a larger nexus of 
urban Third World, past institutional arrangement associated with unilateral and ad hoc 
welfare goals are becoming ineffective in managing the emerging pattern of migration in 
southern Africa. Chapter 7 gives the main conclusions and policy implications drawn 
from above analysis. 
5 The migration process between Lesotho and the country studies of Chapter 4 are not necessarily similar. 
What is of interest in Chapter 4 is the similarity in the development paths chosen by Lesotho and the five 
country case studies. 
6 Chapter 5 contains most ofthe focus ofthc thesis, particularly in terms of empirical analysis. Chapters 3 
and 4 are also important in the sense that they provide the necessary theoretical framework and 
comparative case studies to support the Lesotho and southern African situation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND: AN OVERVIEW OF LESOTHO'S ECONOMY, WITH 
SPECIAL FOCUS ON SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE MINING INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2. I. Introduction 
This chapter describes the three sectors of Lesotho that influence modernization, mainly 
the traditional, external and modem sectors. The aim is to give the background of the 
pressures, particularly on the labour market, that are causing new labour migration 
patterns, economic activity, and unemployment in Lesotho.] 
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section one is this introduction. Section two 
gives the macroeconomic overview. Section three examines rural development and the 
traditional sector growth. Section four evaluates the external sector evolution. At this 
point, the discussion turus to inspect the external factors affecting Lesotho's 
development. Here the chapter particularly focuses on the influence of the SACU and the 
evolution of the mining industry in South Africa, and their impact on Lesotho's 
transformation. Section five analyses the development of Lesotho' s modem sector, 
particularly the growth of export-led manufacturing. Section six drawn conclusion. 
2. 2. Macroeconomic overview 
2.2.1. The IS industrialization phase. 1968 -1987 
During the 1970s and 1980s Lesotho's adopted an import substitution (IS) strategy for 
basic consumer goods and services (Ministry of Economic Planning, 1997b). A key 
element of that strategy was the creation of parastatals and public companies, which 
became a drain on the government's resources while crowding out private investment and 
unnecessarily raising consumer prices (IFC, 2000). The military regime that took control 
I These are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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in 1986 improved Lesotho's strained relations with South Afiica, and in October 1986 
signed the treaty launching the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Ministry, of Economic 
Planning, 1997b; AISA, 1999; IFC, 2000). The regime was responsible for a further 
deterioration in the fiscal balance because of an imprudent rise in military expenditures 
(Akulu, 1995; Gill, 1993). By 1988 the deficit reached 20 percent ofGDP, or 10 percent 
of GNP (IFC, 2000). However, increased donor presence in Lesotho, especially after the 
imposition of financial sanctions against South Afiica in 1985 and the mounting 
influence of a reformist group of technocrats within the government, led to a government 
decision to adopt the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) associated with the World 
Bank and the IMF in 1987. 
2. 2. 2. SAPs and EO industrialization, 1987 - Dresent 
The adjustment program, triggered by a fiscal imbalance, was designed to reduce 
Lesotho's vulnerability to exogenous shocks and set up a macroeconomic and policy 
framework that would encourage private sector development and the productive use of 
Lesotho's substantial revenues from the Highlands Water Project (Ministry of Economic 
Planning, 1997b). The external balance was threatened by declining migrant workers ' 
remittances, and given Lesotho's membership in regional customs and monetary unions 
(Ministry of Economic Planning, 1997b)/ the only significant short-term means for 
2 Under the Common Monetary Area (CMA) arrangement between Lesotho, Namibia and South Aliica, 
the Lesotho currency (Maloti) is equal to the South African Rand. This means that Lesotho has no 
independent monetary policy (Ministry of Economic planning, 1997b). Under the SACU arrangement, 
import revenue is coUeted by South Africa, meaning that Lesotho has no independent tariff policy (Santho 
and Sejanamane, 1991). SACU is the southern African customs union. The SACU formula negotiated in 
1969 granted several concessions to BOLESWA nations (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland). These 
notably involved their right to protect their own infant industries for limited periods against South African 
competition (Wellings, 1985). Underlying this move by Pretoria was the knowledge that these states could 
not as yet compete successfu lly for multinational investment with South Africa. Therefore, in reality the 
newly independent states ofBOLESWA tended to provide investment outlets for South African companies 
rather than viable aJternative sites for multinationals seeking entry into the southern African market. At the 
same time, South Africa continued to pressurise multinationals to confine their operations within its 
economy and also to take advantage of its decentralization incentives in the Bantustans (Transkei, Venda, 
Bophutatswana, and Ciskei), over those offered by BOLESWA. Today SACU operates under a quota 
system, in which member states are entitled to a share (calculated by South African officials) of revenues 
from cross border trade of goods (Santho and Sejanamane, 1991). Lesotho is currently not receiving 
substantial revenue from its participation in SACU. The high importation of South Aliican manufactured 
goods by Lesotho and the lack of reciprocal exportation by Lesotho's manufucturing to South Africa is 
adversely affecting Lesotho's advantage of belonging to a trade customs area (Matlosa, 1995; Ministry of 
Economic Planning, 1997b). 
IS 
correcting these imbalance was reducing public expenditures and increasing revenues 
(]FC, 2000). This stabilization measure was successful. 
Since 1992, Lesotho has achieved healthy growth while maintaining macroeconomic 
stability. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has accelerated from 1.9 percent real growth in 
1991 to an average of 13.2 percent per annum from 1994 to 1996. Simultaneously, 
inflation was cut in hal~ from almost 14 percent in 1992 to almost 7 percent in 1994 and 
1995 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999). The rate of inflation, estimated at less than 
10 percent in 1998, is decelerating, mirroring the trend in South Afiica (]FC, 2000). 
Finally, the extemal current account deficit was reduced from 7 percent of GNP to 1.8 
percent (excluding the water project). The overall balance of payments went from a 
deficit ofM3.9 million in fiscal 1988 to a surplus of about M64.1 million in fiscal 1995 
(]FC,2000).3 
The government also enjoyed healthy budget surpluses between 1988 and 1995 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1999). The fiscal deficit, after grants, of 1 0.3 percent of GNP 
in 1988 was reversed into a surplus of2.5 percent of GNP in 1995, while the fiscal deficit 
before grants was reduced from 14.3 percent to 0.4 percent of GNP by 1995 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1999). In addition, given that the Basotho have never resorted 
to much foreign financing in comparison to other sub-Sahara countries (U.S. Department 
of Commerce, 1999), in 1998 foreign debt equalled about a third of GNP. Lesotho thus 
has a very modest debt service level equivalent to just 4.7 percent of exports (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1999). 
To a large degree, exports have been the engine of growth in the 1990s, led by 
manufactured goods and exports (see figure 2.1). The impressive performance of 
manufacturing exports is largely driven by the inflows of foreign private investment of 
East Asian or South Afiican origin attracted by the improved macroeconomic framework, 
intensive investment promotion efforts, Lesotho's attractive wage rates and productivity, 
, In 1994, this represented 1.0 percent of GNP (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1999). With surpluses in 
the balance of payment, foreign reserves climbed steadily from 2.1 months of imports in 1991 to 6.5 
months at the end of 1995 (U.S . Department of Commerce, 1999). 
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and preferential access to export markets through the Lome Convention and the General 
System of Preferences applicable to low income countries (!FC, 2000). In the first half of 
the 1990s, despite the political disturbances, exports increased in real terms at an average 
of over 25 percent a year, albeit from a small base. This is discussed in detail in section 
2.5 below. 
. Growth sectors in Lesotho 
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Figure 2.1 
Note: Data has been converted from nominal figures to real figures using a GOP deflator by the 
Bureau of Statistics, 1999a. The figure indicates the main three booming sectors of Lesotho's 
modern sector. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Bureau of Statistics, 1999a. 
2.2.3. Recent economic developments 
From 1996, the filst growth experienced in the early 1990s began to decrease. GDP 
growth for 1997 was recorded at 3.5 per cent, down from average annual growth between 
1993 and 1997 of 8.4 per cent (!FC, 2000). The early growth had also been largely 
influenced by the construction of the first stage of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
(LHWP), which was completed during 1997, in addition to the manufucturing "boomlet" 
(lMF, 1996; !FC, 2000). In 1995, it was expected that the second phase (phase 1 B) of the 
LHWP would assist in promoting a similar level of growth for the latter part of the 1990s 
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(Ministry of Economic Planning, I 997a). Nevertheless, so far the phase 18's growth has 
been slow and has been mostly accompanied by rural development programme 
bottlenecks, particularly in the resettlement of displaced population due to the 
construction of the LHWP project (Coverdale and Pottinger, 1996). Nevertheless, the 
completion of the LHWP remains the country's main prospect for maintaining continued 
expansion of the economy and providing jobs (lFC, 2000). 
The second phase of structural adjustment began in 1997 (lMF, 1996). The aim of this 
phase is to continue the employment ofJabour-intensive export production while at the 
same time enhancing the skills of the general workforce of the country, by implementing 
medium-term economic strategy that is specifically geared towards human development 
(lMF, 1996; Ministry of Economic Planning, 1997a). The human development focus also 
requires the privatisation of government enterprises and companies as well as informal 
sector promotion (Ministry of Economic Planning, 1997a).ln a programme launched in 
1997, the government said it was to privatise 31 companies (lFC, 2000). Of these, just 
four have been sold to foreign companies. One was Lesotho Airways; renamed Air 
Lesotho after a Johannesburg-based charter company, Ross Air, bought it in August 
1997. However, it is instructive that by late 1998 the company had closed down largely 
because a predicted rise in passenger numbers failed to materialise (lFC, 2000).4 
In 1998, heavy political unrest and rioting destroyed a substantial proportion of the 
private sector in Lesotho. Finance Minister Leketekete Ketso estimated a 10 per cent fall 
in nominal GDP growth for 1998 after rioting and heavy fighting destroyed much of the 
centre of the capital, Maseru (lFC, 2000). The damage pattern was similar but less 
extensive in other towns, where rioters and looters particularly targeted shops owned by 
South Africans and Indians. South African businesses in particular, lost an estimated R2 
billion as a result of the 1998 disturbances. These businesses are central in providing 
4 The latest sale proposal is the Lesotho Bank, a 70 per cent-stake of which is to be sold to The Standard 
Bank of South Africa for about R350 million (IFC, 2000). The remaining 30 per cent-stake is to be held by 
the government for eventual sale to the public. 
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employment for the Lesotho workforce which can no longer rely for its livelihood on the 
army and migrant work in South Africa's mines (]FC, 2000; The Gold Crisis Team, 
2000). Some 3,000 jobs were lost as a result ofthe unrest (The Gold Crisis Team, 2000), 
although it is estimated that many of these will be regained by the next two years, as 
economic activity normalises and the construction process picks up as part of the 
rebuilding process (]FC, 2000). Thus, the structural adjustment phase has so fur been less 
impressive compared with the stabilization phase. 
2. 3. The traditional sector 
Despite these recent developments, Lesotho's economy is still largely dominated by the 
rural traditional sector. This sector operates within a complex social structure of rural 
peasant farmers with economic and political obligations to the external and modem 
sectors within urban areas in Lesotho and in South Africa (van de Geer and Wallis, 1982; 
Matlosa, 1995). 
The traditional sector employs most of the non-migrants in Lesotho and provides an 
important source of subsistence income. Growth in population, limited agricultural land 
and lack of natural resources together with the articulation of this sector with the other 
two sectors (external and modem), limit the traditional sector's scope for development 
(Foulo, 1996). Currently eighty percent of the popUlation is classified as predominantly 
rural (Bureau of Statistics, 1996c). The rural popUlation belong to households that 
practice subsistence funning . In 1976 out of an estimated economically active population 
of 426091 , about 99 090 (23 percent) were engaged in agriCUlture . These villages, which 
were located in the mountainous areas, were scattered along slopes and ridges. This made 
former rural development projects of the 1970s difficult to implement (Cobbe, 1982; van 
de Geer and Wallis, 1982; Bureau of Statistics, I 996b). In 1986 the population engaged 
in traditional peasant production had decreased to 20 percent. By 1996, only 10 percent 
of the population was engaged in peasant agriCUltural production (Bureau of Statistics, 
1996b: 33). 
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With two thirds of the land uncultivable, there are over 3 persons for each tillable hectare 
ofland in the countIy whose livelihood still depends upon agriculture. Between 1950 and 
1970, the average furnily holding of cropland decreased from 6.2 to 4.9 hectares. It is 
estimated that a decline in the average farm area per funn operations between 1986 and 
200 I will occur from 0.9 hectares to 0.5 hectares (Sechaba Consultants, 1995: 51). This 
trend is particularly noticeable in the lowlands where the average size of the family 
holding dropped 18 percent in the last forty-six years (Bureau of Statistics, 1982, 1996b). 
The population of landless households has been increasing significantly since 1950 
(Rechmann, 1982). Between 1950 and 1970, landless households rose by an estimated 4 
percent in 1950 to approximately 13 percent of all households in 1970 (BOS, 1982: 1.2). 
By 1993, 40 percent ofal! households were landless (Sechaba Consultants, 1995: 51). As 
a result, rural-urban migration and emigration are currently on the rise. 
The move to urban areas is not solely motivated by the desire for work. It is also 
detennined by fumily decisions (especially for women, who must move to a new family 
when they marry) (Baker, 1990; Pederson, 1997). To a large extent, in Lesotho, rural-
urban migration is increasingly becoming driven by the desire for improved social 
services and house sites with such amenities as tap water and sanitation (Sechaba 
Consultants, 1994; Bureau of Statistics, 1996b; Gordon, 1981). Households in the urban 
, 
areas are on average more recently established than rural households. This reflects a rapid 
growth of towns at the expense of the villages where population growth implies that new 
households will have neither fields nor employment. It is reported that household urban 
relocation is strongly correlated with monthly income, fonner sector wage employment 
and adult schooling. The older the rural household the more fields and livestock it has, 
the less likely it is to relocate into urban areas (MinistIy of Labour and Employment, 
1998c). This implies that households who remain in rural areas are the ones associated 
with these traditional measures of wealth. As is discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, there is 
thus significant "push" migration from rural areas. 
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Shares of population by ecological regional and by district depict a steady out-flow of 
people in the past 26 years from the rural location (mostly mountainous zone) into less 
rural areas. 
Table 2.1 
Share of de jure population by ecological zones, 1976, 1986, and 1996 
Zone 1976 1986 1996 
Lowlandsl 46.0 49.0 58.6 
Foothills l 22.5 22.7 12.4 
Mountains 20.7 16.8 22.8 
Senqu River Valley 10.6 1l.5 6.2 
Total de jure pop. 709000 1500000 1970000 
Note: I. The lowlands and foothills are the most fertile zones of the country. 
Total population figure for 1976 is based on data from migration and manpower in 
Lesotho, and is very small in comparison to the total population figures for 1986 and 
1996. This discrepancy suggests a significant undercount for the 1976 data. 
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, 1982: 3.2; 1996b: 21; I 999a: 2 
Table 2.1 shows that total shares of percentage population have increased almost by 10 
percent between 1986 and 1996 for the lowlands. The lowlands region, which is the most 
suitable area of agricultural production (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c: 5), 
is also the site of major urban corridor in Lesotho (Bureau of Statistics, 1996b: 22). The 
mountain region also increased in the share of percentage population, by about 6.0 
percent between 1986 and 1996. Perhaps this phenomenon is due to the launch of the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) in 1986. The period 1976-1986 indicates that 
previously the mountain area has started shedding population (by about 4.7 decrease in 
share of population). It is the Foothills and Senqu River Valley regions that appear to be 
losing population shares to other zones. 
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Table 2.2 
Sbare of de jure population by districts, 1976. 1986, and 1996 
District 1976 1986 1996 
Butba-Buthe 6.3 7.0 6.0 
Leribe 16.3 17.0 16.0 
Berea 12.0 9.6 13.0 
Maseru 18.2 19.0 21.0 
Mafeteng 13.0 13.0 11.0 
Mobale's hoek 11.0 11.0 10.0 
Quthing 7.2 8.0 7.0 
Qacha's nek 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Mokhtlong 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Tbaba-Tseka1 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Total de jure pop 709000 15000000 19700000 
Note: 1. Thaba-Tseka is a rural resettlement project district that was created in 1979 (Bureau of 
Statistics, 1996b). 
Total population figure for 1976 is very small in comparison to the total population 
figures for 1986 and 1996. This discrepancy displays a significant undercount for the 
1976 data. 
Sources: Bureau of Statistics, 1982: 3.2, 1996b: 22, 1999a: 2 
Lesotho is further divided into ten administrative zones. Administratively, for the period 
1986 - 1996, only Maseru and Berea districts had increased in percentage share of the 
population. Maseru had the biggest share of population over the other districts between 
1976 and 1996. The percentage share population in Berea is due to the proximity of its 
boundaries to Maseru, such that there has been significant spillover effect of the 
urbanisation process into Berea district. Quthing, Qacha's nek, Mokhotlong, and Thaba-
Tseka, which are situated in the mountain areas, had a fairly stable percentage share of 
population distribution between 1976 and 1996. The remaining districts had experienced 
a decline in the percentage share of popUlation, implying an out-migration to the other 
districts. This is confirmed in Chapter 5. Leribe, Berea, Maseru and Mafeteng districts 
form the greater part of the Lowlands zone. Hence, they have over 60 percent share of the 
total population. 
New arrivals in urban areas tend to rent accommodation in lines of fiats. This is also 
where the bulk of the unemployed (including job-seekers) urban popUlation is situated. 
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One of the sacrifices that the renting household must make in order to earn enough 
money to survive in the urban area (and so build their own house) is to send their children 
to work and not to school. This feeds into a vicious cycle of reproducing a low-skilled 
(and unskilled) labour force (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Ministry of Labour and 
employment, 1 998c). "Manifestations of female migration from rural to urban areas in 
search of employment and other social problems emanating from this trend, e.g., 
prostitution and juvenile delinquency are noticeable in most towns of Lesotho" (Bureau 
of Statistics, 1982: 1.3). Despite the constraints, rural-urban migration to the lowlands is 
expected to increase in the twenty-first century (Hollingsworth, 1984). It is estimated that 
by the year 2030 half of the Lesotho population will be urbanized, and by the year 2025 
urban and semi-urban settlements will constitute the entire western lowlands (Bureau of 
Statistics, 1982; Hollingsworth, 1984). This implies that the current rate of urbanization 
is a result of the failure of traditional sector and not due to increased employment 
opportunities in the towns. Moreover, it also implies that the growth of urban-slums is 
likely to be on the increase in Lesotho. This further supports the notion that rural-urban 
migration in Lesotho is a push migration. This trend poses a serious predicament for 
youth employment in the country. 
2. 3. 1. The traditional sector labour profIle 
Peasant furmers display the ability to own and rent land and equipment, to recruit non-
family labour from the landless popUlation and to accumulate wealth from small-scale 
subsistence production and trade, and services (Bundy, 1979; Cobbe, 1982; van de Geer 
and Wallis, 1982; Sechaba Consultants, 1994; Matlosa, 1995). This is conducted through 
the mafisa system.5 Landless labourers have no ownership ofland or equipment. They 
depend entirely on wages earned from services provided to the commercial and peasant 
5 In Lesotho, livestock is kept for numerous reasons: for subsistence (food and cash), as a store of wealth, 
as a measure of a person's social status, and as a source of a variety of raw materials. Furthermore, the 
importance of livestock is evidence in social relations such as bohali (the paying of bride price) and mafisa 
(a structure in which livestock is co-managed by both owner and non-owners) (van de Geer and Wallis, 
1982; Sechaba Consultants, 1995). Livestock accumulation is thus an important measure of traditional 
wealth and the traditional sector development. 
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fanners (Sechaba Consultants, 1994; Matlosa, 1995). This population group also relies 
on remittances from migrant mine workers (Sechaba Consultants, 1994). 
In the situation where men are absent as migrants either in towns or in the mines of South 
Africa6, women have assumed the responsibility over fanning production, particularly 
since the 1970s. Such women are the de facto managers and operators of all family affairs 
and the fanning activities. Currently in Lesotho over fifty percent of rural households are 
female-headed (Sachikonye, 1998; Sechaba Consultants, 1994, 1995). This has altered 
the role of women in peasant production, particularly in the area of non-traditional 
exports of fruit and vegetables. Most of the new export crops were originally in the 
domain of women peasant farmers. Their recent commercialisation has given women 
extra command over cash incomes. This may slowly be changing the exclusion of women 
from control over incomes in Lesotho (Sechaba Consultants, 1995). However, the export 
of these crops is marginal in Lesotho, and the contribution to the total household income 
is minimum. Also, official figures suggest that there are, despite their high absentee rate, 
more male fanners than female farmers in Lesotho (see table 2.4). This implies that 
seasonal fanning has profound implications for the rural labour force profile. Annual 
crops cultivated in the country require yearly land clearing and planting, weeding and 
prompt harvesting. In the absence of mechanisation (as is the case with the peasant 
fanners), fanners deal with seasonality through reciprocal assistance (mostly using 
extend family labour) and by hiring in outside labour (Sechaba Consultants, 1994). Thus, 
most rural wage labour in Lesotho is seasonal labour and comes from fann households. 
In the face of declining yields, this means that many of the rural households consist of 
underemployed and unemployed workers. These factors taken together suggest that a 
large portion of the underemployed and unemployed rural labour is female labour. 
Chapter 45 seems to confirm this. 
6 In Chapter 5 we see that approximately 40 percent of rural prime-age males were absent in 1996. 
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2.3.2. Institutional structure surrounding the traditional sector 
The chieftaincy structure of the pre-colonial period favoured the development of the 
traditional sector (Spence, 1969; Gill, 1993). During this era, fuur main institutions that 
guaranteed the reproduction of the chieftainship and the security (economic as well as 
political) were introduced. The aim ofthis strategy was to absorb the surplus labour into 
the management of the state: the matsema institution involved the use of the surplus 
(male) labour by the chiefs; the mafisa system loaned cattle to the people in exchange for 
tribute labour; the bohali institution involved the exchange of cattle for wives; and the 
mephato institution involved an age-group classification of the military regime (Akulu, 
1995). The combination of these institutions enabled the ruling class to build and sustain 
a powerful economic hold over the surplus labour in the region during the pre-colonial 
era. 
The colonial era and post-independence present ruling class in Lesotho introduced class-
alliances with South Africa's ruling class and other foreign businesses that led to the 
underdevelopment ofthe traditional sector (Spence, 1969; Gill, 1993; Akulu, 1995). For 
example, the impact of the introduction of new Christianity ideology into the 
management of the local economy in Lesotho was particularly felt at the fiunily level. 
The introduction of petty commodity production, which was promoted by missionaries, 
influenced the traditional division of labour between men and women in the family. 
Whereas before Christianity the household chores (inter alia funning, harvesting, child-
care) were equally distributed among all members of the external family, after the 
introduction of Christianity, child-care, harvesting, and other home-oriented activities fell 
to the women (Gill, 1993). The men became more market-oriented and wage earners. 
Principally what changed in the Sotho society was the value of a man as compared to a 
woman. Men were treated and regarded as more valuable and important since they went 
outside the home setting in search of income for the family. In contrast, women, who 
were directed to stay at home and conduct the family-affairs, were 
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treated as less capable and regarded as less worthy (Gill, 1993). From this point on-
wards, the traditional sector was transformed from a non-egalitarian chiefdom into a 
patriarchal monarchy based on a hierarchical chieftaincy. 
The introduction of education by the missionaries in Lesotho facilitated the emergence of 
an educated upper middle-class, and also unfortunately increased the marginalisation and 
isolation of the traditional sector. The educated class compromised of mostly wealthy 
Basotho traders (Gill, 1993). The children of these traders in turn became the salaried 
employment that formed the teachers, clergymen, and court translators of modem 
Lesotho (Gill, 1993; Akulu, 1995). 
The emergence of the increasing numbers of migrant mineworkers signified the transition 
of households from independent producers to sellers of labour power as well as the 
traditional sector's and the ruling class' institutional dependency on South Africa. Wages 
earned in the mines became crucial to the chiefs. They taxed the earnings of migrant 
mineworkers under the guise of guaranteeing a pension for the migrants after their 
contractual employment ceased to exist. In reality, these taxes were used to reproduce the 
powers of the ruling class (Spence, 1969; Gill, 1993; Akulu, 1995). Legal and binding 
agreements were forged between Pretoria and the ruling class in Lesotho to oversee that 
the deferred payment scheme was fully functional .7 Institutional dependency (as well as 
economic dependency) in Lesotho continues to dominate the political structure of the 
country. 
Institutional dependency (and the wealth accumulation of the ruling class) has not come 
about without a high cost to the traditional sector. Each post-independent ruling regime 
realigned itself more closely with the Pretoria government to ensure its economic 
dividends. However, the alliances with South Africa's apartheid regime were increasingly 
formed at the expense of the civil community (predominantly the traditional sector) in 
Lesotho. As a result, the times of strong alliances with South Africa, such as in the late 
1980s, early 1990s, and late 1990s, coincide with the isolation of the ruling class from the 
7 Chapter six will pick up on this point under the analysis of the institutional structure surrounding 
international labour migration between Lesotho and South Africa. 
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civil society. The episodes of isolation of the ruling class from the civil society usually 
tmnslate into periods of extreme violence in Lesotho. Moreover, during these periods of 
violence, the ruling class continues to struggle to establish new channels of self-wealth, 
increasingly under the maintenance of weak constitutions (Gill, 1993; Akulu, 1995; 
Mopheme, 2000). It is no coincidence that Lesotho's democratic transition took place just 
two years in advance of South Mica's democratic transition, or that riots broke out in 
1998, two years after the extension of the permanent residence status to Basotho miners 
by South Mican officials. Thus, through interaction with Christianity and its capitalist 
ideology, and mine labour work in South Mica, the traditional sector in Lesotho became 
commodified and altered. Although it remained distinct from a capitalist society, it 
nevertheless was transformed from its pre-<:olonial existence. The theoretical basis of this 
observation is discussed in Chapter 3. 
2.3.3. Rural development 
Rural development schemes entail building the legal, political, economical and social 
framework within which agricultural production and activities would thrive and grow. 
This generally involves the setting up of local governing bodies in the form of 
cooperatives, associations, societies and community networks, that would address 
specific concerns and matters related to the activities of agricultural production. The local 
representation is also supposed to address general rural lifestyle interests, such as the 
rights to a piece ofland, etc. Land tenure, a complex affair in the country, remains held 
by the King via the local chiefu. The right to utilize arable land is normally awarded by 
the King or the chiefu on behalf of the King, to the male heads of households (Cobbe, 
1982; Sechaba Consultants, 1995). This implies that land is thus a communal property in 
Lesotho, handed over via the patrilineal heritage. Women cannot own land (Gordon, 
1981 ; Riley, 1989; Matlosa and Pule, 2000). Under the Land act ofl979, powers ofland 
allocation became accorded in land committees who supervised the tmnsfer ofleasehold 
and thus, prevented further subdivision ofland that was already fragmented into separate 
fields. 
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Nonetheless, this approach to rural development has not produced the desired outcomes. 
This is largely because of the duality of the rural economy in Lesotho, whereby on the 
one hand there is the traditional chieftainship economy with its unique political order, and 
on the other hand there is the modem economy (cooperative societies, etc.) under the 
representation of the government district appointments8 Additionally, the dependency of 
the Lesotho economy on foreign financial assistance for its development process, has led 
to foreign factors dictating the development path for the country, particularly in 
establishing the "correct" bureaucracy and related institutions to support the "correct" 
path of bottom-up development. As a result, rural development policy in Lesotho remains 
a "confused mish-mash of inadequately funded "top-down" and "bottom-up" projects" 
(Wellings, 1985: 145). This poses a challenge also to the current situation of 
unemployment and retrenchment of miners. One can argue that the current economic 
situation of Lesotho is itself a result of the poor representation of the rural population at 
the district level by the decentralization system adapted at independence. There is a 
tendency by national development institutions to criticize returning miners of having a 
lack of interest in self-help, self-reliance and self-determination schemes, such as the 
miners' cooperatives, or self-employment ventures (The Gold Crisis Team, 2000). 
However, the poor organization oflocal representation largely contributes to the collapse 
and general failure of such schemes, both directly (by impacting negatively on the non-
civil members) and indirectly (by not having sufficient qualification follow-up of the 
8 The origins of the land tenure system can be traced back to the traditional chieftainship pyramidal 
structure in Lesotho. Under this system, there was no separate authority for policy formulation or for 
administration and justice. All governmental functions were performed by the chieftainship. Nevertheless, 
policy formulation was opened to extensive public participation within the pi/so (public meetings). Further, 
chiefs had advisory councils, whose outcomes were evaluated in a pi(so. Pitsos also took place at different 
levels. The chiefs acted as the top organizers to these public meetings (van de Geer and Wallis, 1982). 
During the colonial era, chiefs became more separated in the strategies they adopted in conflict. After the 
colonial era, the tasks of chiefs shifted from being largely connected with warfure to becoming more 
binding in the administration of land and justice. In addition, the structure of governance transformed from 
the previously responsive pyramidal to an authoritarian, hierarchical formation (Cobbe, 1982; van de Geer 
and Wallis, 1982). During the colonial era, Lesotho was governed under a parallel system. In this system, 
the colonial powers were in charge of law and order and the collection of tax in the country, while the 
chieftainship remained responsible for the land tenure system. In 1966 Lesotho adopted the system of 
devolution that applied local governance decentralization by geographical locations. In 1968 local 
governance was abolished and the system of devolution became replaced by the system of deconcentration. 
This process involves a bureaucratic decentralization in which elected districts acted as central government ' 
in their functions and power distribution. (Cobbe, 1982; van de Geer and Wallis, 1982). The current system 
of governance in the country is modelled on the above order. 
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work). Thus, pressures emanating form the traditional sector involved the partial 
commodification of the traditional production system that resulted in the collapse of the 
traditional production and emergence of the Third World sector. 
2.4. The external sector 
Lesotho's economy is significantly dependent on external factors for its development. 
International foreign institutions (!Frs) contribute significantly to the modernization 
process in Lesotho. The largest external contributor to Lesotho's development, however, 
is South Africa. The external sector in Lesotho is compromised of the Southern Africa 
Customs Union (SACU) (discussed earlier), and the mining sector of South Africa. At 
this juncture the chapter will now turn to the discussion of the importance of South 
Africa's mining industry in shaping Lesotho's economic development. 
The 1960s marked the peak of gold production in the mining industry (Bell et ai, 1999: 
6). According to Bell et al (1999), industrial diversification, particularly in non-mineral 
production was extensively pursued by the end of the 1960s. There was a considerable 
shift away from consumer non-durables, and an overall diversification of manufactured 
exports, particularly the downstream manufacturing sectors (motor industry, 
transportation equipment sectors, electrical machinery, etc). In 1972, the world price of 
gold increased dramatically, from approximately US$35 an ounce in 1970 to US$52 an 
ounce in 1972 (Bell et ai, 1999: 7). This marked the beginning of the gold price boom in 
the mining production. The price of gold continued to rise dramatically throughout the 
1970s (despite the overall growth decline in the manufactured production in the mid-
1970s) until 1980, when the price was at a peak of US$613 per ounce. From then 
onwards the gold price began to fall, with US$376 per ounce recorded for 1982. This 
marked the end of the gold price boom in the mining industry (Bell et ai, 1999: 8). The 
effect of the "gold boom" in South Africa was the reversal of industrial diversification 
and the re-adoption of gold as the principle export product (Central Bank of Lesotho, 
1991). The gold boom growth period lasted up to 1986. Instead of the mining sector 
having being gradually shedding jobs after reaching its peak production point in the early 
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1960s, the mining industry (and other natural resource base industries) began to 
dramatically increase the number of workers in the 1970s and early 1980s, leading to the 
eventual adjustment being much sharper. 
The end of the gold boom growth resulted in the decline in mine employment. Employees 
recruited during the gold boom period were of low-skill, as mostly surface gold was 
extracted and exported. The mining sector was being sustained not by increases in the 
volume of gold production but by the increase in the relative price of gold (Bell et al, 
1999). The employment of mine workers echoed this artificial sustenance of mining 
production. 
Since 1986, gold prices in the world have been on the decline and the mining industry has 
returned to its natural path of development. The artificial maintenance of growth by 
natural resources in South Africa began to disappear. This produced the drastic decline in 
mine labour observed between 1986 and 1998. 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Matiosa, 1995: 17; The Gold Crisis Team, 2000: 5. 
Figure 2.2 shows the rise and fall in the employment of Africa workers in the gold mines 
in South Africa between 1970 and 1984. The gold mine employment data is used here to 
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represent the overall trend in employment in the mining industry. This is because, 
according to Bell et al (1999) other mining sectors, such as uranium, coal, diamonds, etc, 
to a great extent, came to mirror the developments in the gold sector since the gold boom 
period. The rise in African labour employment indicates the total increase in mine labour 
during the gold boom period. According to figure 2.2, the rise in Basotho employment 
over the course of the boom period was not as dramatic as the rise in the employment of 
the other African labour. Similarly, the decline in the employment ofBasotho workers in 
the mining industry appears to be more gradual than the decline in the employment of 
other African workers in the mining industry. This implies that the employment of 
Basotho workers is not only based on economic trends per se in the mining industry. The 
suggestion here is that other mctors other than economic trends in the mining sector were 
contributing to the employment ofBasotho workers in the mining industry. As we shall 
see later in chapter six, the decision to employ Basotho workers in South Africa was 
greatly influenced by pre-colonial and colonial political arrangements between the ruling 
class in Lesotho and the South African officials. 
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Figure 2.3 shows the growth in modem sector employment in South Africa, between 
1970 and 1998. The data for mining sector employment (shown by the gold and uranium 
data) indicates a decrease of up to 60 percent of total mine labour between 1986 and 
1998. The sudden decline in labour employment in the mining industry has been 
accompanied by less dramatic but sustained employment stagnation in the other sectors in 
South Africa. The gold boom had arrested the process of industrial diversification, which 
inhibited prospects offurther modem sector diversification into tertiary and non-mineral 
base manufacturing in South Africa. Since 1986, these sectors have become stagnant in 
growth as their artificial sustenance by the mining sector began its decline. Employment 
prospects in these sectors echoed their growth prospects and have remained largely 
stagnant (for example, see the employment trend in the secondary sector on figure 2.3 
above). 
The gold price boom thus created a Dutch disease situation in South Africa, which 
inhibited the development of non-mineral manufilcturing and tertiary sector 
industrialization. Once the boom period ended in 1986, there was no other sector to pick 
up on the growth in industrialization and the labour force that was being shed by the 
mining sector. Hence, the high unemployment and stagnant growth in South Africa 
between 1986 and 1998 (see Bell et al, 1999) are an indication of the Dutch disease 
phenomenon of earlier industrialization efforts. 
To a large extent the industrialization experience of South Africa has been mirrored by 
the regional economies. The story of modem sector development in Lesotho is no 
exception. In the 1960s, Lesotho was attempting industrial diversification into modem 
sector agricultural export (wool production) and into low-grade manufilcturing (irnport-
substitution) of textile and clothing (Bureau of Statistics, 1990; Ministry of Economic 
Planning, 1997b). The gold boom of the I 970s led to a dramatic increase in the number 
ofBasotho migrant mineworkers. 
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Figure 2.4 displays the absolute number ofBasotho migrant mineworkers in South Africa 
between 1970 and 1998. The data indicates a gradual decline in the numbers ofBasotho 
migrant mineworkers. This trend mirrors the general trend in the decline mine labour in 
the mining industry since 1986 (displayed in figure 2.3 above). According to figure 2.4, 
the decline ofBasotho mineworkers follows a similar trend to the retrenchment of South 
African mine workers. That the mines did not retrench foreign labour first supports the 
earlier analysis that Basotho migrant labour employment in the mining industry was 
based on factors other than pure economic requirements. Indeed, the share of Basotho 
mineworkers seems to have increased in the retrenchment period since 1986. 
The increase in migrant mineworker employment set back the industrialization process in 
the Lesotho, primarily because it eroded on the manpower availability in the country, but 
more importantly, the gold boom changed the policy direction from import-substitution 
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growth to remittance-reliant welfare generation. In the early 1980s, Lesotho experienced 
its first unemployment crisis (Central Bank, 1991). According to the Lesotho officials, 
this crisis was linked to the mining sector wages increases and eventual worker reduction 
(see for example, Central Bank, 1991; Hollingsworth, 1984). Nevertheless, the 
employment crisis in Lesotho was rectified after political developments in South Africa, 
concerning the stabilization and intemalisation policies, had settled. Moreover, during 
this period, Malawi had also recently reduced the number of workers in the mines, so too 
had Zimbabwe, which led to the greater demand of Basotho migrant mineworkers in 
South African mines. Thus, the problem of unemployment was temporarily resolved. 
In 1986 Lesotho experienced its second unemployment crisis. Once more the Lesotho 
officials attributed the crisis to the mines shedding mineworkers (Central Bank of 
Lesotho, 1991). As we have seen, the decrease ofBasotho mine workers since 1986 has 
not been as dramatic as the decrease in other workers. Political developments in 
Mozambique (the FRELLMO movement) in 1987 to 1989 led to a sharp decrease of 
Mozambican migrant mineworkers in South Africa and a greater demand for Basotho 
workers. Once again, the problem of unemployment was temporarily resolved for 
Lesotho. 
Since the 1990s, the mining industry in South Africa has been pursuing the policy of 
increased mechanization more intensively, while at the same time implementing the 
stabilization and intemalisation policies (Head, 1995). In 1994, following the removal of 
the apartheid government rule in South Africa, the migrant labour system became 
challenged by the new political constitution in South Africa. There was no longer any 
need for the mining sector to maintain the expensive system of mine labour recruitment. 
Migrant mineworkers were being replaced much faster by local labour, and few novices 
were recruited to replace them. Even less migrant workers were being recruited from the 
labour supplying countries (MinistJY of Economic Planning, 1997b; The Gold Crisis 
Team, 2000). There developed a conscious move in South Africa to remove migrant 
workers in the mining industry (Head, 1995,2000; Crush, 1997; Sachikonye, 1998). 
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1998 was a year of massive retrenchment on the mines, brought about by greater 
mechanization and plunging world gold prices. 21.1 percent of total Basotho migrant 
mineworkers employed in South African mines were retrenched. In 1999, a further 12 
percent of total Basotho employed in South African mines were returned home (see 
figure 2.4 above). Again, Lesotho experienced its third unemployment crisis. And again, 
the Lesotho officials attributed this crisis to the developments in the mining industry (see 
for example, The Gold Crisis Team 2000).9 TEBA, the recruitment institution that 
operated under the migrant labour system, particularly in the employment of Basotho 
migrant mine workers (Bureau of Statistics, 1994), has become extremely marginalized in 
the decision-making of the mines (Head, 1995), as we discuss in Chapter 6. Mines can 
now recruit mine labour from their gates, which is a first for the industry. The free 
availability of labour for the mines means that, by South African labour laws, migrant 
labour is more expensive than local labour. Even though the mining houses are no longer 
responsible for the supply of cheap accommodation to migrant mineworkers, there are 
still responsible for their legal paper work and their health care (Crush, 1997). Thus 
although mines have tended to prefer Basotho workers because of their experience and 
discipline (as reflected in the maintained share) other considerations may begin to 
override this. 
The recent political democratisation of South Africa suggest that preference for mine 
labour is likely to turn inwards at the expense of experienced Basotho migrant 
mineworkers. Nevertheless, it seems as if so far mine employers have been managed to 
downplay these political factors and continue using past migrant workers. The inability of 
NUM to put a halt to the classical migrant labour system is one testimony of the power of 
9 The decline in the world price of gold and other minerals in the recent past has led to several of the major 
mines to scale down operations, reduce production and close unprofitable shafts. A recent trend among the 
mining houses is to abandon prospective large-scale deep-level projects and concentrate on less expensive, 
smaller and shallower projects (COM, 1999). These smaller mining operations typically require less than 
R50 million in capital investment. They also tend to produce no more than 15000 tons of ore per month, 
and employ fewer than 300 people (COM, 1999). Currently the move towards small-scale mining is still in 
the infancy stage. Nevertheless, recent studies on the industrial diversification of the mineral sector in 
South Africa (e.g., Head, 1995; COM, 1999) concluded that the streamlined structure of the small-scale 
production (which provides an avenue for higher returns on investment) and beneficiation (adding-value 
through addition local processing) would fonn the core production technique in the mining sector in the 
future. 
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the mine houses over internal political bargaining. Moreover, the recent extension of 
permanent residence status to older Basotho miners by the South African government is 
an indication of emerging migration patterns in the region. Nonetheless, increasing 
repatriation ofBasotho mineworkers is an indication of the collapsing migrant system in 
the region. 
Thus, Lesotho's current employment crisis appears to be occurring at a time when the 
migrant labour system is in decline. The story for remittances flows to Lesotho during the 
crisis period mirrors the employment trend above. The only difference is that remittances 
appear to be falling faster than total earnings and employment. 
2. 4. 1. Migrant mineworker remittances 
Migrant mineworker remittances (and deferred payments) are the principle supplier of 
foreign reserves in Lesotho. Since 1986 remittances have been steadily declining. The fall 
in remittances is taking place at a faster rate than the decrease in Basotho mine 
employment. 
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Figure 2.5 indicates a rapid decrease in remittances and deferred payments between 1990 
and 1996 compared with a less rapid decrease in total mine earnings for the same period. 
The statistics should be treated with caution. ln In 1990, total remittances were M141 
million. By 1996, remittances had fallen to M41 million. This means that remittances fell 
by about 29 percent during that period. In contrast, total earnings, which were M770 
million in 1990, had reached M628 million in 1996. This is a drop of only about 20 
percent. The story here is thus the fall in mine wages in the 1990s. Nonetheless, the 
suggestion here is also that the dramatic fall in remittances is probably due to other 
10 Estimates oftbe scale of remittances by Basotho are very difficult to make, not least because so little is 
remitted through official channels (refer to Chapter 6)_ Given the sudden dip in remittances in the early 
1990s, it is possible that the official channels to remit were influenced by the increased political instability 
during that period, and the changes in the deferred pay scheme, among other things, It is likely that the 
official figures given above are an under-representation of the real levels of remittances that entered 
Lesotho between 1986 and 1998, especially given the less dramatic fall in mine employment. Nonetheless, 
the important point with regards to fulling remittances is that even though little of the remittances inflow 
passes through the official banking system, they nevertheless account for huge benefits to the Basotho 
exchequer in terms of revenues. In addition, and more importantly, remittances represent an important 
inflow of private income and capital into the economy (Ministry of Economic Planning, 1997b), Their loss, 
coupled with the immediate impact on the labour market of the increasing repatriation, adds another serious 
blow to Lesotho's ailing economy_ 
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factors than the fall in mine earnings alone. Chapter 6, which analyses the institutional 
structure surrounding international mine labour employment between Lesotho and South 
Afiica will elaborate on this point. For now it is suffice to note the dramatic decrease in 
remittances (and the deferred payments against the less dramatic decrease in total mine 
earnings (which also represent decrease in mine employment). The sudden increases in 
the numbers oflaid-offworkers from the major workforce contributor to GDP and GNP, 
indicates investor and expenditure decreases, which suggests that the incidence of 
poverty is rising in Lesotho. 
This implies that the employment crisis in Lesotho is in fact, a crisis offactors other than 
the trends in mine employment. Yet, the decline of the migrant labour system and the 
introduction of permanent residence status to former temporary migrant workers signify 
the new labour migrancy pattern that appears to influence employment creation in 
Lesotho. 
The reintroduction of industrial diversification in South Africa since 1986 has seen the 
growth of the construction, tourism, leisure, and domestic work sectors that utilize 
flexible employment (as it is cheaper than full -time permanent labour employment, thus 
the low-wages in these industries are less preferable to the domestic labour force). 
Although (as figure 2.4 indicates) there has been little recorded employment growth, the 
"informal" nature of these developments may conceal some employment growth. The 
ILO (1996) report suggestion is that there is a lot of disguised employment in South 
Afiica. Since 1994, much of this flexible work has been performed by migrant labour, 
particularly in the services, domestic work, and leisure sectors (Crush, 1997; Reintzes, 
1997; Fontana, 1997). The rise in undocumented migration in South Afiica, a 
phenomenon of the "new" division of labour, is another indication of this changing 
pattern of migration in the region." To counter the possibility of attracting only low-
skilled labour into its labour force, the SA government has opted for permanent residence 
11 Chapters 3 and 5 elaborate on this point by distinguishing between the "classical" and "new" division of 
labour in the global (Chapter 3) and southern Africa (Chapter 5) labour markets. 
38 
status of immigrants as a mechanism to attract and retain the more skilled migrant pool 
over the less skilled (Foulo, 1996; Crush, 1997; Fontana, 1997). 
This nationalistic approach to international labour migration by South Africa, however, 
has triggered antagonistic responses from the neighbouring labour sending countries who 
complain of a rise in "brain-drain" by South Africa (Sachikonye, 1998; Gay, 2000). At 
the same time, there is the collective movement, by the regional governments, towards 
establishing an integrated free market area with the free movement of capital (but not 
labour) in southern Africa. 
The differences and diverging views regarding cross-border labour migration, on the one 
hand, and the desire to establish an integrated southern African free trade area, on the 
other, continue to dominate any discourse on the prospect of regionalisation in southern 
Africa (Crush, 1997; Siiderbaum, 1997). Such is the current calamity of the SADC. 
Where does this leave Lesotho and the challenge it currently faces offinding employment 
for the retrenched migrant mineworkers? The answer to this difficult question must lie 
within the formation of its modem sector and the path of industrialization the country 
opted for in the 1990s. Since it has already been established that Lesotho's development 
path more or less mirrors South Africa's, there are echoes that the future of Lesotho's 
employment development lies within a regional effort rather than a national struggle. 
2. 5. Lesotho's modern sector 
The modem sector in Lesotho consists of the primary sector (agriculture and mining), the 
secondary sector (manufacturing; construction; and electricity, gas and water), and the 
tertiary sector (wholesale and retail; private banking; and transport and 
telecommunications). The main sectors of growth between 1986 and 1998 have been the 
manufacturing, construction, and electricity and water sectors (see also figure 2.1). 
Although mining 12 and agriculture13 have some potential for expansion, the main growth 
12 Mining currently makes only a small contribution to GDP, mainly through artisan digging for diamonds, 
although there are known reserves of uranium, iron ore, lead and peat (Ministry of Economic Planning, 
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generators in Lesotho are the secondary sectors (see figure 2.1 above). The secondary 
sector is largely dominated by the manufacturing, construction, and electricity and water 
sectors. These three sectors have been the main engines of growth between 1988 and 
1998, although the construction and electricity sector's growth has been slower in the late 
1990s. The continuing expansion of the manufacturing sector is influenced by the 
favourable expansion of global apparel manufacturing (World Bank, 1998). Through this 
avenue, the manufacturing sector has recently displayed tremendous growth, albeit from 
a small base, making it the leading sector of Lesotho's EOr phase. 
The secondary sector is thus the main focus of this section. First we consider the 
industrial policy surrounding manufacturing activity in Lesotho then we descri be and 
critique the growth performance and path. 
2.5. 1. Industrial policy 
At the end of the lSI phase, several EOI-friendly conditions and polices were adapted to 
support manufacturing production. The main industrial policy revolves around the 
Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) and donor funding. 
1997b). However, commercial mining is about to be resumed with the reopening of the Letseng·la· Terai 
Diamond Mine (LNDC, 2000). The De Beers group of South Africa formerly operated the Letseng-Ia-Terai 
mine between 1977 and 1982, but was unprofitable during the diamond glut in the early 1980s. The re-
opening is expected to create 300-400 new jobs and is expected to inject new investment into the country 
worth more than M260 million over the next five years (LNDC, 2000). In the late I990s, two Canadian 
mining companies, Messina Diamond Corporation and Diamond Works had also been actively sampling 
kimberlite pipes and conducting feasibility studies in Lesotho (LNDC, 2000). Messina's project is 
reportedly close to commercial production. The company completed a feasibility study for an open-pit mine 
at Liqhobong in 1998, which projected production of700 000 carats a year over II years. Diamond Works 
has secured an option on 70 per cent of the nearby Kao pipe and is now reportedly negotiating to buy the 
rest of the pipe (LNDC, 2000). These new developments in mining in Lesotho are encouraging. 
Nevertheless, mining is unlikely to yield a sustainable growth, given, among other things, its reliance on 
world prices and markets. 
IJ Commercial agriculture involves mainly wool and mohair as main agricultural exports. Other crops 
include wheat, sorghum, beans and sunflower oil. Severe droughts have decreased agricultural output in 
recent years, particularly in the early 1990s (Mochebelele and Winter-Nelson, 2000). The government is 
seeking to encourage cash crop production for export, but only 13 per cent of Lesotho is potentially 
cultivated arable land, with 60-80 per cent usable for livestock grazing (Sechaba Consultants, J 995). 
Livestock rearing is likely to remain the predominant activity with considerable opportunities for 
expanding local processing of animal hides and other products. However, population pressures are 
increasingly forcing settlement in marginal areas, resulting in overgrazing and severe soil erosion, which 
remains unchecked (Mochebelele and Winter-Nelson, 2000). Aside from migrant mine work, social and 
environmental pressures thus limit the potential for vibrant commercial agriculture in Lesotho. 
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The Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) was formed in 1967 to promote 
a policy of export led industrial growth and commercial development at a time when 
local industry was non-existent (OSISA, 1999). The LNDC is the principal government 
agency for promoting investment, and operates as a development finance institution with 
a special emphasis on developing the industrial and commercial sectors (Wellings, 1985). 
Its main activities are the sourcing and arrangement ofloan finance, and the provision of 
serviced sites, factories and training grants. It also provides free back-up services to 
investors with regard to residence and work permit applications, and assistance with all 
aspects of industrial relations and collective bargaining arrangements. The LNDC 
guarantees a range of real estate services, including fully serviced industrial plots, general 
purpose-built factories, customised factories , and development of commercial properties 
for leasing (LNDC, 2000). The main four fully serviced industrial estates with sites and 
factory buildings for rent are located urban areas in Thetsane (Maseru), Maputsoe 
(Leribe) and Ha Nyenye (Berea). All are provided with tarred roads and installed power, 
water, sewerage, and telecommunications facilities. The LNDC provides factory 
buildings in advance, in order to shorten the investment cycle and reduce start-up costs 
(LNDC,2000). 
In general the LNDC does not take up equity participation in developments unless 
requested to do so by the project promoter, or for projects regarded as desirable in the 
national interest, but for which no suitable private investor can be found. In these cases 
the LNDC will require membership of the board of directors proportionate to the size of 
its shareholding (Wellings, 1985; LNDC, 2000). As explained by the LNDC investor' s 
guide, loan finance is provided by the LNDC for projects that can demonstrate long-term 
economic viability and on the basis of a detailed project proposal and business plan 
(LNDC, 2000). The duration of loans is up to ten years at a fixed annual interest rate, 
with negotiable arrangements for repayment of borrowings (Wellings, 1985; LNDC, 
2000). The LNDC can also guarantee loan finance to its clients by other financial 
institutions, at a standard fee of 2 per cent annually (LNDC, 2000). Any guarantees 
issued by the LNDC are supported by a counter-guarantee from the central bank, under 
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which the latter assumes 95 per cent of the total risk associated with the guarantees issued 
by the LNDC (Wellings, 1985; LNDC, 2000). 
Lesotho is a signatory to the convention on the settlement of investment disputes between 
states and is a member of the Multilateral, Investment Guarantee Agency (Lesotho 
Government, 1999). Furthermore, as a member of the International Monetary Fund, 
Lesotho has accepted the obligations of the Articles of Agreement, thereby giving 
confidence to the international community of its purposefulness of sound economic 
policies, contributing to a multilateral payments system free of restrictions (Lesotho 
Government, 1999). As mentioned earlier, Lesotho's central position also provides 
distinct advantages. For investors, Lesotho offers a highly competitive environment that 
is conducive to productivity. The principal markets to Lesotho are the SADC, the United 
States, and the European (Italy and the U.K.) markets (Wellings, 1985; LNDC, 2000). 
The current investor package is provided within the LNDC structure. According to the 
Lesotho government and the LNDC investors' guide, the current investor package in 
Lesotho includes the following: a low corporate tax rate of 15 % on profits earned by 
manufacturing companies, with free repatriation of profits, as well as no secondary or 
withholding tax on dividends distributed by manufacturing companies to local or foreign 
shareholders. (LNDC, 2000); a comprehensive export finance facility to support 
exporters with working capital on concessionary terms and unimpeded access to foreign 
exchange; loan guarantees, with long-term loans and/or equity participation in strategic 
projects; general sales tax exemption on capital machinery and equipment for 
manufacturing industries, as well as full rebates on imported raw materials or 
components used solely in the processing or manufacturing of goods for the export 
market, thus enabling manufacturers to offer credit facilities to customers; an abundant 
labour force that is predominantly English speaking, literate and well motivated, with 
high productivity and competitive wage rates; a non-repayable skills training grant that 
covers up to 50% of the wage bill during the initial training period for newly established 
manufacturing company; availability of serviced industrial sites and purpose-built factory 
shells for rental at competitive rates; and declining water and electricity tariffs as a direct 
spin-off from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Lesotho Government, 1999; LNDC, 
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2000). 
One major criticism ofLNDC is that it did not promote and develop business activities to 
benefit indigenous entrepreneurs who were very critical of the organisation during the IS 
industrialization phase. LNDC received heavy initial grants and concessionalloans from 
mUltiple donor organisations that diminished and eventually discontinued (Wellings, 
1985; OSISA, 1999). LNDC intervened in the agricultural sector with the goal of 
achieving food self-sufficiency despite land degradation, declining yields, very limited 
technical farming skills and labour out-migration to South Afuca's mines (Wellings, 
1985). The government's import substitution industrialisation with subsequent export-led 
growth strategy was far more effective in promoting indigenous small-scale 
entrepreneurs. But the modem sector remained under the ownership and control of 
foreign investors who did not establish linkages with the weak, indigenous small and 
micro-enterprises sub-sector (Wellings, 1985; OSISA, 1999). Small sector enterprises in 
Lesotho are thus represented by a different institutional organization. 
The Basotho Enterprises Development Corporation (BEDCO) was established in 1984 to 
support the indigenous micro and small enterprise sector (Wellings, 1985; OSISA, 1999). 
BEDCO's loan portfolio achieved little, and could not financially sustain itself despite 
significant levels of donor funding. The government eventually rescued BEDCO in the 
early I 990s. In 1991, BEDCO subsequently helped implement the Small Scale Industries 
Development Project (SSIP) that was sponsored by the UN Capital Development Fund 
and the government (OSISA, 1999). Projects were identified and appraised by technical 
assistance service organisations then financed and managed by Lesotho Bank. The 
objective was to make 500 MSE loans and create/sustain 1 500 jobs (OSISA, 1999). The 
scheme failed in its initial phase and was rescued by the government in the late 1990s 
(OSISA, 1999). 
Given the constraints associated with BEDCO, most micro-enterprises in Lesotho 
increasingly rely on micro-finance schemes for their start-up funds. There are three 
categories of micro-finance schemes: formal government/donor, semi-formal co-
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operatives and credit unions and informal self-help groups or associations (van de Geer 
and Wallis, 1982; OSISA, 1999). Formal micro-finance programmes receive funds from 
the government and donors, and are located within development finance agencies or 
banks and finance specific business activities. They are legally registered, require loan 
appraisal applications and interest rates on short to medium term loans, and are often 
artificially low and/or heavily subsidised (OSISA, 1999). Co-operatives and credit unions 
are governed by the same rules and regulations as formal institutions (van de Geer and 
Wallis, 1982). The Lesotho Co-operative Credit Union League (LCCUL) is an apex 
organization of between 70 to 80 registered credit unions. Members get loans equal to or 
as a multiple of their savings (OSISA, 1999). Since the late 1980s, co-operatives have 
suffered from negative savings activities, which increase their dependency on external 
funding from government and use of loan funds from revolving funds (Foulo, 1996; 
OSISA, 1999). 
The recent "boomlet" in the manufacturing sector is directly related to the good financial 
and investment incentives offered by the LNDC and foreign donors (IMF, 1996). 
Government finance however has recently began to decrease with deepening of EOI 
policy (F oulo, 1996). Compared with foreign investment performance, indigenous 
enterprises have been marginal throughout the period 1986 to 1998 (Foulo, 1996). 
Further reduction in government expenditure is likely to worsen the position of 
indigenous entrepreneurs, who rely on BEDCO for their start-up capital (Foulo, 1996; 
Ministry of Economic Planning, 1997b). 
In addition to the LNDC and BEDCO policy framework, a number ofNGOs with varied 
levels of service delivery capacity were established to promote and support the small-
scale manufucturing sector. These, however, have not been very successful in attaining 
their goal during the period 1986 to 1998. Most of the bottlenecks encountered in these 
organizations are linked to poor management and lack of accountability. The most 
successful of these organizations is the Basotho Mineworkers Labour Co-operative 
Society. This society is funded by the South African National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM), some mining companies, and membership fees (OSISA, 1999). It provides 
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management and technical training and project development services. Nevertheless, this 
society had not yet succeed in creating employment in Lesotho for most returning 
migrant mineworkers. The lack of funds and the poor follow-up ofprojects are the main 
constrains associated with the society (The Gold Crisis Team, 2000). Donor funding has 
thus become the engine of financial credit in Lesotho. 
Both multilateral (World Bank, African Development Bank, U.S. Embassy, etc.) and 
bilateral donors (E.U., Irish, Danish and Canadian consulates, etc.) support the 
development of the modem sector in Lesotho. Most donors are involved in the financing 
and training of small-scale enterprises and entrepreneurs (OSISA, 1999). The World 
Bank is the main organization that is involved in large-scale manufacturing production. 
The World Bank and the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) implemented a 
policy to build on Lesotho's comparative advantage in regards to manufactured export-
led production in 1990 (World Bank, 1998). The policy package included a policy to 
improve the environment for foreign investment that was introduced in 1990 as part of 
the pre-conditionality, as well as two projects associated with the Industrial and Agro-
industries Development Project, which was launched in 1991 and the Investment 
Promotion Centre (IPC) that began operating in January 1992 (World bank, 1998). The 
key elements ofthe policy and institutional development package implemented under the 
projects included: establishment of an active investor promotion and service institution 
focused on creating well-paid jobs rather than large fixed investments; limiting minimum 
wage increases; investment in industrial infrastructure; and reduced regulation and 
taxation (World Bank, 1998). 
The central pro blem with all multilateral and bilateral donor funding in Lesotho is that all 
of the donor associations as well as UNDP and other UN agencies funding micro-finance 
projects function without co-ordination and shared programme linkages that results in 
overlap (OSISA, 1999). 
The overall implication with the industrial policy in Lesotho is that the current industrial 
policy so fur has tended to favour foreign investment over indigenous micro-enterprises. 
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This suggests weak backward linkages between foreign and local entrepreneurs. The 
implication then is that it is probable that little technological transfers takes place in 
Lesotho under the current industrial policy. How has the growth performance been like? 
In order to get a full understanding of the modem sector development in Lesotho, it is 
imperative that we next examine the growth performance ofEPZ industrialisation. 
2. S. 2. EPZ growth performance 
Although small, the manufacturing sector represented about 18 percent of gross domestic 
product (ODP) in 1998 (World Bank, 1998). According to the World Bank group, during 
the past decade, the manufacturing sector in Lesotho increased 14-fold, an exceptional 
achievement by Afiican standards (World Bank, 1998). This growth was due largely to 
an export boom of ready-made garments and footwear fuelled by foreign investors 
coming principally from the Republic of South Africa, Europe, Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Taiwan, mostly in joint ventures with the Lesotho National Development 
Corporation (LNDC, 2000). Between 1985 and 1994, Lesotho's exports oflight, labour-
intensive products rose from less than $6 million to $123 million (see table 2.1). From 
1985 to 1990, they rose from 25 to 55 percent of total exports, surging to more than 80 
percent in 1992-94 and to 85 percent in 1998 (World bank, 1998). 
In 1993, Lesotho's garment exports stood at $106 million, while those of the Southern 
Afiican Customs Union (SACU), excluding Lesotho, stood at $50 million. Zimbabwe's 
stood at $42 million, and Kenya's, at $9 million. In 1996, Lesotho's exports of clothing 
stood at about $154 million, making Lesotho the largest exporter of ready-made garments 
in Afiica south of the Sahara (World Bank, 1998). Employment in these establishments 
ranges between 200 and 2 000 local workers. Overall employment in the manumcturing 
sector has increased from 12 000 in 1990 to over 18 000 by the late 1990s (LNDC, 2000). 
A central attraction is the country's highly literate, English-speaking workforce, which 
has a record of high productivity and competitive wage rates by world standards; 
according to the World Bank group, these wage rates are considerably lower than those 
of South Afiica (World Bank, 1998). 
46 
Table 2.3 
Manufactured Exports in Lesotho. 1985-94 
(Millions oCcurrent U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted) 
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Clearly the manufacturing perfonnance has been impressive. Nonetheless, it is suggestive 
that the "footloose" nature of the foreign investment is unlikely to yield long-tenn growth 
with a sustainable development in Lesotho. Moreover, most of the footloose capital is 
contained in industrial sites that require a priori massive physical infrastructure 
investment by the Lesotho government. In tenns of overall modem sector performance, it 
is probable that the remittances, manufacturing boom, and the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project (LHWP) contributed to the expansion of the construction and electricity sectors. 
The suggestive pattern of modem sector development is that of "footloose" EPZ 
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industrialisation on the one hand and non-tradable, seIVice-oriented production on the 
other hand. This implies a likely Dutch disease development, particularly given the small 
size of EPZ employment. Like other old lSI countries (Chapter 4), EO! in Lesotho does 
not seem to go very deep. It suggests an enclave that has little effect on the Third World 
sector. Even in terms of industrial relations, the policy tends to favour employers by 
maintaining weak labour laws and union organisation. This is as expected, given the goal 
of maintaining a fiiendly EO! investment environment. 
2. 5.3. Industrial relations and exploitation 
Overall, industrial relations are good, with basic minimum wage rates fixed annually and 
subject to review in accordance with prevailing macroeconomic trends by a Statutory 
Wages Advisory Board, a tripartite body of employers, employee representatives and the 
government (IFC, 2000). 
In terms of worker's rights, under the law, workers have the right to join or form unions 
without prior government authorization, with the exception of civil seIVants. The Labour 
Code prohibits civil seIVants from joining unions. The Government regards all work by 
civil seIVants as essentiaL In a 1997 judgement by the High Court concerning a petition 
filed by the Lesotho Union of Public SeIVants (LUPE) against the registrar oflaw, the 
Chief Justice dismissed the LUPE's application to form a union on the grounds that it was 
not consistent with the Labour Code. The LUPE filed an appeal with the Appeals Court, 
but it had not been heard by the year's end (U.S. Department of State, 2000). Under the 
1993 Labour Code, prepared with the assistance of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), all trade union federations require government registration (U.S. Department of 
State, 2000). 
In terms of general labour organisation, there are two small trade union federations that 
rarely cooperate with one another: the Lesotho Trade Union Congress and the Lesotho 
Federation of Democratic Unions. Unions are not affiliated formally or tied to the same 
political parties (U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
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The labour movement is represented by three different federations, which have links with 
different political parties, the most representative being the Congress of Lesotho Trade 
Unions (COLETU). Although efforts have been made in the past to form a common 
understanding among the unions, not much has been achieved (ILO, 2000). The 
fragmentation has weakened the unions, and forced the govermnent to intervene in labour 
disputes in the absence of agreements between labour and business. The employers' 
organisation, Association of Lesotho Employers (ALE), also has only a limited capacity 
to effectively deal with labour relations issues. All these have had a negative impact on 
the National Advisory Committee on Labour, which is alleged to address only a limited 
scope of issues, with low-level officials representing the govermnent (!LO, 2000). 
There are also several small unions in the public and industrial sectors, but there is no 
unified trade union congress. There are cases of unions competitively organizing small 
numbers of workers in the same sector (U.S. Department of State, 2000). Overall, 
unionised workers represent only about 10 percent ofthe work force (U.S. Department of 
State, 2000). Consequently, efforts toward collective bargaining and tripartite 
policymaking are not amenable to strong trade union influences. Permanent rifts within 
the labour movement and the weak institutional capacities of government and business 
threaten to spoil the categorical industrial relations (U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
Moreover, no legally authorized strike has occurred since independence in 1966 
(Wellings, 1985; LNDC, 2000). Civil servants generally are not allowed to strike, and all 
public sector industrial actions are, by definition, unauthorized. In the private sector, the 
Labour Code requires an escalating series of procedures to be followed by workers and 
employers before strike action is authorized. In past years, some small unions and their 
members have undertaken wildcat strikes or spontaneous industrial actions without 
following the procedures for dispute resolution. In February 1998 it is reported that a 
wildcat strike took place in the textile sector. Legal protection for strikers against 
retribution has not always been enforced in cases of illegal strikes (U.S. Department of 
State, 2000). 
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Security forces violently suppressed some wildcat strikes in the textile, garment, and 
construction industries in 1994, 1996, and 1998 (U.S. Department of State, 2000). In 
February 1998, police fired shotguns into a group of workers protesting at a textile plant 
for better wages and conditions of work, killing 2 workers and injuring more than 20. 
Two police officers were arrested and held briefly for the shooting; however, they were 
released when no one came forward to lodge a formal complaint. Both officers were 
transferred from the capital to rural districts (U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
All legally recognized trade unions in principle enjoy the right to organize and bargain 
collectively; however, in practice the authorities often restrict these rights (U.S. 
Department of State, 2000). Employers usually are not cooperative in this area 
Employees often are threatened with expUlsion and loss of employment if they join 
unions. There is credible evidence that some employers in the textile and garment sector 
engage in the use of blacklists to deny employment to workers who have been fired by 
another employer within that sector. In 1998, there were reports that some employers 
harassed union organizers. Although there was some collective bargaining between 
unions and employers to set wage and benefit rates, employers generally continued to set 
wage rates through unilateral action (U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
Furthermore, in theory, all national labour laws apply in the industrial zones; however, in 
practice, employers in the zones do not always respect these rights. Employers reportedly 
harass and intimidate union organizers, and prevent them from entering the zones (U.S. 
Department of State, 2000). There were reports that union activists often were fired, 
particularly in the early late 1980s and early 1990s (U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
There were also reports that many companies in the zones paid below minimum wage, 
enforce long hours, locked in workers until orders were finished, refused payment for 
sick leave, and deducted wages when employees were found talking or taking more than 
one break a day (U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
The legal minimum age for employment in commercial or industrial enterprises is 14 
(Bureau of Statistics, 1996a). However, reportedly children under 14 are employed in the 
textile and garment sector and in fumily-owned businesses (lLO, 2000). According to a 
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1994 study by a foreign government, as much as IS percent of the textile work force of 
some IS 000 persons may be children between the ages ofl2 and IS (U.S. Department of 
State, 2000). The Ministry of Labour and Employment denies the validity of this report 
(U.S. Department of State, 2000). The !LO was not able to confirm allegations of illegal 
child labour after visiting all 14 of the country's garment producers in 1994 in response to 
a complaint by trade unions in the textile and clothing industry (U.S. Department of 
State, 2000). 
There are statutory prohibitions against the employment of minors in commercial, 
industrial, or non-family enterprises involving hazardous or dangerous working 
conditions, but enforcement is very lax. The Ministry of Labour and Employment's 
Inspectorate, for example, is severely understaffed (U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
Youths under 18 years of age may not be recruited for employment outside of the 
country. In traditional society, rigorous and occasionally dangerous working conditions 
for the country's young livestock herd boys were considered a prerequisite to manhood, 
essential to the livelihood of families, and a fundamental feature oflocal culture beyond 
the reach of labour laws. The government specifically prohibits forced and "bonded" 
labour by children, and there were no reports that it occurred (U.S. Department of State, 
2000). Nevertheless, it is still suggested that "unbonded" labour, especially related to 
herding and EPZ manufacturing frequently goes unchecked. 
It is thus not surprising that manufacturing production bas achieved such a spectacular 
performance in Lesotho. Considering the fact that most manufucturing production is 
foreign and footloose, one has to enquire as to the sustainability of this development path. 
Here, chapter turns to critique the development implications ofEOL First, we will discuss 
wages and conditions of work. Second, we analyse the modem sector labour profile. By 
examining the overall employment pattern in the country, and determine whether 
Lesotho's current growth path is sustainable or not. 
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2.5.4. Critique of EO I growth path 
Wages in Lesotho are generally low. The monthly minimum wage for unskilled labour is 
M320 (US$68), and M616 (US$131) for a heavy vehicle operator (U.S. Department of 
State, 2000). Minimum wages for workers in lower skilled jobs are insufficient to ensure 
a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Most wage earners supplement their 
income through subsistence agriculture or remittances from relatives employed in South 
Africa. Many private employers pay more than minimum wages in an effort to attract and 
retain motivated employees. However, there is also reason to believe that some 
employers, especially in export sectors, treat the minimum wage as a maximum wage 
(Wellings, 1985; Sechaba Consultants, 1995; U.S. Department of State, 2000). This 
situation is made possible by the high levels of unemployment and underemployment, 
which provide a large pool of surplus unskilled labour that bids down wage rates and 
threatens job security for workers who make demands for better wages and conditions of 
work (U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
In theory, the Labour Code spells out basic worker rights, including a maximum 45-hour 
workweek, a weekly rest period of at least 24 hours, 12 days of paid leave per year, and 
paid public holidays (LNDC, 2000). However, in practice, and a point that cannot be 
emphasized enough, employers do not always respect these rights. As mentioned before, 
there are reports of employers locking in workers until an order is finished without 
overtime pay and of employers refusing sick leave (U.S. Department of State, 2000). 
Workers generally are unable to obtain an expeditious hearing in court on their 
complaints. The labour court has a large backlog of industrial dispute cases on the 
docket; there is only one labour judge to deal with cases filed as early as 1995 (U.S. 
Department of State, 2000). 
In theory, the Labour Code requires employers to provide adequate light, ventilation, and 
sanitary facilities for employees and to install and maintain machinery in a manner 
designed to minimize the risk of injury (LNDC, 2000). However, in practice, employers 
generally follow these regulations only within the wage economy in urban areas, and the 
Ministry of Labour and Employment enforces the regulations haphazardly (U.S. 
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Department of State, 2000). The Labour Code does not explicitly protect the right of 
workers to remove themselves from hazardous situations without prejudice to 
employment. However, the Labour Code's sections on safety in the workplace and 
dismissal imply that dismissal in such circumstances would be illegal (U.S. Department 
of State, 2000). Thus, generally, workers in the modern sector have little protection. This 
is not surprising, given the fact that the main type of manufucturing is "footloose" EPZ 
production and service-{)riented, non-tradable, foreign-funded production. Nevertheless, 
although wages in the EPZ are one of the lowest in the country (table 2.5), they are not 
that much worse-{)ff than wages in other sectors of the urban labour market. This is 
because the overall modern sector labour profile is segmented, with a large proportion of 
workers existing outside the formal protected labour force. 14 The employment analysis 
below elaborates on this point. 
The employment explanation in Lesotho specifies that on average, in the 1980s, women 
and male workers fuced different employment opportunities. In general, male workers 
faced better chances of finding employment compared to female workers. Male workers 
couId be employed within Lesotho or in the mining sector of South Afiica. On the other 
hand, female workers only had the option of finding employment within Lesotho. 
However, given the general small size of formal employment in the country, many 
women were not active in the labour force. The story for 1997 suggests that there are 
"new" job opportunities related to the EPZ production in Lesotho and the services sector 
in South Africa that require the greater use of female labour (refer to chapter 5 as well). 
However, generally male workers still face a better labour market in southern Afiica 
compared to female workers. 
14 The urban labour market is divided into the protected wage earners (professionals) in the modem sector 
and unprotected wage earners outside the modern sector. Currently. the modern sector contains a minority 
of wage earners (4.1 percent of total labour force) in the public formal sector (especially in the service 
sector), and a tiny private formal sector entrepreneurship (involved in LNDC industries, the LHWP, and in 
telecommunications) (Ministry of Labour and Employment, I 997b). 
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Table 2.4 
Number ofnersons in activity bv !!ender 1997 
• 
Type of activity Male Female Total 
Any emp (SA and L) 357200 207900 565100 
of which 
Emp in SA mining 72700 800 73500 
Emp in SA (other) 23300 16400 39700 
Emp in Lesotho 261200 190700 451900 
of which 
Ag and assoc. 124800 73800 198600 
Emp outside ag 136400 116900 253300 
Grand total pop 711100 765900 1478000 
Grand total pop less 
HSSR' 500900 430100 931000 
Unemployed, etc 143700 222200 365900 
U/(G-HSSRr 28.69% 51.66% 39.30% 
Note: HSSR denotes populatIon at home, In school, sIck and retired (I.e., roughly, economICally 
inactive). U/(G-HSSR) denotes the unemployed population divided by the 
difference from the grand total population and the economically inactive 
population (i.e., roughly, economically active population). 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c: 41 
Table 2.4 above indicates that the population not home, in school, sick, or retired (Grand 
pop. less HSSR) in Lesotho in 1997 was 62 percent of total population. However, only 48 
percent were employed in Lesotho, while 39 percent were officially recorded as 
unemployed. This leaves a further I 2 percent of the population that was neither counted as 
officially employed or unemployed, or at home, in school, sick and retired. This makes 
the story of employment and unemployment in Lesotho not very clear, in the sense that 
there is a significant percentage of the population that should be economically active that 
is not either employed or unemployed or at home, sick, in school or retired . According to 
tables 2.4 above, the most significant type of employment in Lesotho is still mine 
employment in South Ailica, although this sector is also beginning to shed significant 
numbers ofBasotho workers. Table 2.4 above also reports that females seem to dominate 
the current pool of unemployed labour force in Lesotho. This is not surprising given the 
fact that modern sector employment (table 2.5 below), which is dominated by young 
female labour force, is still a relatively new development in the country. 
Employment opportunities in the modern sector in the 1990s indicate that the main 
employment opportunity is the textile and clothing industry. According to table 2.5 
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below, the textile and clothing industry employed approximately 5353 workers by 1999. 
Most of these were reported as young, single, semi-educated women workers (Lesotho 
Government, 1999; u.s. Department of State, 2000). 
Table 2.5 indicates that food and beverage, clothing and textile, and construction are the 
top employment sectors in the modem sector. These sectors also tend to employ mostly 
female workers. The wage level in textile and clothing, the largest formal private sector 
employer, in contrast, reports the lowest wage earnings for its employees. This suggests 
that in general female employees in the modem sector production in Lesotho tend to 
receive low incomes. 
Although food and beverages is one of the main private sector employers in Lesotho, its 
production performance (under primary sector production) since the late 1980s has been 
largely stagnant (refer to section 2.5.1 above). On the other hand, although the secondary 
sector seems to have mushroomed rapidly between 1986 and 1998, the employment 
generation in this sector continues to lag behind the increase in domestic labour force 
participation. This implies that new entrants to the labour force are unable to find 
positions in the modem sector. Consequently, the rate of unemployment in Lesotho has 
also increased significantly with the increase in secondary sector production (refer to 
Chapter 5). Population pressures and lack of industrial diversification contribute to this 
phenomenon. Rural areas and the external sector are shedding workers due to the poor 
primary sector productivity, and the modem sector (located in the urban areas) is unable 
to absorb the rapidly growing pool of new entrants into the labour force, and retrenched 
workers. The result of this is a push migration and the rise in hidden and open 
unemployment in Lesotho (refer to Chapter 5). 
According to Tsietsi (1996b: 86), the rate of urban growth in Lesotho has increased from 
1.8 percent growth rate between 1976 and 1986 to 6.6 percent growth rate between 1986 
and 1996. The high rate of urban growth and the inability of the modem sector to 
generate jobs have two implications for the urban labour market. Firstly, the high urban 
growth rate and the stagnant job availability in the modem sector indicate that there is no 
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Table 2.5 
Companies supported by LNDC. 2000 
PRODUcr COMPANY MARKET EMPLOYMENT NO. OF EMPffOT AV. FEMALE 
ORIGIN ESTABLISHMENTS WAGE EMP 
SHARE 
Clothing Total Total 16220 22 77% 90% 5741 
Clotbing Taiwan Exclusively 13443 13 64% 
USA 
Clothing 6 SACU + 2 SE SADC 2577 8 12% 
Asia 
Footwear RSA Exclusively 2970 2 14% N/A N/A 
Lesotho except 
LesotholRSA 
Food and agrt>- Various 1064 6 5% 19435 24% 
industry 
Other 735 10 4% 
Total 20989 40 100% 885 80% 
Note: a) the last two columns are fro 1998. 
b) it is not clear from either source whether the data represents the whole population of Lesotho secondary industries. The total 
figure in the table (20989) is low, given that the Ministry of Labour and Employment (1998c: 41) reports over 253 300 people 
working outside agriculture in Lesotho. However, both sources indicate that the sector is female dominated. 
Source: Own calculations from LNDC (2000), except last two columns (own calculations 
from Bureau of Statistics, 1999). 
55L~ 
contingent increase in formal sector employment. Secondly, the high rate of urban growth 
and the lack of jobs in the modem sector imply that there is a third sector operating in the 
urban areas, which absorbs the urban growth. 
In addition, the pool of urban unemployment and underemployment include a significant 
section of the semi-educated young persons (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 
1998a, 1998b). The implication here is that Lesotho is currently suffering from the 
problem of youth unemployment. 
Given the fuct that the traditional and external sectors are currently shedding labour, and 
the inability of the modem sector to absorb this labour, most of the labour force in 
Lesotho is situated in a third sector, which is characterised by low wages and informal 
trading. The urban Third World (or informal sector) is largely dominated by educated 
youth (Minist!)' of Labour and Employment, I 998c). Moreover, employment 
opportunities for the young, uneducated population are severely restricted. Wealthier 
families have more children in school, and children who attend school longer than poorer 
families. They are thus more likely to reproduce the next generation of the modem sector 
employed labour force. Such a trend implies a vicious cycle in employment prospects of 
the youth in which poverty breeds the inability to attend school which guarantees poverty 
in-breeding in the next generation by making it difficult for disadvantaged people to find 
employment. Young people are currently classified as the "victims of migration" 
(Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c: vi). This is because essentially, it has been 
the elders who have found jobs and done well in the modem sector in Lesotho. A large 
proportion of the youth are neither employed nor educated. The rate of formal 
employment among the youth is much lower than that of adults of over 25 years of age. 
Urban areas tend to record high underemployment and low unemployment (Sechaba 
Consultants, 1994; Bureau of Statistics, 1996b; Foulo, 1996). This suggests that the 
current rural-urban migration in Lesotho is highly related to the urban Third World sector 
development. 
56 
Economic activities in the urban Third World sector usually involve production (and 
trade) for consumption purposes rather than for export (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; 
Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c). This sector is thus characterised by 
survivalist economic activities, and does not largely differ from the traditional sector. 
This also suggests that the urban modem sector in Lesotho is currently developing into 
the source of external migration. 
The development and expansion of the urban Third World sector is not unique to 
Lesotho. The urban Third World sector15 will be analysed in greater lengths in chapter 5. 
Suffice it to point out here that the large expansion of the urban Third World sector in the 
last twenty years in Lesotho and the southern Afucan region is turning the development 
process in the region into an informal urban areas development, associated with the 
formation of urban slums. 16 This is because the Third World sector tends to be highly 
porous and easily diffuses across national borders, especially in a circulatory manner. The 
economic implication here is that the urban sectors in southern Afuca are increasingly 
developing into urban slums associated with possible circular external migration. 
is There is generally no one definition of the urban Third World or informal sector in the development 
literature. Many studies categorise it as the urban in which productivity and wages are low, there are no 
value-added practises, and there are few or no barriers to entry due to a lack of education (Berry and Sabot, 
1978; Cole and Sanders, 1985; Gindling, 1991; Cohen and House, 1996; Todaro, 1997). In this thesis, the 
informal sector is defined as the urban sector with low productivity and medium human capital, no value-
adding practises, in which a pool of the labour force that is neither officially employed or unemployed or 
economically inactive is situated. Economically active population is here defined as the population that is 
10 years and over that is either employed or unemployed. By economically inactive population we are 
referring here to the population 10 yrs and over that is neither either in school, at home, retired! disabled or 
other. The specific categories given by official national records in Lesotho, for the economically inactive 
population are student, homemaker/ housewife, retired/disabled, and other (e.g., Bureau of Statistics, 1982, 
1990, 1996a, I 996b; Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998b, 1998c). 
16 The rapidly expanding Third World sector in Lesotho suggests that the current urban economy in 
Lesotho is becoming informalised, particularly in monetary terms. This point also implies that wages are 
declining in the urban sector. For a detailed reading on the informalisation of urban economies in 
developing countries, refer to Jamal (I 995). 
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2. 6. Conclusion 
In 2000 the Central Bank of Lesotho declared the situation in Lesotho a "national 
disaster," following the massive retrenchments ofBasotho migrant mineworkers of which 
in 2000 alone was a further ]5 percent of the total foreign employed Basotho miners 
(Monyau, 2000: ] 0). Although the country currently boasts a positive balance of 
payments, most of the growth has not been accompanied by job creation. Sectoral 
industrialization in Lesotho, particularly modem sector development, remains largely 
stimulated by external financing. 
The amount of cereal grown per capita has steadily been declining in the past 20 years. 
Although the manufucturing sector is currently showing increases since ]988 in terms of 
value-added production, the employment levels within this sector remain stagnant and 
low. Additionally, commercial agriculture, largely practised in rural areas where the bulk 
of the population is located, experienced very little growth (in terms of value-added 
production and employment) during the same period. The spread of wealth in the country 
is thus highly unequal. Rural areas have not grown wealthy to the extent of the urban 
areas. The result has been a growing gap between the "rich" and poor in the country. 
The wealthy are disproportionately found in the urban areas, but in all areas both rural 
and urban, there is extreme diversity among the population. Nevertheless, even in the 
urban areas, there are signs of the formation of slums. All populations, whether rural or 
urban, require modem facilities including clean tap water, modem fuel, in-door toilets, 
spacious houses, and a good education. At the same time, there is a rapid rate of 
urbanization, particularly of the youth, that is stimulating a rapid demand for consumer 
goods, requiring almost every fumily to find a source of income. The poor may own 
fields and livestock, and thus live up to the old Basotho traditions, but they have little 
else. At the same time, Basotho migrant mineworkers have recently been granted the 
option to apply for permanent residence status in South Africa, thus increasing the porous 
nature of the rapidly forming urban slums. It is under these precarious circumstances that 
the Lesotho economy is liberalizing. 
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It is behind this background that the impact of international labour migration on the 
Lesotho's development is approached in subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 analyses the 
changing nature of international labour migration in southern Africa, using a cumulative 
approach to the dual labour market theory. The purpose here is to demonstrate how the 
theory illuminates the changes in labour migration in southern Africa, and how these 
changes are related to the challenge of job creation in Lesotho. Chapter 4 uses a 
comparative country case-study analysis to compare and contrast the Lesotho (and 
southern African) labour market development experience to other developing countries. 
This chapter also tests the a prior assumptions of the dual labour market theory against 
the labour market development experiences of the country case studies. Chapter 5 offers 
the empirical analysis of the thesis, particularly elaborating on the formation of urban 
slums in Lesotho and southern Africa. Chapter 6 examines the recent changes framing the 
institutional structure surrounding international mine labour migration between Lesotho 
and South Africa. Chapter 7 gives the summary, conclusions, and policy implications. 
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Table 2.6 
s .summar v oroJ r !!ovemment [ file of . L oliev imnact on business £.. .... T" .. V un ........ .aLl .LJ .... ~ .... ,U..lV ~ d 978-1998 
CLIENT GROUP POLICY IMPACT SECTOR IMPACT AND SECTOR AFFECTED 
AGENCY AND EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS 
SERVICES 
Foreign investors in LNDC Rapid increase in jobs since EXPORT INDUSTRY" 
capital city Loans, industrial sites, 1987 More than 100 
tax holidays, research employees 
on import substitution 
products, equity 
participation, 
facilitating government 
compliance procedures 
Investors willing to BEDCO' Less than 25 jobs created BASIC INDUSTRY' 
locate in capital city Loans, site rentals, each year since 1978 1 - 3 employees 
marketing, training, 
sourcing of materials 
Retail, Wholesale METRO CASH AND No increase in jobs since Retail trade 
CARRY 1978 
Government ILO, IDA, UNDP, WB, About 800 to 1000 trained Government 
EU each year 
Government personnel 
training 
Informal sector' 
Note: 1. Basic industry is defined as local production and consumption at levels below wholesale, either for export or local 
consumption (USAID, 1986). 
2. More than 10 employees is considered a large business in Lesotho. 
3. The informal sector consists of street vendors mainly selling food items, shoe repair business, car wash, prostitution, baby-
sitting, etc. 
4. BED CO supported industries consist oflocal small enterprises (SMBs). 
Source: USAID, 1986; Sonntagbauer, 1997; and personal interviews with government officials. 
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OVERALL SECTOR 
GROWTH SINCE 1978 
Little (1978 - 1986) 
Rapid 1987 - 1997) 
Little 
Little 
Rapid (1978 - 1987) 
Shrinking (1990 -
present) 
Unknown but visible 
CHAPTER 3 
DUAL LABOUR MARKET THEORY: A CUMULATIVE APPROACH TO THE 
CONCEPTUALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION 
3. 1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the dual labour market theory of international labour migration 
under two broad categories of functional and structural approaches. The difference 
between the two approaches is their techniques and their policy concerns. Whereas the 
functional approach is interested in the micro-level analysis of external and internal 
migration as it affects the welfure of the economy, the structuralist approach adapts a 
macro-level stance with development as its ultimate concern. Within these two theoretical 
approaches, there are several sub-theories, each of which reinforces the techniques and 
policies of the broader two approaches. It has thus become clear that any migration 
experience is better understood with a cumulative model that combines the two main 
approaches in international labour migration theory, under the umbrella of the dual labour 
market theory. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one is this introduction. Section two 
contains the orthodox economics and functional approach to international labour 
migration analysis. Section three analyses the heterodox economics and the structuralist 
approach to international labour migration, and section four closes the overall chapter 
analysis with the final concluding remarks of the discussion. 
3. 2. Orthodox economics and the functionalist approach to international labour 
migration 
Functional models of labour movement are based on the modernization theory and 
classical and neoclassical development economics. This approach falls under the larger 
group of orthodox economics. The functionalist approach to studying international labour 
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migration is divided into two categories, the classical functionalist approach, based on the 
Lewisian model of labour migration, and the neoclassical approach, based on the Todaro 
model. In addition, the new economics approach has recently been actively generating 
distinct analysis of migration at the household level with the aim of reconciling the 
classical and neoclassical difference within the functionalist approach. The new 
economics theory thus begins to integrate the functional theories to the structural 
ideology. The basic feature of these models is that people "rationally" migrate In 
response to a positive wage (or utility) advantage. 
3. 2. 1. The Lewisian model 
Classical models of the functional approach, such as, Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis, 
(1964), based on classical orthodox economics of wage equalisation and resource utility 
maximization, conceive of migration as the means by which surplus labour in a large 
agricultural economy is transferred to the urban industrial sector. The transfer provides 
for economic growth and a psychosocial reorientation of the migrant in the process. The 
model is strongly associated with the dual sector paradigm, in which surplus labour 
(labour which does not make a positive contribution to production, including domestic 
labour) is transferred from the "subsistence" or "traditional" agricultural sector of the 
economy to the "capitalist" or "modem" industrial sector, fuelling growth and structural 
transformation (Lewis, 1954). 
Although the explanations may be based on either general socioeconomic characteristics 
of the source and destination societies or individual perception and decision-making, this 
is a micro-social approach in the sense that it assumes that social process is merely the 
aggregate of individual actions (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). The model makes the 
assumptions of methodological individualism. The model assumes that individuals make 
rational decisions to maximize their utility on the basis of available knowledge of 
objective conditions. In the case of migration, this means that they migrate in response to 
wage differences that result from uneven distribution of returns to the fuctors of 
production. Labour moves from areas of capital scarcity and labour abundance to areas of 
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capital abundance and labour scarcity, or from rural to urban areas (Lewis, 1954). The 
theory predicts that competition among migrants will eventually depress wages in the 
capital-rich region, while remittances, together with the return of skilled migrants to the 
source region, will stimulate economic growth, eventually eliminating spatial inequality 
and the wage differential that drives migration (Tannen, 1991). 
At first glance, it would appear that international migration in the early to mid-20 th 
century in southern Africa could be explained using the Lewis model. The gold mining 
industry in South Africa drew from a regional labour reserve (of basically subsistence 
economy) in the labour sending countries (including Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and 
Mozambique) to which labour was drawn and transferred to the more urban centres in 
South Africa' s mining centres (Head, 2000). 
However, further analysis reveals that the process was less benign. The continuous 
removal of male labour from agricultural production in the labour reserves countries did 
not lead to wage equalization nor development of the reserve economies as predicted by 
the Lewisian economy. Firstly, the absence of male labour resulted in the stagnation of 
agricultural production in these economies (Mochebelele and Winter-Nelson, 2000). As a 
result, rural development was delayed and wage equalization between the rural and urban 
areas in the southern African labour market did not materialize. Secondly, international 
migration in southern Africa was "managed," in the sense that the South African mining 
industry exercised monopolistic control over the regional labour market, and that 
permanent rural-urban migration was severely restricted. Thus, it turns out that the Lewis 
model does not fit the southern African labour migration story. The assumptions of 
surplus labour and wage equalization in the model appear to misrepresent the situation in 
southern Africa. The Lewis model does not fit because migration in southern Africa was 
not benign (as discussed later). But, the story of "labour surplus" in the Lewisian sense 
(with a modern and traditional dichotomy) is appropriate in explaining classical 
international labour migration in southern Africa. 
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Nonetheless, the fact that labour migration has not produced wage equalization nor 
promoted rural development in the southern African region implies that the Lewis model 
cannot fully explain the reality oflabour distribution (or oscillatory labour migration) in 
southern Africa. Moreover, the recent rise in both internal and external migration and 
unemployment in the region suggests that perhaps the southern African region is more of 
a Todaran economy than a Lewisian one. 
3. 2. 2. The Todaro model 
Rural-urban and international migrations have increased in many contexts in southern 
Africa, despite high levels of unemployment and underemployment in the urban-
industrial sector. Nor has economic development of source areas occurred as predicted by 
the Lewisian model in these countries. Todaro (1969, 1976, 1997) and Harris and Todaro 
(1970) propose that individuals respond rationally to perceived differentials in wages 
(income) and the expected probability of securing employment, rather than actual 
opportunities. Hence, they migrate despite the fact that destination opportunities for wage 
labour are limited (Todaro, 1997). The model characterizes migration as an individual 
decision in which a person compares herlhis expected income in two sectors or 
geographic areas over a given time horizon. Expectations are based primarily on the 
probability of finding employment in each sector, although other factors such as crop risk 
(in the case of agriculture) and the existence of social networks (in the case of urban 
employment) may also be influential to the migrant's decision. The key result of the 
model is that, if urban-rural income differentials are high enough, people will migrate 
even if their chances of actually gaining urban, formal sector employment in the short run 
are quite low (Todaro, 1969). The principal policy implication is thus that, without 
raising rural incomes, urban job creation will only attract more migrants, further 
contributing to urban unemployment, and because the marginal product of labour is 
greater than zero, rural underdevelopment. Thus, individually rational decisions may lead 
to socially sub-optimal outcomes (Todaro, 1997). 
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This behavioural modification or normative theory makes sense. Empirical tests of the 
Todaro model have generally supported the hypotheses of income disparity-induced 
migration and the importance of human capital (especially formal education) in 
determining migrant selectivity (e.g., Berry and Sabot, 1978; Shields and Shields, 1990; 
Trainski and Randolp, 1991). More highly educated young people are more likely to 
migrate because education increases their probability of obtaining relatively well-paid, 
formal sector urban employment. The results regarding the deterrent effect of formal 
sector unemployment have been considerably more mixed, leading some economists to 
posit an alternative model which incorporates the urban informal sector as an easy-entry 
employment haven, especially for less educated migrants and those facing formal sector 
labour market discrimination, such as women (Cole and Sanders, 1985). An important 
result of this latter development is that compared to the original Todaro model, migration 
is no longer viewed as a social "bad" for contributing to urban unemployment and 
poverty, especially insofar as linkages between the formal and informal sectors allow for 
complementary employment and income growth. 
But, as Goss and Lindquist (1995: 320) point out, the assumption of non-equilibrium 
tendencies in migration and the incorporation of imperfect information and supra-
individual decision-makers, make the model lose its "theoretical distinctiveness and fails 
adequately to take explanatory value." The model also reduces migrants, a social class, to 
mere embodiment oflabour power (Saith, 1998), and fails to take adequately into account 
the political and other structural barriers to mobility (Bartram, 1998). 
In terms of policy concerns, Goss and Lindquist (1995) note that it is ironic that while 
developing countries have generally sought to redirect rural-urban migration due to its 
manifesting "disequilibrating tendencies" and inefficiencies, the "functional" approach 
has become a policy-making orthodoxy for international labour migration. For example, 
as in the case of Lesotho, the Philippines has actively encouraged its citizens to seek 
income opportunities overseas under the belief that while the host country is provided 
with a supply of cheap labour, the source country benefits from foreign exchange 
eamings in the form of remitted wages (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Saith, 1998; Liu and 
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Chiu, 1999). International labour migration also provides a temporary relief from 
domestic unemployment and a political safety valve, particularly as it is generally the 
most ambitious and politically vocal individuals who migrate (Straubhaar, 1988; 
Enchautegui, 1993). In the longer term, as with the Lewis model, it is anticipated that 
increased rates of domestic savings and application of new skills by returning workers 
will translate into productive investment and the creation of new employment 
opportunities, with a reduction in migration (Macmillan, 1982; Straubhaar, 1988; 
Enchautegui, 1993). However, as the cases of Lesotho, Egypt and Sudan, among others, 
will demonstrate, the skills acquired abroad by migrant workers do not get applied in the 
domestic economy upon their return. This is because there tends to be a mismatch in 
skills of migrants and those required in the domestic economy. Thus, the long-term 
welfare-related benefits of a "functional" migration policy to a labour sending country 
(and even to rural locations) become reduced to short-term profits only. More 
importantly, these countries will also demonstrate that international labour migration is 
not likely to decrease or end in the long run (as assumed by the Lewis model) due to 
pressures building in the source locations, and more importantly, due to an evolving 
international division oflabour. 
From a gender viewpoint, the Lewisian and Todaro models, and their more recent 
adaptations (e.g., Grabowsky and Shields, 1989) are intended to be "gender neutral" in 
the sense that the laws governing migration are assumed to be the same for men and 
women. The possibility that the determinants of migration differ systematically for men 
and women remains unexplored; the individual model thus mils to explain the gender 
selectivity of migration except with reference to individual income and employment 
differences. Katz (2000) notes that: "Todaro himself has characterized mainstream 
migration theory as "sex-specific ... to male migration" and therefore "special ... rather 
than general." 
Katz (2000) further explains that in response to this "sex specificity," Thadani and 
Todaro suggested that a distinguishing feature offemale compared to male migration was 
the importance of marriage as a reason for migration. According to Katz (2000), their 
model represents female migration as a function of three sources of income differential: 
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the usual expected rural/urban gap; the "mobility marriage" differential (defined as an 
unattached female migrant's chances of achieving a certain expected income through 
marriage to a male in the modem sector); and the "customary marriage" differential 
reflecting the relative probability that an unattached female can find any spouse in urban 
as distinct from rural areas. 
As said by Katz (2000): "Behrman and Wolfe (1984) tested this model for a large sample 
of Nicaraguan households, and found that while the probability of finding a companion 
motivated a significant amount offemale urban-rural (and large to small city) migration, 
women moving from the countryside to the city did so largely for own-labour market 
reasons. Findley and Diallo (1993) likewise found that rural Malian women's migration 
responded to source region economic variables such as average village income and the 
existence of female income-generating opportunities such as sheep and goat raising, 
although this migration was most often "disguised" as being family-related." Thus, 
Katz's criticism demonstrates that although the Todaro model does introduce the 
probability of "risk" associated with migration, it relates such risks to exogenous factors 
beyond the individualistic, rational and voluntary setting of neoclassical economics. 
The new economics approach expands the decision-making focus of microeconomic 
classical and neoclassical functional approaches to incorporate larger social units, 
typically households and communities that are not motivated by income maximization 
but by risk minimization. Decision-makers allocate labour in various activities and 
locations in order to diversifY income sources and spread risk associated with investment 
in agricultural production, petty enterprise, and even formal employment in the 
developing world context (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Papapanagos and Vickerman, 
2000). But, like the classical and neoclassical models they attempt to reconcile, this 
model also makes specific assumptions about the pool of migration and does not 
distinguish between gender differences in migration. 
The key to the integrative approach is the identification and the specification of an 
intermediate object of analysis. The orthodox school of thought proposes the household 
unit as the main object of analysis. The household is proposed because it is an empirical 
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object lying somewhere between the individual and society. It is presented as a means to 
account for the aggregation of the actions of individual decision-makers (Goss and 
Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997; Bartram, 1998). It is argued that the household provides 
a means of bridging the gap between social and individual levels of analysis (Low, 1986). 
The household also provides a cornmon unit of analysis for the functionalist approach. 
The household is conceived here as it is in conventional economics and sociology of 
developing countries - as a primary productive and reproductive unit, defined by a single 
function and acting strategically in pursuit of its collective interest (Low, 1986). This 
approach presumes that the household rationally allocates capital and labour resources to 
provide for the productive and reproductive needs of its members. Under this conception, 
migration of individual members or the entire household unit represent a strategy at the 
household level to achieve a fit between resources such as land or capital, the 
consumption needs of its members, and the alternatives for generating monetary and non-
monetary income (Low, 1986; Shields and Shields, 1990). Migration thus results from 
very precise calculations of utility and collective decision-making in order to adjust to 
changes in the external environment and/ or the internal configuration of the household 
unit, to diversifY income and minimize risk, and to enhance capital accumulation (Shields 
and Shields, 1990). 
Poor households are assumed to be unable to strategize in the literature, and they are also 
assumed to be the least able to apply sanctions to family members in order to ensure their 
cooperation (Low, 1986; Shields and Shields, 1990). However, and for the moment, 
besides the gender shortcomings within the household concept, the general and more 
serious problem here is the effective substitution of the rational, calculating individual 
with a rational, calculating household. As in the general application of orthodox 
economics, the conception of the household as an individual by another name, mystifies 
the social processes by which interests are defined and decisions made within the 
household, and thus repeats the errors of voluntarism in neoclassical approaches (Goss 
and Lindquist, 1995). 
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Nevertheless, the household unit of analysis does offer some useful insight into the 
decision-making and motives for migration at the family level. The two main alternative 
strands of migration theory that address some of the limitations of the individual model 
by considering two variants ofhousehold migration are the new home economics and the 
household theories. These remain within the broad orthodox camp. The first focuses on 
an entire household's relocation from one area to another, and the second examines the 
effects of select household members changing their place of residence while remaining 
effective economic members of the family by virtue of continued resource pooling. 
3. 2. 3. The new home economics theory 
According to Katz (2000), Mincer (1978) argued that, "net family gain rather than net 
personal gain ... motivates migration of households" (Mincer, 1978: 750, cited in Katz, 
2000). Katz (2000) explains that this family migration model is an application of the New 
Home Economics, which assumes that the preferences of household members can be 
aggregated together into a common utility function and that income is fully shared within 
the household unit. As a result, some household members may be "tied movers" or "tied 
stayers" in the sense that their own private decision (action) would dictate an opposite 
migration decision. 
The Mincer model suggests that women are more likely than men to be tied movers, since 
they exhibit more discontinuous labour market participation and the returns to migration 
are smaller for individuals with weak labour market attachment (Katz, 2000). According 
to Katz (2000), migration within the Mincer framework is thus both facilitated by and 
reinforces gender-based comparative advantage in market and household activities: 
wives ' initial relative specialization in domestic production frees up their husbands to 
move the family in response to his own labour market opportunities, and, since tied 
movers are more likely to suffer earned income losses when they migrate, women's 
comparative advantage in domestic labour is further enhanced after relocation. Katz 
(2000) explains that in this regard, Mincer (1978: 771) claims that, "tied migration ranks 
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next to child rearing as an important dampening influence ill the life-cycle wage 
evolution of women." 
The assumption of gender-specific migration in the Mincer model suggests that the type 
of migration being discussed here is short-distance migration related with marriage and 
household lifetime migration versus long-distance temporary migration related to 
individual migration. As pointed out in chapter 2 and as shall be empirically tested in 
chapter 5, in Lesotho, household migration is largely associated with women migration. 
This is because in the patrilineal society, women are required to relocate to their 
husbands' family upon marriage, while, on the other hand, men tend to participate more 
on individual long-distance and cross-border migration, particularly to the mines in South 
Africa. This suggests that women's ability to migrate is limited by filmily responsibility, 
which in tum also limits their career life cycle (Kao et al, 1994). Nevertheless, the 
correlation between household migration and the short life span of career women is not 
unique to the Lesotho example. 
Empirical evidence from the U.S. for the 1960s and 1970s suggests that migration is 
indeed associated with a decrease in women 's earnings, and that the gains from migration 
are larger for married than for single men (Greenwood, 1975). Econometric tests using 
developing country data have also been broadly supportive of the family migration 
hypothesis: in Brazil, Tannen (1991) found that, correcting for migrant selectivity, male 
but not female wage differentials were significant in explaining married women's 
migration; and in Costa Rica, Shields and Shields (1990) argue that the negative effect of 
mothers' education on family migration probabilities reflects the transfer costs of non-
market household production. A recent study ofintemational immigrants to Canada finds 
evidence that wives in immigrant fiunilies take on 'dead-end' jobs to finance their 
husbands ' investments in human capital until the migrant men can obtain higher-paying, 
more stable employment (Baker and Benjamin, 1997). 
According to Katz (2000), Mincer, however, does warn against misinterpreting the 
adverse effects of migration on the labour market experience of some married women as 
a form of social oppression: "Such a view .. . fails to note that [migration] behaviour ... is 
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a product of furnily welfure maximization. This is Pareto-optimal, since private market 
losses can be internalised by the family, that is, compensated by a redistribution of gains" 
(Mincer, 1978: 757, cited in Katz, 2000). Thus, as said by Katz (2000): "In other words, 
migration, which offers differential net individual benefits, can be considered incentive 
compatible for all household members if one accepts the basic premises of the New 
Home Economics. In particular, the model hinges on the assumption that certain family 
members' sacrificing of their own income earning potential is compensated for by 
sharing rules (altruism), which allow them to benefit from overall higher household 
earnings." 
The sustained feminist critique of the household demonstrates that the concept of 
household strategy misrepresents intra-household behaviour, obscures intra-household 
stratification by gender and generation, and stifles the voice of the unempowered, usually 
females and the young (Stitcher and Parpart, 1990; Ward, 1990). Most serious is the 
tendency to the perceived utility gains to the household and various interests of its 
members with those of the male household head. This ignores the fact that as a primary 
productive unit and resource-allocating mechanism, the household is also a primary point 
for the exploitation oflabour transfer of value (Anker and Hein, 1986). Given the reality 
of patriarchal structuring of the family, household-based theories assume that collective 
interests are represented by the male household head whose authority is recognized by 
each member as an exercise of altruism or benevolent dictatorship (Anker and Hein, 
1986; Goss and Lindquist, 1995). This notion is unlikely to be applied uncritically to 
Western societies (for example, Yeandle, 1999). It is nevertheless consistent with the 
ideological tendency in social science to romanticize peasant and community in 
developing countries (Squire, 1979). Somehow members of less developed countries 
households, not bound by the individualism of Western societies, resolve to cooperate 
willingly and completely, each according to their capacity, to collectively lift the burden 
of their poverty (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). 
Ethnographic research on the migration of women (Ward, 1990) and fieldwork on 
migration decision-making (Goss and Lindquist, 1995) suggest that household members 
often pursue their own individual interests, sometimes compromising collective interests 
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and sometimes overtly struggling against power normatively invested in the male 
household head. Others, (Mohtadi, 1986; Tenjo, 1990) have noted that the prospect of 
adventure are particularly important to younger migrants, both male and female, and that 
individual perceptions of relative deprivation rather than household consumption may 
motivate migration (Saith, 1998). 
A model developed by Katz, Morrison and Bilsborrow (1998) draws on household 
bargaining theory to treat the migration decision as a negotiated outcome, with spouses' 
relative bargaining power and resulting in share ofthe net benefits from migration acting 
as a function of their fullback positions or threat points. In this model, household are 
faced with several alternatives to improve their welfare, migration being one of them. An 
empirical test of this alternative model using data on migrant married couples in Quito, 
Ecuador suggests that women with higher levels of education play more active roles in 
the migration decision, while households in which men participate more fully in 
household production demonstrate less male bias in the migration decision-making 
process (Katz et al, 1998 cited in Katz, 2000). Clearly the concept of single unit 
household does not adequately explain such motivations. 
3. 2. 4. The household theory 
Goss and Lindquist suggest that it may be better to conceive of the household as a social 
collective whose configuration and internal division of labour results from measured 
decisions of individuals and negotiations between cooperating and competing interests 
(1995 :328). Oded Stark (1991) suggests that migration can be interpreted as a household 
strategy to diversifY labour market risk and substitute for incomplete capital markets in 
rural areas (Stark, 1991 cited in Katz, 2000). His argument is that young migrants serve 
as financial intermediaries for their families who participate in credit-constrained, risky 
agricultural undertakings: "children's primary role as migrants is not to generate an 
income stream per se, but to act as catalysts for the generation of such a stream by 
precipitating an income-increasing technological change on the family farm" (Stark, 
1991 :12 cited in Katz, 2000). 
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In contrast to the Mincer model above, this household theory recognizes that the decision 
to migrate is often a joint one, part of a "chronological contractual arrangement between 
the migrant and hislher family" (Katz, 2000). In this cooperative game framework, both 
the migrant and non-migrant parties must "do better" (in utility or expected income 
tenns) by placing someone in the urban labour market and making remittance transfers, 
in comparison to the relevant alternatives (Katz, 2000). Only if the gains to cooperation 
are positive for each party will the arrangement be incentive compatible - particularly if 
the "contract" is to be self-enforcing (Katz, 2000). The tenns of the migration contract 
reflect the relative bargaining powers of the parties. Factors which enhance the non-
migrants' relative position in the absence of remittances, such as large landholdings, 
policy-induced easing of capital market restrictions, or a high underemployment urban 
labour market, are predicted to have the counter-intuitive effect of increasing migrant 
remittances, while variables which either weaken the source economy or strengthen the 
migrant's position may have the opposite impact (Stark et ai, 1986; Stark, 1991 cited in 
Katz, 2000). In this model, therefore, women are motivated by "efficient" bargaining as 
opposed to being "pushed" into a consensus against their will. 
Empirical assessments of the household framework have generated interesting results. 
Data from Botswana, for example, indicate that remittances are larger to families with 
higher per capita incomes and assets, countering the idea that such contributions are 
motivated solely by altruism (Lucas and Stark, 1985 cited in Katz, 2000). Another 
African study found that both the probability of male migration and the level of 
remittances from sons in Western Kenya were positively influenced by the prospect of 
land inheritance, especially where there was competition for such inheritance from other 
adult sons (Nelson-Richards, 1988). Chin (1997) makes the case that daughters' 
migration in the Philippines is largely detennined by family characteristics and the need 
for a immediate and steady source of remittances, where the latter leads migrant Filipinas 
into wage labour in large cities, despite better (but slower to develop and less secure) 
self-employment opportunities in small towns. The empirical assessments thus support 
the notion that stronger bargaining power on the part of non-migrants increases the 
migrant stream. This may be very important in our observations showing the weakening 
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of "traditional" remittance stream in southern Africa as the rural economies become 
weaker. 
From a gender analytical perspective, this inter-generational household bargaining theory 
represents a significant advance over prior economic models of migration insofar as it 
recognizes the strategic interplay between individual interests and collective welfare. 
However, according to Katz (2000), the representation of household decision-making and 
resource allocation is problematic on at least two levels. First, the cooperative game 
framework implies a symmetry among the parties that ignores the gender and age 
hierarchies that structure the household economy. In other words, although their fallback 
positions may differ, actors are equal with respect to the rules of the game, meaning that 
both the weights given to their gains to cooperation and the weights given to their exit 
options are equal (Katz, 2000). In this sense, the model is still firmly "orthodox," with a 
voluntary and individualistic methodology. Katz (2000) explains that, in the case of youth 
migration, for instance, the roles of filial obligation and obedience (which may 
themselves be gender specific) in the determination of remittance levels are likely to be 
important, but it is difficult to represent such social psychological parameters in a formal 
model and to measure them empirically. In the Botswana study cited above, Lucas and 
Stark do not explore the theoretical foundations of the significant systematic gender 
differences in the fuctors influencing remittances, in which daughters appear to be 
motivated by repayment for schooling while sons apparently pursue a strategy to 
maintain favour in (patrilineal) inheritance. 
According to Katz (2000), a second shortcoming of the Stark model is that it assumes that 
non-migrant household members form a coalition with respect to the migrant based on 
shared strategic interests. However, it may be the case that individual non-migrants are 
affected quite differently by a given household member's move, depending on the nature 
of their interdependence in the rural division oflabour and the intra-household remittance 
flow (who within the household actually sends and receives monetary exchanges with the 
migrant), both of which typically have strong gender components. While this does not 
necessarily prevent the formation of a union by non-migrants, it does introduce a degree 
of complexity that might at the minimum influence the terms of the migration contract 
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(Katz, 2000). For example, in societies where daughters contribute substantial amounts of 
labour to domestic production (including childcare for younger siblings, freeing up their 
mothers to pursue income-generating work), such as in Malawi, their migration may 
impose substantial costs on their mothers, who are only compensated insofar as 
remittances directly or indirectly benefit them (Mkandawire, 1985; Chirwa, 1997). A 
parallel argument could be made for sons who contribute to their father's agricultural 
work, such as in Lesotho (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Mochebelele and Winter-Nelson, 
2000). 
Generally, critics of the household unit of analysis argue that, "the concept of the 
household as a co-residential kinship unit, and the assumption of an isomorphism 
between units of production, reproduction, investment and primary affective loyalty, is a 
Eurocentric convection applied inappropriately in much of the developing world" (Goss 
and Lindquist, 1995: 328). As the case of Lesotho demonstrates, when men leave for 
contract mine employment in South Africa, women only become the de facto household 
heads with most of the decisions they have to make in relation to the household still being 
dictated by the absent migrant miner (Gordon, 1981). This is because the patrilineal 
culture in Lesotho does not permit or extend ownership of material or ideas to women. 
Ethnographic research shows that the concept of households has to be considerably 
modified to apply to non-Western contexts (Buvinic, 1983; Anker and Hein, 1986; Ward, 
1990; Date-Bah, 1997). It is reported that recent migration studies have recognized that 
non-kin or distant kin who share the daily budget, and non-residents whose primary 
loyalty is to a particular household should be considered to be members of the household 
(Goss and Lindquist, 1995). However, this begs the question of the meaning of 
determination of primary loyalty and makes the definition of decision-making units 
extremely problematic. Goss and Lindquist (1995) point out that the recognition of 
residential multiple locality, ambiguous boundaries, and unstable composition is 
consistent with a conception of the non-Western household as a deviation from the ideal 
typical nuclear family unit. A recent survey of the labour force in Lesotho (Bureau of 
Statistics, 1990) attempted to incorporate the multiple roles of household members into 
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their study of the 1986 labour force. However, the study was unsuccessful because it 
employed two concepts of the labour market activities (usual activities versus current 
activities) that are most fitted for labour market analysis in developed countries. The 
study thus ended up confusing between migrants with usual economic activities and 
migrants and non-migrants with current economic activities. This made the distinction 
between migrant and non-migrant workers also problematic in the study, given the fact 
that most current status migrant workers could have been usual status non-migrant 
workers. The migration status of current migrant workers could thus be a situation of 
labour mobility and not migration. 
Nevertheless, despite the conceptual and practical definitional problems, the household 
remains the most convenient unit for the collection of data and analysis in orthodox 
economics and micro-level analysis of migration, especially in developing countries (for 
example, Collier et al, 1994; Balisacan, 1995). This is quite evident in the example of 
Lesotho. As mentioned earlier, women tend to dominate internal migration in Lesotho 
because of their responsibilities to the family once they marry. On the other hand, men 
tend to dominate individual external migration because of their assigned role as de jure 
household heads and principal "bread-winners" of the family. However, the story of 
internal and external migration in Lesotho, is not simply motivated by voluntary 
decision-making at the household leveL The culture of patrilineal heritage, and the 
history of apartheid in the southern African region have both contributed directly to the 
current observed pattern of migration in Lesotho. The functional approach to 
international labour migration, and the orthodox economics to which it is based, both do 
not have the relevant tools to analyse these historical and societal relationships that shape 
external and internal migration in Lesotho and the southern African region. In general, 
the lack of historical and network analysis in orthodox economics marks the point of 
departure for the structuralist and heterodox economists. 
Although Mincer does realise the power dimensions of migration, by introducing aspects 
of push migration (whereby the household' s interests are normally equated to those of the 
male household head), he presents his model in an apologetic manner and maintains the 
rational utility maximisation assumption inherent in neoclassical economics. Similarly, 
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the bargaining model after Katz et aI, and the household model after Stark, both maintain 
the rational, voluntary assumption of neoclassical economics, and thus do not deal with 
the other aspects of power relations, which may not be so benign, such as dominant and 
subordinate relationships that lead to involuntary decisions and migrations. 
Therefore, migration under the orthodox methodology is a "pull" migration, with 
optimising "individualistic" and voluntary decision-making by rational actors. The 
''refinements'' to the Lewis and Todaro models are useful in explaining, inter alia, who 
migrates, whether the migration is family or individual migration and location 
attachments. For example, in his study of the impact of Turkish guest workers on the 
German labour market, Straubhaar (1988) demonstrated that most labour migration from 
developing countries/ locations, including labour migration to the Middle East, in the 
post-World War IT era, was individual pull migration motivated by the shortage oflabour 
in the Western (and particularly European) and Middle East labour markets. Migrants and 
their source locations (including the household) benefited from the migration process by 
experiencing a general utility and welfare increase. Migration thus provided migrants 
(individual or households) with another alternative to improve their welfare. 
But, since the 1980s, and especially after the developing countries' economic crisis of the 
1980s, labour migration between developing countries has been on the increase, while 
labour migration between developing and developed countries is stagnant 1 or declining. 
This observation suggests a shift in the global pattern of labour migration. Labour 
migration between developing countries is occurring at a time when both the receiving 
and sending location/ countries are experiencing massive unemployment and lack of job 
opportunities. This suggests that the assumption of pull migration is no longer viable in 
explaining contemporary international (and internal) labour migration from less 
developed countries/ locations. This also suggests that the heterodox approach to 
international labour migration may be a complementary tool for explaining the current 
pattern of migration at the global and also at local levels. 
I This is due to strict immigration policies (e.g., Lipshitz, 1991). 
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3. 3. Heterodox economics and the structuralist approach to international labour 
migration 
Since the 1970s, structuralist approach has explained migration in tenns of the 
exploitative political-economic relationship between sending and receiving societies. In 
this approach, it is not so much the demographic or even socioeconomic characteristics of 
the migrant that explain international labour migration. It is rather their social class 
position (BOIjas, 1989; Goss and Lindquist, 1995). In this macro-social approach, the 
observed patterns of migration are not seen to be merely the result of the aggregation of 
individual decisions and actions, but the product of objective social and spatial structures 
that produce the necessary conditions for migration (Appleyard, 1989; Bartram, 1998). 
Migration literature generally identifies three closely related but distinct fonns of this 
approach. These are the neo-Marxist dependency theory, old world systems theory and 
new systems theory, modes of production theory, networks theory, and migration 
institutions theory. 
3. 3. 1. Dependency theory 
The oldest fonn of the structuralist approach is the dependency theory. Dependency 
theorists argue that labour migration results from colonial and neo-colonial relationships 
between developed and capitalist economies and the underdeveloped peripheries (Marks 
and Richardson, 1984; Leys, 1996). Migration is not only a response to the spatial 
inequality characteristic of underdevelopment, but it is also a social process by which it is 
reinforced (Moser, 1978). Empirical studies in Egypt (Leonor, 1985) and the Philippines 
(Saith, 1998) indicate that, due to the selection of the most productive and educated 
workers from the underdeveloped regions or country, migration represents a geographical 
transfer of value greater than the return to the individual in remitted wages. The process 
of underdevelopment creates and sustains a dual labour market at the global level. In this 
global dual labour market, the developing countries periphery provides for reproduction 
of a reserve of cheap labour that is selectively recruited by the core to counter fulling 
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rates of profit, particularly in sectors affected by the struggle of the metropolitau working 
class for improved wages aud working conditions. 
Dependency approaches are more sophisticated thau the review literature usually allows 
(Hubert et al, 1993; Meier, 1995; Leys, 1996; Skeldon, 1997). However, they do tend to 
emphasize historic processes (colonialism) aud exploitation through unequal exchauge 
(differential wage rates) rather thau the existing social relations of production in the 
source country. Although the historical processes that shaped the dependency theory are 
no longer viable in the 21 ~ century, the principal argument of the theory, i.e., inequality, 
powerlessness aud underdevelopment are still very much a reality in the late 20th (Hubert 
et ai, 1993) aud early 21 ~ centuries. Dependency theory thus still provides a useful 
corrective to the rnicroeconomic approaches. However, this theory is not sufficiently 
sensitive to differences between source societies or the contradictory experiences of 
distinct social classes within them (Skeldon, 1997). 
A recent brauch of the dependency theory involves the study of the political structure 
surrounding international labour migration. The political aspects of intemationallabour 
migration recognises that states generally control their borders effectively, if not 
perfectly, aud thus that a political decision to allow labour immigration is required 
(Bartram, 1998; Schiff, 1998). Most political aualyses fall into three categories, 
instrumentalist, structuralist aud autonomous states. Instrumentalist state theorem 
declares that states allow labour migration because powerful social groups pressure states 
to do so (e.g., Bartram, 1998 for the Israel-Palestine example). The instrumentalist state is 
also evident in the southern Africau migration story, whereby the mining industry in 
South Africa pressured the apartheid state to allow the recruitment of foreign labour to 
work in the mines mainly because the rnining industry did not waut to see wages rise in 
the mines. Structuralist state theorem proclaims that states allow labour migration 
because doing so facilitates capitalist accumulation (e.g., Schiff, 1998 for the US-Mexico 
example; aud Papapauagos aud Vickermau, 2000 for the UK-Italy example). Again, the 
structuralist theorem is applicable to the southern Africau case, this time, explaining the 
reason for the consent ofthe South African state to the demauds of the mining industry. 
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Autonomous state theorem explains that states allow labour immigration because doing 
so advances the interests of states and state officials, when officials are sufficiently 
capable of advancing their interests (Head, 1995; Lipshitz, 1991; Bartram, 1998). This 
was clearly the case with the apartheid government in South Afiica. The use of foreign 
labour provided the state with cheap labour and a quick way to generate wealth, which 
they employed in undermining the interests of the Black group in the country (Matlosa, 
1995). This theorem can also be used to explain the motivating factors for pursuing 
international labour migration in the labour sending country. For example, the ruling 
class of Lesotho, together with the mining industry and the South Afiica officials, created 
bilateral agreements that determined the functioning of the classical migrant labour 
system by setting the terms of employment and the deferred pay plan for Basotho mine 
migrants. The benefit to the Lesotho officials in undertaking such a formal and expensive 
structure of migration was the returns to migration through the deferred pay scheme, 
which largely accrued to them. 
In reality states may assume the different roles outlined in the three respective theories, at 
various development stages of the migration institution, as was the reality in southern 
Afiica. Political analyses of international labour migration are still in their infant stage of 
development in the migration literature. They currently tend to repeat the emphasis on 
historic processes (colonialism) and exploitation through unequal exchange (differential 
wage rates) that overwhelm the dependency approach rather than the existing social 
relations of production in the source country. 
3. 3. 2. Old world systems theory 
The old world systems theory was developed as a response to the limitations of the 
dependency. This theory thus complements the dependency theory above. This theory 
introduces the concepts of unequal exchange and negative flexibility, by arguing that the 
global market economy effectively commodifies the means of production, establishes 
flows of capital and commodities, and creates the ideological conditions that produce 
potential migrants (example, Sassen, 1988). As investment capital and consumer culture 
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flow from the dominant market economies, so labour flows from their less developed 
clients, establishing transnational populations that are in turn integral to the circulation of 
capital and information in the global market economy (Skeldon, 1997; Felstead and 
Jewson, 1999). This theory argues that it is the penetration of the market and the total 
commodification of everyday life that produces migration (example, Chandra, 1997). The 
important idea here is that migrants become commodified in the process of integration 
with the capitalist system. Nevertheless, how distinct non-capitalist social relations in the 
periphery may affect the transfer of value incorporated in the migrant workers' labour 
power is not considered in this theory (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). 
3.3.3. New Systems theory 
A recent and more integrative version of the world systems framework, the new systems 
theory, focuses on both the macro and micro linkages between places linked by 
migration, including the political-economic relations and personal relationships between 
individuals and families. Macro-level relations include political systems, economic 
dependency! dominance, immigration policy, and cultural! linguistic associations. Micro-
level relations include friendship and kinship resulting from the geographic distribution 
of populations. Migration is conceived as a sequential process of decision, transition and 
adaptation by the individual made within the context of general political-economic and 
specific social relationships at each stage (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997). 
The old division oflabour was associated with immobility of the factors of production 
(capital and labour), unionised labour and permanent employment schemes. Traditional 
permanent employment was associated with high wage rates, job security, and benefits 
(Fryer and Newham, 2000). However, increased globalisation marked a turning point in 
the old international division of labour with immobile factors of production, pull 
migration and permanent employment schemes. Since the 1970s flexible labour and 
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temporary work has risen in the world (Fryer and Newham, 2000)2 This is mainly 
because since the 1970s capital mobility has risen over labour mobility, resulting in the 
new international division of labour. The increased mobility of capital thus led to 
increased flexibility of labour and employment. 3 
Generally, the service sector, particularly the rapid expansion and high value-added 
production of the infonnation and technology (IT) industries, fonns the core of the global 
economy and the new division oflabour. Within the global economy, the highly skilled 
labour force is mostly located in the service sector. Traditional primary and secondary 
manufacturing production is now characterised by a semi-skilled workforce with 
contingent and insecure jobs and wages and low value-added production. This fonns the 
larger periphery of the global economy (Sachikonye, 1998; Fryer and Newham, 2000). 
With greater mobility of capital, most production processes are increasingly being 
perfonned by flexible labour. Countries such as the United States, Taiwan, and Hong 
Kong are increasingly becoming characterised by a flexible labour force (Sachikonye, 
1998; Fryer and Newham, 2000). However, these countries are also characterised by 
strong export -oriented economies and high human capital value (skill). These countries 
are thus associated with positive labour flexibility. 
According to orthodox economics, the free movement of capital, governed by open 
market trade and non-government intervention policies, is proving to be advantageous to 
the overall development of the "New Economy" and technology, its top hi-tech 
leadership (Wilkinson, 1994; Fryer and Newham, 2000). The problem of many 
developing countries characterised by a flexible labour force is that they lack strong 
export-oriented economies, characterised by the aggressive pursuit of value (skills and 
2 Temporary work is here defmed to mean non-standard work, associated with low wage rates, coercive 
management, intensified labour processes, unsocial hours and high rates of job turnover (Fryer and 
Newham, 2000: 8 - 9) . 
J According to the systems theory, the process of globalisation (capital mobility) is characterised by a 
duality in labour market flexibility. On the one end there is a minority ofa highly skilled labour force who 
can cope with freedom (of capital and information), and thus who experience positive flexibility. On the 
other end there is the burden of a majority unskilled labour who are poor and socially dislocated, and who 
tend to be associated with negative flexibility (Fryer and Newham , 2000). 
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technological transfers) and the adaptation of some form of structural adjustment 
measures (Horton et aI, 1994). The greater movement of capital has thus not generated 
the desired growth in high-value production and labour productivity in these countries 
(Emmerij , 1993; Fryer and Newham, 2000). 
The new systems theory, which is a response to the above orthodox assumptions, argues 
that under the assumption that capital is mobile, the new international division of labour 
includes the emergence of EPZs, and internal migration. These "new" forms of 
migrations are distinct from the old "pul!" migration discussed in section 3.2 above. The 
"new" migrations are themselves a reflection of the positive and negative flexibility 
associated with global capital mobility and the new international division oflabour. The 
point that the new systems theory brings out is that as capital moves across different 
labour markets in the world, it generates various forms of labour flexibility that can be 
either positive (e.g., Taiwan, the US, etc, associated with orthodox export-led economics 
and high-skilled labour) or negative (related to EPZ employment, Third World structural 
adjustment programmes, and low-skilled labour). 
In terms of international labour migration, the negative flexibility stems from various 
factors. The chief ones are the emergence of global non-tradable sectors and the 
emergence of EPZs. The inability for capital to relocate applies to industries where the 
means of production or the product is effectively immobile, such as agriculturai 
production, mining, construction, and retail and social services. According to Skeldon 
(1997), external migration from the Philippines in the late 20th century thus resulted from 
the demand for labour at fixed locations in the Middle East (construction and services), 
Japan (entertainment and cultural work), and East Asia (domestic work). The specific 
characteristics of the capital used in these sectors perpetuate international migration in the 
global economy, regardless of the costs associated with the migration (both to the migrant 
and to the labour sending country). Skeldon (1997) thus ascribes the large-scale 
migration of construction workers from the Philippines to the Middle East, for example, 
to the emergence of a new international division oflabour in the late 20th century, and the 
specific characteristics of construction capital. 
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New systems theory also argues that generally, with respect to less developed countries 
(LDCs), the assumption of free capital mobility is not appropriate. Capital mobility is 
limited even in the 21 st century. This is related to specific non-tradable sectors, mainly 
construction and services (Saith, 1998). The increase in external migration in the late 
20th century among LDCs is here argued to be a direct result of the immobility of capital 
in these countries. The main assumption here is that the new international division of 
labour has created two options for labour in the global economy: non-migration due to 
the relocation of capital, and migration due to the inability of capital to relocate. 
Moreover, the new systems theory points out that in situations were capital is mobile, 
negative flexibility results due to unequal exchange. Increasingly and more often than not 
in the global economy, multinational capital generally reduces production costs by 
exporting production processes to offshore locations with favourable conditions of 
production, particularly cheap, unorganised labour (Felstead and Jewson, 1999). Export 
processing zones (EPZs) are created as a means to attract this footloose capital by the 
capital receiving government. Labour is then allocated to the production of the EPZs at 
the various industrial zones within the country. This raises internal or inter LDC 
migration within LDC countries that have adapted the EPZ model. Skeldon (1997) argues 
that there is thus little incentive for labour from the Philippines to relocate outside the 
country when capital is footloose. The implication here is that EPZ industrialisation is 
used as a substitute for external migration in the Philippines. The outcome of capital 
mobility in LDCs has so far has been accompanied by a rise in internal migration 
(Chapter 4) 
The new systems theory importantly notes that the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) model 
of development is the orthodox answer to an alternative to import-substitution 
industrialisation strategy that has so far been actively pursued by the least developed 
countries (LDCs). According to the orthodox reasoning, import substitution 
industrialisation (lSI) tailed to generate sustainable levels of growth in LDCs. EPZs were 
regarded as an instrument to reorient developing lSI economies towards the export-
oriented growth strategy, and jump-start their economies on to higher growth paths, and 
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according to the systems approach, associated with positive flexibility." Typically, EPZs 
are defined as industrial estates that consist of a free trade area commune in the customs 
and trade regime of a country where foreign (and sometimes domestic) manufacturing 
firms producing mainly for export benefit from fiscal and financial incentives (Esquivel 
et ai, 1998; Sachikonye, 1998). EPZs are designed to provide for a transitory and 
effective adjustment towards long-term open market trade regime, by providing much 
needed foreign exchange, technology transfer, diversification of local economy through 
stimulation of non-traditional exports, and job creation (Kanyenze, 1998). This is 
achieved mainly by reducing transaction costs at the EPZ, as rental factory buildings and 
sites, with easy access to the global economy, utilities, and communications are provided 
at a very reduced cost to investors (Wilkinson, 1994; Sachikonye, 1998). The success of 
the East Asian economies to attain higher growth paths, value-added production and, 
enhance skills has been widely attributed to the development of "sweatshop" industrial 
production in East and South East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s (Wilkinson, 1994; 
Kanyenze, 1998; Lui and Chiu, 1999). The reduction of transaction costs in the EPZs in 
East Asia provided for a quick return to investment in the fonn of high levels profits, 
high levels of investments, foreign exchange earnings, skill development, and 
employment (Sassen, 1988; Wilkinson, 1994). The good reputation of the EPZs is thus 
largely based on the East Asian experience (Esquivel et ai, 1998). 
However, generally, heterodox economics and the new systems theory points out that the 
unregulated movement of capital (the EPZ firms) usually tend to exploit workers in 
developing countries, resulting in negative flexibility (Sassen, 1988; Fryer and Newham, 
2000). The demand for labour in the EPZs is mainly characterised by low wages and low 
skill requirements. Like traditional contract migration, most workers in the EPZs are 
recruited from rural locations. Unlike traditional contract migration, most EPZs employ 
young single female labourers, who are usually not forced to return to the rural locations 
when they leave the factories, but who remain easy to exploit (Sassen, 1988; Ward, 1990; 
Date-Bah, 1990). This is because the migration of these workers occurs within national 
4 Note that positive and negative flexibility are not concepts of the orthodox approach. They are the 
heterodox response to orthodox assumptions of endogenous growth. 
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boundaries. National labour laws, workers right to strike, and union power have been 
reduced and even suspended in some countries operating under the EPZ model, such as in 
Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Mauritius, and the Philippines, and Costa Rica (Esquivel et ai, 
1998; Kanyenze, 1998). 
This is because under orthodox economics, such regulations and labour standards are 
regarded by development technocrats (e.g. the World Bank and the IMF) as distortions on 
the movement towards flexible labour market development and trade liberalization. The 
EPZ model carries the orthodox assumption of a homogenous labour force that can easily 
move across all sectors of production. However, the labour markets in developing 
countries are dualistic in nature with little movement of workers across sectors. As a 
consequence, there has generally been greater internal migration but with little real 
upward mobility of skills in countries that have adapted the EPZ development model 
(Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997). The suggestion here is that labour in lSI 
economies with the EPZ model is moving between different parts of the "Third World" 
sector, as opposed to traditional modem skill-unskilled labour mobility. 
Recent research on East Asia (Wilson, 1994) and on the process of globalisation (Fryer 
and Newham, 2000) has begun to question the attribution of EPZs to the development 
success of the Asian Tigers. According to this perspective, the EPZ model represents a 
stage in the process of globalisation of operations of capital, particularly its freer 
movement relative to labour (Kanyenze, 1998). Given the fact that only low-skill labour 
was employed by EPZs even in East Asia, the success of their ability to enhance skills is 
thus attributed to the division of labour within the region, and the relationships that 
developed between labour, unions, indigenous employers and governments (Wilkinson, 
1994). 
The new systems theory acknowledges that given the limitations of the orthodoxy 
methodology, there do not seem to be viable development alternatives for countries faced 
with abundant labour. In Guatemala, the Philippines and Mauritius, for example, 
temporary employment of female labour in "sweatshop" industries has become the core 
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of the development path (Kanyenze, 1998), thus reinforcing the negative flexibility. For 
example in 1996 up to 80 percent of women were employed in sweatshop factories in 
Mauritius, and 90 percent of them were new entrants to the labour force (Kanyenze, 
1998: 65). Although EPZs provide an array of external sector benefits to countries with 
abundant labour, the temporary and "dead end" nature of the jobs, and the use of costly 
imported labour at high levels of skill preclude any meaningful transfer of skills to the 
local workforce (Kanyenze, 1998: 67). In addition, the sudden and unpredictable 
relocation of foreign firms usually leads to high rates of retrenchment and unemployment 
in the host country. 
The new systems theory also notes that development of EPZs has been met by rising 
scepticism among governments of developing countries, such as in Costa Rica in the late 
1990s (lCG, 1997). According to the new systems theory, the particular concern here is 
the increase in the lack of regulation of the relocating firms and the exploitation of 
workers by the relocating firms (lCG, 1997; Sachikonye, 1998). The new systems theory 
explains that increasing unequal exchange in international trade resulted in the evolution 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This institution was designed to set the 
regulations to govern international trade under complete freedom of capital and to reduce 
inequalities generated by increasing integration of the world economy. However, labour 
has been granted restricted mobility by international formal institutions, largely because 
labour remains the raison d'e/re of the nations-state (Fryer and Newham, 2000; 
UNRISD, 2000). In terms of the migration perspective, this means that international 
labour migration regulation is largely left to the responsibility of individual labour 
sending and receiving countries, with no formal regulation at the glo ballevel (UNRISD, 
2000). Thus, according to the new systems theory, international labour migration as it 
currently exists on the fringes of regionalisation and globalisation entails worker 
exploitation and welfare losses for labour sending countries. 
In summary, the new systems theory points out two very important observations with 
regards to dual labour market theory in the 21" century. First, the new systems theory 
acknowledges that given greater mobility of capital in the late 20th century, a new 
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international division oflabour is emerging in which positive and negative flexibility are 
reinforced by capital mobility. Secondly, the new systems theory notes that the new 
division of labour is characterised by new patterns of migration related to negative 
flexibility and exploitation. The new systems framework argues that with internal 
migration, the EPZ model has led to nations abdicating responsibility for labour, where 
labour is subj ect to the "race to the bottom." In terms of international labour migration, 
the new systems theory points out that there is no equivalent of the World Trade 
Organisation (WfO) to address the regulation oflabour at the global level. As a result, 
international migrants are essentially "stateless," and dependent on ad hoc bilateral and 
unilateral institutional support. The new systems theory attempts the above 
interpretations of the new division of labour noting all the time that the lack of 
institutional support is interactive with the nature of work (negative flexibility). This 
framework points out that both non-migrants and migrants in an "international" 
multilateral issue are part of the global labour force. The point being put across here is 
that workers are inherently hard to protect in the new division of labour with greater 
mobility of capital, even with the will. As shall be shown below, this is a point that the 
modes of production theory refines. 
Nevertheless, according to Goss and Lindquist (1995), like the old world systems theory, 
the new systems theory lacks a coherent unit of analysis outside the individual and thus 
fails to explain how distinct non-capitalist social relations in the periphery may affect the 
transfer of value incorporated in the migrant workers' labour power. The modes of 
production framework and the networks theory offer two distinct units of analysis, the 
household and the community, and thus begin to address the non-capitalist social 
relations that shape external and internal migration. The modes of production theory 
offers the sectoral breakdown while the networks framework investigates the underlying 
power dynamics and relationships within the given social networks. Both are critiques of 
the orthodox methodology. 
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3.3.4. The modes of production theory 
The modes of production theory presents a critique of the classical orthodox (Lewis) 
classification of sectors. The modes of production theory acknowledges the historical 
significance of colonialism but argues that under conditions of uneven development of 
capitalism, pre-existing forms of production may co-exist with capitalism in the periphery 
social formations. Individuals and households may thus be implicated in various forms of 
production relations and may move between them. Since these forms of production are 
differentially distributed over space, this necessitates migration (Skeldon, 1997). Value is 
transferred through super-exploitation, where individuals work in capitalist sectors ofthe 
economy but part of the reproduction of their labour is provided by non-capitalist sectors. 
Non-capitaiist reproduction thus subsidizes the costs to capital of the reproduction of 
labour power (Moser, 1978; Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997; Felstead and 
Jewson, 1999). This theory notes here that the assumption of gradual assimilation in 
classical orthodox methodology does not take place in the new division oflabour . What 
happens instead is the partial assimilation that leads to the formation of a third sector that 
remains distinct from both the traditional and capitalist sector. This sector is also 
commonly referred to in the literature as the "petty commodity" production sector 
(Moser, 1978). It is a subordinate sector of the capitalist system that exists on the fringes 
of both capitalism and traditional (peasant) sector. In terms of migration, the Third sector 
is usually associated with "informal" and "illegal" status, and remains on the fringes of 
the formal regulations. 
In terms of international labour migration, the modes of production theory picks from the 
new systems theory in explaining the situation where capital is immobile in economic 
sectors, such as construction and services. The new systems theory pointed out that the 
specific characteristics of capital used in these sectors tended to perpetuate external 
labour migration, regardless of the costs associated with the migration. The modes of 
production theory points out that there are several potential advantages to the owners of 
capital in employing overseas contract workers (OCW). The first is that the host takes 
responsibility for the reproduction of contract labour only while it is directly and 
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immediately productive. In this manner, the employer does not pay statutory taxes and 
benefits that apply in the source country (social security and pensions) and the state does 
not pay for the past or future reproduction of this labour, for the lengthy period of 
socialization, education and training of youthful labour, or for the earned retirement of 
aged labour (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Bartram, 1998). Moreover, labour is employed 
only when it is needed, and the host has no responsibility to sustain the labour force 
through periods of decreased demand (Bartram, 1998). The idea put across here is that 
the ideal model for the host is complete non-assimilation. But, as we shall see below, and 
also in the Lesotho case (Chapter 6) such instances are exceptions to the rule, especially 
the new global economy. 
Second, when the lifetime oflabour-intensive projects are typically short, (such as in the 
case of Filipino (Goss and Lindquist, 1995) and Egyptian (Shaban et ai, 1995) overseas 
contract workers (OWCs) in the Middle East, where construction workers are only 
employed during the construction phase, house maids during the childbearing stage, 
technicians only while the national are under training) and the lifetime oflabour power is 
limited due to the demanding nature of the work (for example in the case of the 
Philippines, workers are employed only at the peak of their physical capacity, hence 70 
percent of all OCWs are 20 - 35 years old), the employers gains (Shaban et ai, 1995; 
Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 324; Saith, 1998). However, the gains to the employers in the 
host country become challenged when the lifetime of the labour-intensive projects span 
over decades and even centuries. When this occurs, social relationships between the 
employer and contract migrant worker become reinforced throughout the duration of the 
production. This creates a policy challenge for the destination state, regarding the long-
term continuation ofthe employment of these OCWs. The state on the one hand, must 
meet the interests of employers, and on the other, must contain a stable environment in 
the domestic labour market. 5 Given the ideal of complete non-assimilation by the hosts, 
5 For example, Israel employers have been employing Palestinian workers in the construction industry 
since the formation of the Israel state. For the past 50 years the two parties have established a relationship 
that is co-dependent: the Palestinians have become conditioned to finding employment in Israel and the 
Israeli construction employers have become dependent on Palestinian labour, whom they have trained 
(Bartram, 1998). However, since the recent democratisation of the Eastern European nations, and the return 
of the Eastern European Jews to Israel, the Israeli state policy switched to the approval of labour from 
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most migrants thus become partially assimilated, where they remain on the fringes of the 
legal, social, political and economic spheres in the destination areas. 
The point put across here is that not all labour-intensive projects in the destination society 
are short-term, which creates further social and political consequences to both the 
destination country and more importantly to the migrant workers. Generally there is a 
tendency for migrant workers to stay on "illegally" and indefinitely in the destination 
country, such as was the case with Ghana in the early 1980s, following the mass 
expulsion of over 1 million workers from Nigeria. Most of the repatriated migrants from 
Ghana were reported to have soon returned back to Nigeria, mostly through illegal 
channels, where they generally just awaited the next episode of mass exodus (see Chapter 
4). Given the model of complete non-assimilation in the host countries, migrant workers 
are thus being pushed into illegal status by laws that have either expired or by the total 
lack of legislative regulation on international labour migration. Such is the current 
situation in southern Africa, whereby, most migrants to South Africa suffer excruciating 
xenophobic abuse, including police beatings, and are usually deported upon arrival to 
their home countries, with little or no legal representation (Fontana, 1997). 
The inferior legal and political status of migrants in the host country also excludes them 
from protective legislation and limits their potential for effective organization. OCWs 
must wage a new struggle on unfamiliar terrain separate from the struggle of national 
labour in the host country and their own labour organization back home (Goss and 
Lindquist, 1995). For instance, migrant workers in South Africa have no official union 
that represents them, except for the Mineworkers ' Union. The interests of the 
Mineworkers' Union are not always in favour of the migrant workers. In fact, recently the 
Mineworkers' Union has been actively campaigning for the termination of temporary 
work in the country (which is largely dominated by migrant workers) (Crush, 1997; and 
also Chapter 6). It is thus in the interest of capital to uproot labour from its own cultural 
Eastern Europe over the Palestinians. In addition, the on-going political tension in the Gulf has also led to 
Israeli officials substituting Palestinian labour with Asian labour. Nevertheless, many Palestinians still 
expect jobs in Israel, and many Israeli employers still prefer to employ Palestinian labour (whether legally 
or otherwise) to the other new fonns of foreign labour (Bartram, 1998). 
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and geographical context, or to separate workers from the social networks of their 
reproductive communities that might reinforce solidarity and provide critical moral and 
material support in the labour struggle. As a result, the degree of control over the 
migrants and the migration process exercised by the employer and host state is much 
greater (Bartram, 1998; Saith, 1998). This is what SkeJdon (1997) is arguing to be the 
most crucial concern with international labour migration at the tum of the 21 Sl century. 
The lack of a global legislation to govern international migration has increased the 
vulnerability of migrant workers across the global economy, and left most at the mercy of 
their host countries and employers.6 This is also part of the process of "commodification" 
or "proletarianisation." 
According to Sassen (1988), internal migration results from the "verbal" relationship 
between social processes as reflected in the development of the factors of production, and 
institutions, as reflected in the necessarily uneven nature of this development. For 
example, Shrestha, cited in Goss and Lindquist (1995: 335) shows how the penetration of 
capitalist social relations in rural Nepal alienates subsistence peasants from their land. In 
the context where capital is scarce and the non-farm sector underdeveloped, this forces 
them to depend on the sale of their labour power. With local opportunities for 
employment extremely limited, many migrate. While this appears to be an exercise of 
choice, subordinate socioeconomic classes in general lack the market and political 
capacity to make strategic decisions. Hence, migration may be the only viable response 
where adaptation to local conditions is precluded, particularly under conditions of rapid 
population growth. Members of the locally dominant classes, on the other hand, may 
choose migration as a strategy to expand their market or political capacity and to 
diversifY risk' (Chandra, 1997). Internal migration her is suggested to lead to the 
formation of the urban Third World sector, associated with "survivalist" economic 
activities. Here, the modes of production theory thus points out the possibility of a duality 
6 The government of the source is motivated to provide cheap overseas workers by facilitating private 
recruitment or itself becoming a broker in order to generate foreign exchange through remittances of wages 
(Skeldon, 1997). 
7 As explained in Todaro. 
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within the migration stream, with urban "pull" migration associated with higher skills, 
wealth, and social position, and rural "push" migration associated with lack of skills, low 
social position and poverty. Urban Third World sector is thus related to the rural poor. 
For example, Mohtadi (1986) found that, as in the case of India, migration to the urban 
areas in Iran was influenced by the migrants' social position in the rural areas. Thus those 
with acres to land in the rural areas were also more likely to have land in the urban area, 
with the reversal applying to those without land in rural areas. Urban slums were thus an 
extension of the rural slums. 
The modes of production theory has thus become identified as the study of the role of 
migration in the historical process of articulation of the domestic "traditional" / peasant 
economy (household and community), with the capitalist economy (Goss and Lindquist, 
1995; Skeldon 1997). As capitalist social relations penetrate and undermine the 
productive sphere of the domestic economy, the reproductive sphere nevertheless remains 
at least partly intact, and it is partially responsible for the long-term reproduction of 
migrant labour. The nexus of exploitation thus shifts from wage labourer to the household 
and community and a concern with the microeconomics of kinship relations that ensure 
the reproduction oflabour under the conditions of articulation (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; 
Chandra, 1997).8 
The modes of production theory thus provides some bridges for spanning the gaps of 
articulation in levels of analysis, by theorizing migration, production and reproduction at 
the local level as shaped by, and as a response to global economic conditions (Goss and 
Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997; Felstead and Jewson, 1999). It is also very useful in 
explaining the pervasiveness of the Third World sector. This theory allows us to explain 
specifically Third World modes of production, namely the urban informal sector, and the 
remaining rural "subsistence" sector. Both are seen as subsidizing capitalist development 
by reducing wages. Critical assumption here is that the flow of resources is towards 
8 The migration institutions theory (discussed in section 3. 3. 6) suggests the complete collapse of the Third 
World sector. The distinction between these two points is that the modes of production still has a stronger 
link to the old dependency theory, which argued that proletarianisation provided for possible returns and 
exploitation of the subordinate. The migration institutions theory argues that nature of the Third World 
sector is such that there is close to nothing to exploit. 
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capital, i.e., the notion that the amount of support that migrants receive outweighs 
remittance flows, and! or that the urban informal sector lowers the cost of living and 
hence subsidizes capitalism (i.e., exploitation). 
While some valuable theoretical and empirical contributions have been made to the 
understanding of international labour migration from this perspective, nevertheless, the 
approach fails to theoretically integrate the concept of household and community it 
employs (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). Like the world systems and the systems theories 
above, the modes of production theory thus remains silent about the effect of non-
capitalist social relations in the periphery may have on the transfer of value incorporated 
in the migrant workers' labour power (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). The networks theory 
complements the argument of sectors of production, under the modes of production 
theory, by explaining the relations of production. Both deal with the links between 
capitalist (market) and non-capitalist (non-market) modes and relations of production. 
Nevertheless, the important point of the modes of production theory is the identification 
of the distinctiveness of the Third World sector. 
3. 3. S. The networks theory 
The networks theory offers a critique of orthodox version of relations of production or 
"social capital." The orthodox viewpoint here is that there are modem and traditional 
sectors and their particular interfuces. The networks approach argues that migration 
decisions are made jointly by family members within households; that households 
decisions are affucted by local socioeconomic conditions; that local conditions are in tum 
affected by evolving political, social and economic structures at the national and 
international levels; and that these interrelationships are connected to one another over 
time (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997). 
As in the functionalist approach, the key to this integrative approach is the identification 
of the connections between the macro and micro levels of analysis, and the specifications 
of an intermediate object of analysis. Social networks (including migrant networks) are 
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the proposed unit of analysis here. Social networks are empirical objects lying 
somewhere between the individual and society, and thus are ideally suited for integrating 
the dependency, world systems and modes of production theories. Social networks are 
presented as a means to account for both aggregation of the actions of individual 
decision-makers and the structuring of constraints upon behaviours by the global or 
national-political economy (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997; Bartram, 1998). 
Unlike the household unit of the functionalist approach, the concept of social networks 
incorporates the individual and conventional units of the household, family and 
community, however defined, into a single analytical framework, by analysing their 
relationship patterns. For example, coherent social groupings, whether permanent or 
temporary, may act as coherent social relationships within intersecting social networks 
(Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Cohen and House, 1996). 
Social networks are defined as webs of the interpersonal interactions, commonly 
compromised of relatives, friends, or other associations forged through social and 
economic activities that act as conduits through which information, influence and 
resources flow (Montgomery, 1991; Goss and Lindquist, 1995 : 329; Cohen and House, 
1996). Members of the network will be linked by common interests and! or obligations 
that function through personal contact. Migrant networks develop from social networks 
as individuals and groups exploit social relationships or kinship, friendship, community, 
or employment experience in order to support migration. Migrant networks are the 
mechanisms that link economic and political organisations. 
Social networks provide potential migrants with information about available destinations, 
contacts with gatekeepers, and sometimes with funds for transportation and other fees 
(Martin, 1993; Goss and Lindquist, 1995). At the destination, they provide assistance in 
the form of housing and employment, and may be a means to provide cultural continuity 
and communication with the community of origin. Social networks, thus, reduce the cost 
of migration and mediate between the migrant and the destination society. Social 
networks are not, however, merely resources to be exploited by the migrant. They help 
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detennine the nature of migration by influencing selection of migrants, the availability of 
destinations, and the conditions of employment (Cohen and House, 1996; Skeldon, 
1997). Moreover, the content and meaning of relationships within parts of the social 
network may be transfonned with time into a migrant network, in which community and 
kinship relationships are defined and organized within the context of international labour 
migration (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). The migrant network may thus develop into a 
self-sustaining organization, independent of the initiating circumstances (Skeldon, 1997). 
This implies the notion that once a number of network connections in an origin area reach 
a critical level, migration may become self-perpetuating because migration itself creates 
the social structure to sustain it. Migrant networks also outlines the fact that 
modernisation process in less developed countries is less of a smooth transfonnation as 
presented in the earlier theories above. 
The recognition that migration is increasingly fonnalized and channelled by social and 
migrant networks is important, but it has its specific limitations. First it is an idealization 
of community consistent with the dominant conception of ruraV peasant societies in 
development literature. Social networks are conceived of as the results of universal 
human bonds, or locally bounded affective tiers, governed by infonnal nonns of 
reciprocity and sustained by personal interaction (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). Second, 
migrant networks are presumed to expand opportunities for migration throughout the 
community as they evolve, ultimately providing near universal access to the numbers 
(i.e., "traditional" view is an adjunct to the Lewisian view of smooth modernisation 
process). Research studies of migration networks in the United States (Schiff, 1998), 
Israel (Bartram, 1998), Mozambique (Head, 1995), the Philippines (Goss and Lindquist, 
1995; Saith, 1998), Egypt (Leonor, 1985), Ghana (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994), Costa Rica 
(Weintraub and Diaz-Briquets, 1992) and Sudan (Ertur and House, 1993) suggest that 
this conception of migrant networks is inappropriate. To begin with, the conception 
cannot be limited to everyday social interactions and direct acquaintances within a 
community, since in practice it includes indirect social contacts maintained and exploited 
over long distances (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). Second, it must be recognized that in 
most contexts, migration is increasingly "fonnalized" and governed by commercial and 
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bureaucratic relations as recruiters, brokers, and the state seek to profit from overseas 
migration (Head, 1995; Bartram, 1998; Schiff, 1998; Saith, 1998). In other words, it is 
petty commodity production, in the sense that it is not traditional, but it is neither modem 
in the orthodox sense. For example, the World Bank' s World Development Report: 
Worker's in an integrated world (World Bank, 1995) assumes that traditional 
relationships are used. However, it is more likely that these are shaped significantly 
("corrupted") by contact with capitalism (e.g., Breman, 1996: 11). 
Third, it is clear that opportunities for migration do not necessarily equalize access over 
time9 since as networks expand they may actually become more selective and competitive 
(Leonor, 1985; Weintraub and Diaz-Briquets, 1992; Ertur and House, 1993; Beaudry and 
Sowa, 1994). Indeed, according to Fryer and Newham (2000: 24) non-market and 
informal institutions based on "trust" and "relationships" tend to be highly exclusive. The 
authors point out that this is an example of when "second best" solutions seem to solve 
the allocation problem, but at the expense of exclusivity and intra-relationship power 
imbalances (exploitation). 
A recent study on the remittance behaviour and informal social networks and 
relationships of El Salvadoran and Filipino migrants in the Unites States indicates that 
such dynamic networks can be highly unstable and sporadic (Menjivar et al, 1998). The 
study explains that such networks are linked to the existing structural opportunities in the 
receiving society. A newcomer's friends and relatives may be sympathetic and inclined to 
provide vital support in the early stages of arrival, but when they themselves are 
struggling in poverty, they sometimes cannot. This work is important in the sense that it 
critiques the assumption that migrants' social networks are always supportive, 
particularly when poverty and structural opportunities in the receiving society inhibit the 
positive effects of any supportive social networks that might otherwise exist. What is of 
most significance in the results is not the contrasting and possibly negative interpretation 
9 Orthodoxy assumption here initial asymmetrical information would cause short-term inequalities, which 
would eventually cease to exist with continuous information exchange (see Stiglitz, 1987). 
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that migrant networks are unsupportive and "fragmented," but that conditions in the host 
society can severely limit their functioning. 
The concept ofa communicative migrant network, developed by Kearney, (cited in Goss 
and Lindquist, 1995), attempts to improve on the concept of fragmented migrant 
networks by partially addressing the criticisms of a universally supportive social fabric. 
The communicative migrant network concept links the household and community with 
the global economy. This network develops only in tight knit and kinship communities 
with a clear commercial identity. It is driven by economic necessity as individuals and 
households move in and out of economic spaces (conceived both in tenos of physical 
places and socioeconomic niches), and operates as a "vascular" system through which 
infonoation, goods and services flow (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 330). The network then 
becomes an income-seeking organism whose purpose and function is the transfer of 
value. For example, a study by Singhanetra-Renard (cited in Goss and Lindquist, 1995), 
of contract migrant workers from Northern Thailand shows the evolution of migrant 
networks through three distinct stages. 
"In the first phase, migration occurs under the auspIce of traditional patron-client 
relationships, but transforms into employer-employee relationships as institutions rather 
than patrons become the principal employers. The employer still maintains close relations 
with the village and assumes obligations beyond simply paying for labour. In the second 
phase, intermediaries organize the export of labour, earning their livelihood from fees 
charged to the migrants; hence economics becomes the organizing principle for these 
relationships. Under the third phase, recruiting agents continue to dominate the migration 
process but many now promote illegal migration by forging ties with other purveyors of 
migrants in countries of destination." 
(Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 330). 
The above example thus demonstrates migrant networks as socially dynamic 10 and 
inclusive of exploitation relations. However, Goss and Lindquist (1995) note that the 
10 In the sense that such networks are not merely using existing traditional networks, as the functionalist 
literature would suggest. 
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networks remain the subject of terminological confusion and are treated as a causal 
category by virtue merely of their empirical existence without an adequate theorization of 
their logical and structural characteristics. Hence, it is not clear, under the integrative 
approach how these networks operate as social entities beyond the sum of the individual 
relationships of which they are constituted. 
As far as policy is concerned, ultimately, the problem the integrative approaches attempt 
to resolve is the contradiction between the "welfarise I" outlook by the functionalist 
approach and "developmentalist I2" perspective of the structuralist approach. This 
contradiction results not merely from different levels of analysis, nor even from 
ideological inclinations, but from an inability of the theories to coherently articulate 
structure and agency. The recent rise in economic integration across the world has 
brought with it new rules and regulations that are increasingly eliminating the technical 
differences of the functionalist and structuralist approaches, although the policies of both 
still remain intact. The migration institution theory tries to incorporate even further the 
idea ofa global world in which both micro-level and macro-level decisions and actions of 
actors affect the rules and resources, and are themselves also affected (limited) by micro-
level and macro-level rules and resources. In this sense the world is reduced to a global 
sphere of dynamic actions and interactions that reinforce existing behaviours and 
relationships while at the same time forming new behaviours and relationships. The 
concept of time is the key unit of analysis in this model, since the concepts of actors, 
politics, income, household and social networks become mere behavioural and 
relationships that are constantly transforming. According to this theory, migration defines 
the order of the global economy. 
II Related to short-term, ad hoc unilateral decision-making with the goal of achieving higher growth, at a 
micro unit of reference (urban or rural, national) 
12 Related to longer-term, decision-making with the goal of sustaining living standards, at a global unit of 
reference (national, regional, global). 
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3.3.6. Migration institutions 
The concept of migration institution as suggested by Goss and Lindquist (1995) seems to 
adhere to the Post-modern explanation or view of the late 20th century global order. The 
explanation of migration institutions presented here will thus be introduced by first giving 
a briefing of the general post-modern explanation oflate 20th century global setting. 
In responding to modernisation theorising on the development of the global economy, 
Friedman (2000) explains that: 
"Modernism .. . .is based on the notion of supersession, of growth and development as a 
general process for individuals and societies. Fixed identity in such terms is a kind of 
neurotic paralysis, and tradition is translated into the "repetition compulsion". Modernism 
reigns supreme in the hegemonic realms of the modem world system, but when 
hegemony declines, it is a difficult project to maintain. The concomitant of declining 
modernist identity is an increase in narcissistic tendencies, ... and where collective 
identities become a solution to the threat of ego disintegration. It is in such conditions 
that roots, ethnicity, religion and postrnodemism become increasingly dominant and that 
individualism is replaced increasingly by what is referred to as tribalism, not only in its 
ethnic form, but as a form of social organization in which a fragmented public sphere 
becomes increasing divided into c1ientelistic hierarchies. This is the new Middle Ages 
referred to by political scientists. These variations are predicated on a well-developed 
individualization in which community, tradition, become essential aspects of the modem 
fantasy of the world we have lost. Real communitarianism is in this sense a phenomenon 
of modernity rather than a left over from the past." 
(Friedman, 2000, italics added). 
The point that Friedman is putting across here is that increasingly in the global world, 
there are rules and regulations that are pushing certain groups of people into positions 
outside the capitalist system. His argument is essentially that, in the past when capital 
was regulated under a hegemonic world order, it was easy for diverse social groupings to 
interact in the modern sector sphere. However, with the increasing mobility of capital, the 
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order of interaction has altered, leading to many different variations of modernisation, all 
essentially linked by social networks and historical relations. In this manner then, realities 
such as the Third World sectors in LDCs or migrant networks and migrant institutions are 
essentially part of the modern sector system and not a relic of this system. Although 
Friedman's arguments seems to suggest at one level, a fragmentation of identities and 
production in the global economy, his reasoning at another level seems to imply a 
cyclical and unification process within the global economy. The model thus seems to 
suggest an institutional arrangement in which the actions of actors constrained by rules 
and regulations (hegemonies) push the institutional arrangement into several stages of 
development, all linked by historical accounts and relations. Thus Friedman seems to 
perceive the new international division of labour as part of historical accounts and 
relations that is in turn being shaped by capital mobility, and through this continuous 
interaction, new arrangements result. This model seems to share the classical orthodox 
view of the world progressively moving towards a unified outcome. The important 
difIerence here however, is that the progression does not only lead to one outcome, but 
several unified outcomes. In fact Friedman notes that the level of unification can be both 
at global or local levels, which then suggests the probability of several outcomes. The 
idea of collapsed and new identities appears to be strongly suggested in the Friedman 
argument. 
The migration institutions approach that builds from the concept of migrant networks, 
presents labour migration as an outcome ofa complex combination of individual actions 
and social structures. The model seeks to capture this complexity by theorizing as the 
result of knowledgeable individuals undertaking strategic actions within institutions, 
specifically the institution of migration, which operate according to recognized rules and 
which distribute resources accordingly (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997). The 
principle of "structuration" provides the framework for the analysis of international 
labour migration in this approach. 13 Under this analysis, the migration institution, a 
13 The 'structuration" framework attempts to unifY the welfure versus development dichotomy in the 
development literature envisioning continuous evolving and changing structures in the world, which are 
embedded within larger political, social and economic arrangement that operate within specific rules and 
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complex articulation of rules and resources, presents constraints and opportunities for 
individual action. Individuals act strategically within the institution to further their 
interests, but the capacity for such action is differentially distributed according to 
knowledge of rules and access to resources. This knowledge, in turn, may be partially 
determined by their position within other social institutions (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). 
At the macro-level, an international migration institution is presented as a relatively 
permanent feature of social life that results from the regulation of social interaction for 
the purpose of employment abroad. This in turn regulates interaction and structures 
access to employment abroad through the operation of institutional rules and resources. It 
is a complex institution consisting of knowledgeable individuals and the agents of 
organizations (from migrant associations to multinational and transnational corporations) 
and institutions (from kinship to state) (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). 
The concept begins with the recognition that structural conditions for intemationallabour 
migration are created at the level of the global economy and longue duree14, essentially 
beyond the control of individual migrants, if not beyond the influence of some formal 
institutions that have sufficient capacity for time and space dissociation (such as MNCs 
and nation-states). The increased potential in recent years for international contract labour 
migration is presented here as the result of sustained socioeconomic developments in the 
regulations. The constant interaction between these evolving structures in turn produced other structures, 
which, in their wake may be perceived as threats by the existing structures (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). 
14 The theory of structuration claims that social action and interactions are embedded in time, which it is 
conceived here at three levels. First is the duree of everyday life, or reversible time, in the sense that its 
actions are repetitive and routine. Second is the life span of individuals, dasein, a finite and irreversible 
time that progresses toward old age and death. Third is the longue duree, or international time of 
institutions. The duality of structure implies the articulation of these temporalities and the binding of the 
routine interaction of everyday life together with the life-path, or career moves of the life cycle, and the 
policymaking/ planning strategies of institutional history (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 333 - 334). Migration 
institutions operate within the longue duree or infinite life/time, however, migrants and social rules and 
resources function within the desain or finite lifeltime (migrants) and duree or everyday life/time (rules and 
resources). Rules include, among other things, the political, legal, and social order, while resources include 
inter alia , duree, dasein , work and leisure (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). Rules provide for a dynamic 
efficiency and reallocation of resources, while the resources determine the rules of the global arrangement. 
Migration institution is the constant interaction that takes place between the rules and resources within this 
framework via the actors (migrants, politicians, communities, households, MNCs, etc). 
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richer economies and their demand for service sector labour, the construction boom in the 
Persian Gulf and the Middle East, the rapid economic development in the development of 
oil-producing economies, together with the continued underdevelopment of non-oil 
producing and non-industrializing ofless developed countries (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; 
Skeldon, 1997; Bartram, 1998; Saith, 1998). 
This approach thus argues that international labour migration is best examined not as the 
result of individual motivations and structural determinations, although these must playa 
part in any explanation, but as the articulation of agents with particular interests and 
playing specific roles within an institutional environment, drawing knowledgeably upon 
set of rules in order to increase access to resources. For potential migrants, this means 
enhancing their capacity for relocation, ultimately into the global economy (Goss and 
Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997). This requires assistance from other individuals who 
interpret the rules and distribute the resources of the migration institution. Thus the 
migration institution can be conceived as a set of roles or social positions adapted by 
individuals that then influence their actions. Institutions do not determine individual 
interests and actions, but individuals draw selectively on institutional rules and resources 
in pursuit of their interests and inevitably reproduce the social system (Goss and 
Lindquist, 1995). As potential migrants, returned migrants, patrons, and institutional 
agents draw upon rules and resources of diverse social institutions, it is then that their 
practices become institutionalised, that social networks become migrant networks and 
ultimately migrant institutions (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997). 
In essence, and it is here that echoes of the Friedman and post-modem reasoning are felt, 
what the Goss and Lindquist model describes is a unification of the modes of production 
and networks approach. The point of the modes of production was that sectoral 
production processes can result in the partial integration of migrants at the destination, 
resulting in the formation of petty commodity production units or the Third World sector, 
which distinctive from the capitalist (status quo) production mode. The failure of the 
modes of production theory to identify the social links between the petty commodity and 
capitalism makes the model appear as if it was suggesting that petty commodity 
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production was thus an offshoot of the capitalist system. Indeed, some leading authors in 
this field (e.g., Moser, 1978) do in effect state that the petty commodity production is 
peripheral to the capitalist mode. It took the networks theory ' s outlook ofthe interfaces 
(social relationships) that lead to the formation of exclusive Third World sectors to 
expand the modes of production theory away from the classical orthodox reasoning (i.e., 
classical modernisation theory). The Goss and Lindquist model now then incorporates the 
two explanations and points out that new and exclusive identities are themselves 
governed by the lager rules and regulations, making them their own hegemonies and not 
necessarily offshoots of the capitalist system. Thus, although there is increasing 
fragmentation at the global level, there is greater unification at other levels. This is why 
the formation of these non-capitalist non-traditionalist entities lies beyond the control of 
particular states or production institutions (such as MNCs). Hence, the suggestion of the 
Goss and Lindquist migration institutions model is thus that unilateral responses to 
migration are likely to result in poor allocation of resources. Given the fact that migrants 
operate under exclusive and dynamic social networks outside the formal rules and 
regulations, above national border, ofthe sending or receiving countries, it is then just a 
question of time before repatriated and partially integrated migrants resurface. The case 
of Ghanaian migrants in Nigeria during the mass exodus of the early 1980s offers a good 
example here (see section 3.3.3 above). In terms of policy, the Goss and Lindquist model 
seems to suggest a need to integrate micro and macro policies but with a multilateral 
perspective, as opposed to ad hoc unilateral policy prescriptions. 
Echoes of the Goss and Lindquist model can be picked up within other Post-modem 
critiques of the development of urban areas in less developed countries (LDCs). 
Generally, the Post-modem explanation of development in LDCs argues that production 
and reproduction in LDCs are increasingly less systemic and local and increasingly more 
fragmented, ragged, virtual, absurd, even absent (van Binsberg, 1997; Rimmer and Dick, 
1998). This view seems to be in accordance with Friedman's model. Modernization 
theory seemed to argue that increased consumption of material goods would lead to 
increased integration and decreasing poverty and deterioration of human life (Skeldon, 
1997). However, developing world urban areas, in particular, with their usually recent 
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history, heterogeneous migrant population, and full of social, political and economic 
structures apparently totally at variance with any rural conditions in the surrounding 
countryside, are laboratories of the meaning of a non-global urban reality. 
In these instances, the Post-modem critique asks whether it is efficient to say that towns 
in less developed countries (LDCs) have "engendered collective representations which 
are strikingly urban in the modem sense, and which offer partial and tentative yet creative 
solutions to such typically urban problems as continual personnel flow, ethnic, class and 
religious heterogeneity, economic and political powerlessness, and the increasing 
irrelevance, in the urban situation, of historic, rurally-derived forms of social organisation 
(kinship, marriage, 'traditional' politics and ritual)" (van Binsberg, 1997). In other words, 
"is the LDC townsman a displaced villager or tribesman?" (van Binsberg, 1997). In the 
past it was virtually easy to distinguish the LDC urbanites from traditionalist and 
paternalistic projections (Rimmer and Dick, 1998). 
LDC urban dwellers in the past could be viewed as temporarily displaced villagers whose 
true commitment and identity continued to lie with their rural societies of origin (Nelson-
Richards, 1988; Pedersen, 1997). This is because it was assumed that an exchange of 
resources took place between the urban dwellers and the rural settlers (pedersen, 1997; 
Rimmer and Dick, 1998). Migration was thus regarded as facilitating the incomes of the 
rural areas (given the removal of labour in direct rural production). The post-colonial 
state in particular was perceived as the central planner in these countries. (Nelson-
Richards, 1988; van Binsberg, 1997; Rimmer and Dick, 1998). 
The post-colonial state in LDCs, was generally perceived as the principal actor in the 
struggle for control of the urban space, and also the major agent of social control through 
its law-and-order institutions (the judiciary, police, immigration department); the major 
mediator of '''cosmopolitan'' meaning through the bureaucratically organised services it 
offers in such fields as education, cosmopolitan medicine, housing, the restructuring of 
kinship forms through statutory marriage etc.; and the major context for the creation of 
new, politically instrumental meaning in the process of nation-building and elite 
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legitimisation; and through its constitutional premises the object (and often hub) of 
modern political organisations (van Binsberg, 1997; Rimmer and Dick ,1998; Friedman, 
2000). Clearly, LDC urban dwellers had a limited ability to participate in mass 
consumption given the pervasive role and influence of the post-colonial state in the urban 
settings, and its virtual absence in the rural locations. What the Post-modern outlook 
reveals is that urban locations in third world economies are developing into distinct forms 
of interaction characterised by the inability to find employment, and to consume. The 
past constraints on the consumption of urban dwellers has translated into a new and 
different hegemonic order, in which the Third World rules by its classification, while the 
State can only helplessly observe the unveiling of this new order. Similarly, at the global 
level, nations-states can only observe as the new international division oflabour unveils 
at the turn of the century. Past rules and regulations to restrict this process are becoming 
increasingly obsolete, as they only lead to greater classifications outside the status quo. 
The type of consumption that does take place is more of "survivalist" in nature with little 
interaction with the capitalist (modern) system. In this sense then, many LDCs are 
becoming marginalized in the global economy. 
Whereas in the past such distinct classifications were perceived as somewhat benefiting 
from the capitalist interaction (for example the dependency explanation), here it is argued 
that the level of exploitation is virtually non-existence, due to the fact that the "Third 
World" survivalist sector has nothing of value to offer to the capitalist production system. 
The main viewpoint here is that the Third World sector is almost parasitic in the sense 
that it consumes (including consumption at a criminal level) without adding anything to 
the system from which it draws. Skills and material well being in this sector are low and 
fragmented. As a result, the Third World sector is here presented as entirely removed 
from the capitalist world economy, with only survivalist activities or destruction (fumine, 
war, epidemics, crime) as its identity. The rapid expansion of this sector in the urban 
areas ofLDCs, suggests that this could be the emerging hegemony in these countries. 
Indeed, as argued by the Post-modern critique, the Third World sector, highly associated 
with the Todaran type of economy (with risk and uncertainty) is becoming to be a 
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familiar feature of urban locations in LDCs. The parasitic nature of this sector in a sense 
represents the inability of the urban modem sector to generate employment, and thus the 
contribution of the modem sector in turning the urban locations into 'collapsing slums.' 
The type of work and lifestyle associated with this sector is not different from rural 
slums, ghettos, locations, and townships that are besieged with poor quality employment 
and consumption, and that are visible from Latin America, throughout South East Asia to 
the whole of sub-Sahara Africa. Although urban slums are not unique to the LDCs and 
are definitely not a novelty of the global economy, it is the rate at which urban slums in 
LDCs are multiplying that sees to be of most interest to structuralist theorists.'s 
The interesting point about the institutional explanation is that it provides for a broader 
conceptualisation of the Third World sector by placing it within a progressively more 
global network. This model is thus suggestively useful in offering a broader 
conceptualisation of international labour migration in southern Africa, in the sense that it 
begins to clearly identiIJ the economic impact of restricting labour in a global economy 
with capital mobility (i.e., the formation of urban slums on the one hand, and the 
marginalisation of migrants and LDCs on the other hand). Nevertheless, this model also 
pools extensively from the orthodox methodology and as such this thesis proposes a 
cumulative approach to the dual labour market and international labour migration in the 
southern African region. 
3. 4. Conclusion 
In the context of high urban unemployment in the southern African region, a cumulative 
approach to the study of international labour migration is highly useful. The functional 
" Past policies that addressed the welfare concerns of urban areas, such as the EPZ model of welfare 
generation, long-term development programmes put in place to restructure the economies of Third World 
countries, such as the structural adjustment programmes, or infonnal sector development programmes, have 
proving to be ineffective in reducing the rate of expansion of the Third World urban sector. The Post-
modem explanation of socio-political disorders and fragmentation in the world suggest that the re-
emergence of the third world sector at the end of the 20'h century (through the increased internal and 
external migration particularly from LDCs) signifies the restructuring of the existing institutional structure 
and a turning point in the longue duree or infinite time (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Skeldon, 1997). 
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approach to the study of international labour migration provides for a useful explanation 
as to why the classical migrant came to exist and dominate in the southern African 
region. The lack of an historical account into the behaviour analysis of international 
labour migration within the functionalist approach limits this explanation to that of 
voluntarism and rational behaviour. However, the reinforcement of the classical migrant 
labour institutional order even within the post-apartheid southern Africa labour market 
implies that more than voluntarism and rationality is what is maintaining the existing 
institutional structure. 
Structuralist responses to the functionalist school of thought have opted to integrate the 
dialogue of sectoral and social production systems that operate within specific institutions 
and that are constantly shaping the rules and regulations of the global economy. With 
respect to international labour migration, the structuralist perspective points out that at 
the tum of the 21 st century, there is a new international division of labour that is being 
propelled by the increased mobility of capital in the global economy, and that is 
producing increased labour flexibility with enhanced degrees of unequal exchange. 
Countries with low-skilled labour and low capital are more likely to experience a 
negative flexibility, while countries with high-skilled labour and high capital are more 
likely to experience positive flexibility. Whereas both types of flexibilities are 
characterised by increased inequality among special distributions, negative flexibility is 
further associated with exploitation, vulnerability and low-growth paths. These in tum are 
likely to evolve into separate entities that become completely removed (as opposed to 
being marginalized) from the rest of the capitalist production system. 
The interesting point that the structuralist provide is the expansion of the reference unit in 
labour studies to include either a global perspective (developed versus developing) or a 
local perspective (urban versus rural, males versus females, etc). Nevertheless, the 
functionalist perspective still proved the utility of interaction even within the structuralist 
methodology. It is thus imperative to regard dual labour markets from a cumulative 
stance. 
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We now turn to Chapter 4, which contains a comparative country case-study analysis that 
assists in testing the a priori assumptions examined in the theoretical model presented 
above. After which, in Chapter 5, an empirical analysis using the Lesotho example is 
achieved. 
I 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPARATIVE COUNTRY STUDY ANALYSIS 
4. 1. Introduction 
This chapter offers a qualitative comparative country study analysis of the economic 
impact of international labour migration in five selected developing countries. The point 
here is to demonstrate qualitatively that international labour migration is a dynamic 
progression that is intricately linked to the modernization of a labour sending country. 
The aim of the chapter is two-fold. First the chapter aims to show qualitatively that 
increased economic liberalization in developing countries is resulting in a push out-
migration of labour. Second, the chapter aims to qualitatively test the a priori 
assumptions of the cumulative dual labour market theoretical framework discussed in 
Chapter 3, by applying the assumptions of the theoretical framework to several empirical 
case studies. A historical analysis of the process of industrial diversification of the 
selected countries and the study of impact of export -orientation industrialisation (EOI) 
and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on the domestic labour market and on 
shifts in sectoral employment are the main tools of analysis used here. 
The five chosen country studies are Costa Rica, Egypt, Ghana, Sudan and the Philippines. 
The aim of choosing a diverse group of countries is show the similarities of these 
countries to the Lesotho case on the dependence on commodity manufacturing (including 
Costa Rica) and external migration (excluding Costa Rica). All of the above mentioned 
economies, including Lesotho, followed similar industrialisation strategy of import 
substitution industrialisation (lSn, followed by a subsequent switch to export orientation 
industrialisation (EOI) that was preceded by an economic crisis in the 1980s.1 The 
implementation of the lSI strategy was accompanied by high growth periods and out-
J Naturally the time of implementation ofthe lSI and EO! policies differed with respect to each country's 
political independence. Nevertheless, the lSI policy was usually implemented immediately following the 
political independence. 
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migration rates in these economies? The link between the lSI growth and international 
migration that is central to the analysis of the chapter. The purpose of the comparative 
country study is to extract lessons for Lesotho and the southern Africa region in terms of 
international labour migration management and the attainment of a successful export-led 
industrialisation. 
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section one gives is the introduction. Section 
two analyses the IS industrialisation phase. Section three examines the economic crisis 
period of the 1980s. Section four analyses the EO industrialisation and SAPs. Section 
five discusses the impact of EO industrialisation and SAPs on the domestic labour 
market. Section five gives the summary and conclusions of the chapter. To recap, all 
these sections the impact of industrial diversification on labour migration is emphasized 
and the theoretical a priori assumptions tested. 
4.2. Early industrialisation phase, 1940s - early 1980s 
The objective here is not to document the process of the import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) phase. A lot has been written on that (e.g., Sassen, 1988; Einirij , 
1993; Mensah, 1993; Potts, 1990, Date-Bah, 1997) The aim here is to document the links 
between the lSI phase and international labour migration, therefore a briefing of the lSI 
phase is carried out in conjunction with the story of international labour migration. To 
begin with, during the lSI phase, Costa Rica, the Philippines, Egypt, Ghana, and Sudan 
were all primary commodity exporters and agrarian based economies, with little value-
adding production and a high reliance on international prices and markets for their 
products. Traditionally, these economies were net exporter of coffee, bananas, beef, and 
sugar (Costa Rica), cocoa and timber, gold (Ghana), coconut, fruits and vegetables, and 
2 As expected, there will be important diffurences among the five country studies, in terms of the 
importance of international migration on the national economy. For example, Costa Rica has the lowest 
international labour migration among these countries. In addition. Costa Rica is usually cited as a success 
slory (e.g., Diaz and Briquets, 1992; World Bank, 1995). However, as in the other case studies, the path of 
development in Costa Rica largely mirrors the lSI model, which in this chapter we argue is the root of the 
economic problems facing these economies, such as high out-migration and rural urban migration rates, 
and low standard of Jiving and human capital development, that the EOJ phase has so far fuiled to reverse. 
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sugar (the Philippines), and coffee (Sudan). The economic model of these countries was 
built around food self-sufficiency, and trade with the neighbouring regional economies. 
For example, between 1949 and 1960 Costa Rica had one of the top economic growth 
rates in Latin America, with GDP climbing an average of 9 percent a year (lCG, 1997). 
Similarly, the Philippines, Ghana, Egypt and Sudan all achieved GDP growth rates 
averaging between 6 and 9 percent per annum (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Pangestu, 2000; 
Ertur and House, 1993; Shaban et ai, 1995). 
The focus of the lSI was mainly on unskilled labour-intensive exports that were intended 
to be "pro-labour" in the sense that large numbers of unskilled labour were supposed to 
be easily absorbed into employment particularly with low education requirement (i.e., 
primary schoollevel).3 Governments in these countries nationalised primary education 
and engineered a guaranteed policy for graduates in order to achieve the above goal. In 
addition, in Ghana, Costa Rica, Egypt and Sudan the governments picked winners in 
agriculture and services (i.e., the comparative advantage sectors) (lCG, 1997; Beaudry 
and Sowa, 2994; Leonor, 1985. In the Philippines the government competed with the 
other South East Asian economies in promoting its more comparatively advantageous 
industries (pangestu, 2000). As in the Lesotho case, the main motivation of these 
countries to pursue an lSI strategy were similar in that they all wanted to develop a 
modern and domestic industrial sector which would produce in the first instance 
consumer goods and progress towards intermediate and capital goods. All these countries 
used tariffand non-tariff protection on final goods to promote their local industries. 
With the exception of Costa Rica, Egypt, Ghana, the Philippines, and Sudan all relied 
heavily on international labour migration to boost their economies. Figure 4.1 shows that 
the world share of remittances from these countries increased steadily during the lSI 
phase. 
3 See Link, 1985, Vermaak, 1985, and Som, 1987 for a detailed accounting on social development in Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs), including southern Africa, during the lSI phase. 
112 
Remittances: share of world 
1977 1978 197919801981 1982 1983 19841985 198619871988198919901991 1992 1993 19941995 
I 
0.] ~+=+=:;~~~:::::;=;=~~ 0. ]~~~~~~~1 
0.001 +.--:------------.~::::::==---=---=------'~o:=L=::~~--.J 
Figure 4.1 
I~:! l 
I-+-Sud · 
I
------CR 
---*-1. 
I~Gh L_ ..• _ _ _ 
Note: a) Data is presented in log scale so as to be able to compare the different shares of 
remittances. 
b) On the legend scale, Eq stands for Egypt, ph stands for the Philippines, Sud stands for 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistical Yearbook 
(Annual). 
Most migration was principally to the oil producing countries in the Middle East (Egypt, 
Sudan, and the Philippines) and in Nigeria (Ghana). Revenues obtained from external 
migration, in the form of remittances, were largely spent on services and construction 
(basic physical infrastructure), as well as on basic education. Even in Costa Rica 
revenues obtained from intra-regional trade was spent on building among other things, 
the country's port, roads, public transportation system, and basic education. The lSI 
phase in these countries was thus usually accompanied by large public sector investment 
in human and physical infrastructure, particularly primary education, construction, and 
transport, but without a clearly defined urban focus. Given the small basis of tradable 
sectors in this country, government expenditure on non-tradable sectors lead to their rapid 
expansion (and absorption oflabour) that deterred the development of the tradable sector. 
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Thus, the signs of a Dutch disease phenomenon were already visible as early as in the lSI 
phase. 
As in the case of Lesotho, the early growth associated with the lSI created a Dutch 
disease phenomenon in the five economies, whereby the production of tradable sector 
suffered to the benefit of the booming non-tradable sector owing to appreciating real 
exchange rates during the agriculture, gold and oil price boom (Leonor, 1985; Gindling 
and Berry, 1994; Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Shaban et aI., 1995). Generally, countries that 
were more successful during this phase adapted a more democratic approach to 
development by minimizing social and political unrest, and maximizing public services: 
In contrast, countries that were less successful in their lSI phase displayed a high reliance 
on external migration and non-tradable sector development, and centrally governing 
institutions.5 
4 Costa Rica stands out as the most successful case study here. Costa Rica's early phase of industrialisation 
began well in advance of the other economies, as early as 1948, when the country became a democracy. 
The government abolished the military governing and nationalised the banks. Over the next thirty years, 
Costa Rica government eliminated military coups, civil unrest and guerrilla warfare. The government aJsa 
invested resources heavily in its poorer regions and in energy and transport, and communications 
infrastructure (ICG, 1997). The government built an extensive and well-run social welfare system that 
included public utilities, free healthcare, low-cost housing and insurance, and pension and savings 
programmes. It also established credit and technical assistance programmes for farmers and guaranteed 
subsidized prices to encourage production of food crops (Gindling and Berry, 1994; ICG, 1997). The 
programmes provided a strong social safety net for the country's poor and spurred growth of a large 
middle-class of professionals, entrepreneurs, and civil servants (ICG, 1997). 
5 For instance, Egypt, Ghana and Sudan, non-oil producing countries with unstable political backgrounds, 
benefited a lot from the oil producing countries during the 1970s oil boom period. More than one million of 
the male labour force migrated to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern oil producing countries, and to 
Nigeria, where they became employed in the construction sector of these economies. The governments of 
the labour sending countries soon after adopted an emigration policy that permitted them to accrue 
remittances and deferred pay from the international migrants. The share of public investment increased 
dramatically during the period 1970 - 73 and 1974 - 81 as a result ofthis policy (Leon or, 1985 ; Ertur and 
House, 1993; Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Marais, 1994; Shaban et ai, 1995). Much of the public spending 
was on infrastructure projects in transport and communication. In Egypt, private investment was also 
stimulated as the governments embarked on its open-door policy, lifting the ban on private sector 
participation in foreign trade and encouraging private investment industry (Leonor, 1985). Nevertheless, 
the non-tradable sector was developing at a faster rate than the tradable sector in these countries, which 
produced the classical Dutch disease growth associated with immiserising growth and a low development 
path. Given the lack of coherent democratic institutions in these countries, most of the gains from 
international migration were "lost" to the immiserising growth (including high levels of corruption by civil 
servants, crime, crowding out of the private sector, etc) (Ertur and House, 1993; Marais, 1994; Shaban et ai, 
1995) 
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As in Lesotho, countries also expressed a classical Lewisian economy, whereby the 
surplus labour from the poor rural areas became absorbed into the modem sector 
(agriculture, mining and oil). The Lewisian phenomenon was visible in terms of the 
incidence of poverty and income inequality.6 The pattern of international labour 
migration during the lSI phase in particular corresponded to the Lewis model of dual 
labour markets analysed in Chapter 3. The next sub-section elaborates on this point. 
4.2. 1. Labour migration during the lSI phase. 
Industrial diversification in these countries was occurring at a time when international 
labour migration in the global economy was on the rise. The oil and gold boom of the 
1970s and 1980s, following the slow down of agriculture exports, resulted in a large 
demand for temporary labour in the construction and services industries of the oil and 
gold producing countries. At the same time, the restructuring of Europe and Japan 
following the end of World War IT also generated a large demand for temporary, cheap 
foreign labour. Most of these temporary migrants came from the less developing 
economies. The wage differential between the rich countries and the less rich economies 
was the main motivating factor for international labour migration (Macmillan, 1982). The 
general pattern of migration was thus a classical pull migration. 
Table 4.1 indicates the overall rise in private unrequited transfers from emigrants in the 
in these economies. The overall trend is a rise in the receipts of these transfers since the 
mid-1970s up to the early 1980s (see table 4.1). In developing countries in particular, and 
especially in the case of our five case studies, these transfers were used to finance imports 
6 For example, in the Philippines, the Filipino poor were located mainly in the rural areas, and they 
accounted for 60 to 70 percent of all the poor in South East Asian countries (Pangestu, 2000). The initial 
incidence of rural poverty was higher than urban poverty in the early 1970s. Incidence of rural poverty was 
twice that of urban poverty (Saith, 1998). Over the 1970 - 76 period, during the oil boom period, the 
decline in urban poverty was much more rapid than in rural areas, reflecting the urban concentration of 
construction and lSI activities. However, throughout the reminder of the late 1970s, the trend changed with 
rural poverty falling more rapidly than urban poverty so that by 1980 rural poverty incidence was lower 
than urban poverty (Saith, 1998; Pangestu, 20000). The reasons given behind this trend are mainly 
increased government expenditure on rural development projects and increased remittances from overseas 
migrant workers to their rural households in the Philippines (Ranis, 1992; Saith, 1998). 
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and stimulate internal demand. Table 4.1 also indicates that in the 1970s the share of such 
transfers to imports began to increase, as well as their share of exports, suggesting the 
importance of international labour migration to the industrial diversification process in 
the world. Nevertheless, the pattern of migration also had a socio-political inclination. 
Counties that had shared a colonial history proved to experience greater migration 
interaction between them. However, as international trade deepened in the late 1970s and 
1980s, migration begun to expand its base to include movement to countries that had 
higher incomes but not necessarily the ones with whom the migrants shared a common 
past.7 
The diversity of labour exporting destinations from the lSI countries required that the 
governments established coherent programmes to manage the flow oflabour outside the 
country and the inflow of remittances. As in the case of Lesotho, in the 1970s the 
governments of the labour sending countries established institutions of international 
labour migration for the generation of foreign reserves, the control of population 
movements across its borders, and ostensibly, the promotion oftbe rights and welfare of 
international workers (UNRISD, 2000). The signed bilateral agreements with several host 
countries, including among others, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, 
Jordan (the Philippines, Sudan, Egypt), Algeria, and the Republic of Nauru, and Zambia 
(the Philippines), and Nigeria (Ghana), in order to attain this goal (Ertur and House, 
1993; Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Marais, 1994; Shaban et ai, 1995; Saith, 1998). By the 
rnid-1990s, most of these governments operated their own recruitment agencies and 
7 For example, traditionally, migrant workers from the Philippines were mostly destined for the U.S. 
economy, which had been the main political administration in the Philippines during the colonial era (Goss 
and Lindquist, 1995). Most of these migrants were absorbed in the low-paying jobs in California especially 
related to construction and domestic work (Menjivar et ai, 1998). Most of these migrants also became 
permanent residents in the United States (Menjivar et ai , 1998). Remittances in the form of private 
unrequited transfers sent to the Philippines were the main link between these migrant workers and the 
Philippines economy (Keely and Tran, 1989; Menjivar et ai, 1998). However, between the early 1960s and 
late 1980s, the Philippines' export of labour to Europe (Rome) and Japan increased. Most of the migrants 
were employed in temporary jobs, with one-year renewable contracts (Tacoli, 1999). At the same time, in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s Filipino male migrant labour to the Middle East and female migrant labour 
to the East Asian economies, particularly Malaysia and South Korea, also increased following the oil boom 
in the Gulf oil producing countries and the economic success of the Asian Tigers (Goss and Lindquist, 
1995; Martin, 1995). These migrants were also employed in the construction and services sectors of the 
labour-receiving countries. 
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maintains labour attache abroad, as well as licensing and regulating the private sector at 
home (Skeldon, 1997).8 It is interesting to note that these bilateral agreements were 
signed mainly between South-South countries. This is not surprising, given the fact that 
migrant worlcers from the South to the North always required visas and proof of valid 
entrance and reason for entrance, i.e., migrants from the South had traditionally faced 
stricter unilateral immigration polices from the governments of the North.9 What is 
surprising perhaps is the volume of migrants into the South economies as compared to the 
North. This could be either due to a skill differential, immigration policies, or 
geographical location. Clearly skill differential and immigration would also impact 
South-South migration. It is thus interesting to note the effect of geographical proximity 
on patterns and volumes of migration. 
Most of the destination countries cited above more or less belong within the same geo-
political configuration as the labour sending countries. The suggestion here is that even in 
the lSI phase, social and political relations due to proximity appeared to influence 
specific sectors of production that seemed to reduce labour inflexibility within the 
geopolitical composition. This suggests the operation of migration institutions as 
proposed by the Goss and Lindquist model. 
In terms of internal migration, generally, the period associated with world booming oil 
prices generated a rapid increase in rural-urban migration in the lSI countries, due to both 
economic and social reasons. Urban areas tended to have better social amenities than 
rural area, and most non-agriculture modern sector employment was associated with the 
urban centres (Chitrakar, 1994). Both rural and urban income inequalities increased 
initially up to the mid-1970s then began to decline. This can also be attributed to the 
8 The Philippine government explicitly endorsed the international migration of the Filipino as part of the 
national development strategy (Martin, 1993, 1995). However, unlike in the case of Lesotho, the Philippine 
Labour Code Act of 1974 set up a proposal for the institutionalisation of international labour migration by 
state policy. The amendments to the Labour Code of 1974 provide an institutional framework for regulating 
the rapidly expanding market in foreign contract labour (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). 
9 1t is also interesting to note the asymmetry between international migration and foreign direct investment 
patterns in these countries, but such a study lies beyond the scope of the thesis (see for example, Chitrakar, 
1994). 
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decision to prioritise development of rural areas and the agriculture sector (pangestu, 
2000). However, urban inequality remained higher by the mid-1980s. This is largely due 
to the fact that the rise in wages in the modem formal sector was much faster than that of 
the informal sector, and the fact that the benefits of growth were concentrated within 
certain groups in urban centres (mostly public lobbyist groups). Living in the urban area 
was also associated with a higher position in the society, irrespective of actual incomes 
(Leonor, 1985; Ranis, 1992; Chitrakar, 1994; Saith, 1998; Pangestu, 2000). Thus, during 
the lSI phase, large numbers of rural dwellers migrated to urban centres within (and 
outside) the country in search of both economic and social upgrading. Naturally, given 
the high population growth in these countries during this phase, and the lack of private 
sector entrepreneurship, migration to internal urban areas soon became associated with 
migrant-inequality, whereby access to social and economic amenities in the urban areas 
was determined by social class standing in the rural areas (Gindling, 1991; Cohen and 
House, 1996). The point being raised here is the emergence of urban segmentation and 
inequalitylO, as suggested by Mohtadi, discussed in Chapter 3. 
In terms of push rural out-migration, it is noted that the oil boom period was also 
accompanied by a boomlet in non-food commercial agriculture. In countries were 
agriculture was the pillar of export production, farm sizes were enlarged and small 
producers were forced to relocate to other parts of the country or to migrate. This 
translated to the rural areas in the domestic economic shedding workers faster than jobs 
were being created in the estate farms or the urban areas. As a result, most workers who 
migrated to the urban areas became landless (given the unequal urban stratification), and 
either remained openly unemployed or became absorbed in informal activities associated 
with poor credit and marketing, and no value-adding production 11 (Ertur and House, 
10 Analysts of the regional dimensions of the lSI period reveal that for example, in the case of the 
Philippines, urban inequality was worse for urban areas in Manila compared to off Manila (Saith, 1998). 
The worsening expenditure distribution in urban areas was consistence with the worsening of relative 
poverty in urban areas. This indicates that the benefits of early growth were enjoyed more by the capital-
intensive sectors in urban areas in Manila (Ranis, 1992; Pangestu, 2000), and particularly the government 
sector and foreign investors (Saith, 1998). 
11 For example, in Costa Rica, during the coffee boom period, coffee farms expanded in size as production 
continued to grow, and many small-scale traditional food farmers were displaced from their farmlands 
(Gindling and Berry, 1994). This was accompanied by a rise in the rate of landlessness in the country 
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1993; Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Gindling and Berry, 1994 Marais, 1994; Cohen and 
House, 1996). 
Generally, the early growth period in these countries was however short lived. The sharp 
economic downturn started in the late 1970s with the sudden decrease in the world price 
of agriculture exports, and the subsequent unexpected decrease in the price of oil (Sassen, 
J 988; Gindling and Berry, 1994; Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Shaban et ai, 1995; Saith, 
1998; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999; Pangestu, 2000). The sharp declines in real growth 
were followed by sharp declines in foreign exchange that led to the massive borrowing by 
these countries in international and local banking systems, which subsequently led to the 
economic crisis of the 1980s. 
between 1960s and 1970s. International labour migration, although it remained as an option to some of the 
landless farmers, was not widely pursued in Costa Rica. The United States mission to substitute foreign aid 
for international migration, and the success ofth. regional common market area (CACM) contributed t the 
low rate of international labour migration in Costa Rica (Weintraub and Diaz-Briquets, 1992). 
Nevertheless, rural-urban migration rose dramatically during the coffee boom period. Early migrants were 
easily absorbed into the modem formal sector but, since the late I 970s, employment in the formal sector in 
urban areas became less available to later migrants (ICG, 1997; Saith, 1998). Most were forced into the 
informal sector employment, while some opted for emigration (Gindling, 1991). San Jose in particular 
emerged as the main centre for in-migration and infonnal sector development. The structure of the informal 
sector was such that some jobs were classified as "protected" in the sense that kinship, family, neighbour, 
and friendship ties determined entrance into such jobs, and unprotected jobs in which entrance was mostly 
free and competitive. Women tended to occupy the freer entry informal sector employment sector and men 
(Gindling, 1991). Due to the relatively large size and diversification of the informal sector since early 
industrialisation phase, unemployment levels in Costa Rica have remained relatively low in comparison to 
levels in other developing countries (Gindling and Berry, 1994; ICG, 1997). 
Like in Costa Rica, rural-urban migration rose as well as international labour migration due to the cocoa 
boom. A lot of small producers were pushed out of their land and forced to either settle in the urban areas 
in Ghana or migrate outside the country. The urban areas lacked employment, particularly the 
manufucturing sector, and so most of the landless rural dwellers emigrated to neighbouring economies and 
also to the Middle East. Unlike in Costa Rica, the regional market in West Africa was not developed 
enough to allow increased trade as a substitute for international labour migration. The oil boom in Nigeria 
and the Middle East absorbed most of Ghana's low-skilled and highly skilled labour that emigrated in the 
1970s (Sassen, 1988; Potts, 1990). The rural poor who migrated to the urban areas were absorbed in the 
unprotected informal sector, which was largely dominated by "market women" in the stadiums (which 
operate as market places in Ghana). Entry into the informal sector employment was relatively free 
(Beaudry and Sowa, 1994) in Ghana in comparison to the situation in Costa Rica. 
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4.3. Tbe economic crisis oftbe 1980s 
In all of the country case studies, the economic crisis signified the lack of industrial 
diversification and the vulnerability of these countries to external economic shocks. Costa 
Rica was the first country out of our chosen case studies to experience the economic 
crisis of the 1980s. The economic crisis in Costa Rica arrived earlier than the 1980s. The 
signs were already obvious by the late 1970s. The economic crisis in Costa Rica was a 
result of cumulative external factors influencing the local economy.12 The pattern of 
diversification (i.e., coffee and exports to CACM) made Costa Rica vulnerable to 
external shocks. 13 
12 The suggestion here is that Costa Rica experienced two econom ic crises during the lSI phase. The first 
one, in the late 1970s, was an export crisis associated with the falling price of cocoa crisis. The second one, 
in the early 19805 was a macroeconomic crisis associated with high government foreign borrowing. 
13 The leftish Sandinistas toppled the U.S. backed Samoza dictatorship in neighbouring Nicaragua and the 
Reagan Administration took office in Washington (ICG, 1997). The economic down spiral, reported as the 
worst in the country's history, was triggered by a steep rise in the price of gasoline and other petroleum 
products, and a rapid fall in the world price of coffee (Gindling and Berry, 1994; ICG, 1997). As the terms 
of trade shifted, Costa Rica was forced to borrow heavily from foreign banks and lending international 
fmancial institutions (IFls). The situation was particularly acute because half of the country's debt was in 
high-interest, short-term loans from commercial banks (Sassen, 1988; lCG, 1997). Between 1977 and 1981 
Costa Rica's debt service quadrupled, totalling 60 percent of export earnings. By 1980, the country's debt 
had reached US$3 billion. At the same time, Costa Rica had one of the highest per capita in the world 
(US$2021) and an inflation of 100 percent (ICG, 1997). Under these conditions, President Rodrigo 
suspended debt payments to nearly all of the country's foreign creditors, predominantly international 
commercial banks. 
However, the international financial institutions (IFls) were not sympathetic to Costa Rica' s situation. 
Faced with impeding financial default from two Latin America giants - Brazil and Mexico, the commercial 
banks and the IMF were reluctant to negotiate new loans or repayment with Costa Rica, regardless of its 
relative small debtor country status (ICG, 1997). Instead, the Reagan Administration stepped forward with 
a bail out scheme, motivated not so much by Costa Rica's internal crisis as by Washington's strategic need 
to buy its cooperation in the concealed mission against Nicaragua, coupled with the Administration's 
crusade to push "supply side" economics beyond the U. S. borders (ICG, 1997). Thus began Costa Rica's 
long association with U. S. food aid and financial aid programmes. Whereas in the late 1940s up to the late 
1970s the U.S. government and IFls viewed Costa Rica as a stable but economically and strategically 
unimportant, in the 19805, the U.S. and international opinions regarding Costa Rica's economic position in 
Latin America had changed. During the 1980s Costa Rica received substantial foreign aid from the U.S. 
For example, soon after President Luis Alberto Monge took office in May 1982, the Reagan Administration 
quickly struck a deal with his government. Again in 1983 , the USAID assistance in Costa Rica soared to 
USS212million, a 27-fold increase over 1978 (ICG, 1997: 23). Thus during the 1980s Costa Rica became 
the second largest per capita recipient of U.S. economic aid, surpassed only by Israel. 
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Similarly, the Philippines and Ghana who were also dependent on primary exports and 
international labour migration were very vulnerable to the external shock that resulted in 
the early 1980s. The effects of the full of agriculture relative prices in the late 1970s in 
the Philippines were offSet by the rise in remittances from high oil price in Indonesia and 
the Middle East (Keely and Tran, 1989; Martin, 1993; Pangestu, 2000). In the 
Philippines, the economic crisis manifested itself in terms ofa financial crisis in the mid-
1980s (pangestu, 2000). During the mid-I 980s, the Philippines embarked on a 
programme of rapid globalisation that was characterised by more aggressive and 
consistence export oriented strategy. The economy started to shift away from labour 
intensive exports to more skilled labour and human capital-intensive exports (pangestu, 
2000). At the same time, in the late 1980s, the Philippines liberalized the frnancial sector 
(capital account) and attracted larger capital inflows, particularly in the form of Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs). 
However, the economic crisis of the 1980s associated with huge debts in commercial 
banks triggered a lot of the EPZ factories to shut down over night in the Philippines and 
left the economy in financial turmoil. The government had borrowed heavily from the 
local banking sector to finance the necessary infrastructure requirements for the EPZ. 
When the fuctories shut down unexpectedly the government found itselfin serious debt to 
the frnancial sector. The huge borrowing by the government sector squeezed out private 
frnancing and created bad credit in the banking system (Chitrakar, 1994; Sachikonye, 
1998). By the time the oil prices fell in the early 1980s, the Philippines had been 
transformed from a country of high economic prosperity to a country of dire economic 
situation. Over one million migrants were repatriated to the Philippines at once from the 
Middle East and Indonesia due to declining prices of oil (A WORC, 1999). 
In Ghana, the economic crisis of the 1980s manifested in the form of a severe shortage in 
foreign exchange, a contraction of the manufacturing sector, and several periods of 
political instability.14 As in the case of the Philippines, the financial sector in Ghana was 
14 The price of cocoa began to fallon the world market in the early 1960s. By the mid-1960s, the 
government borrowed heavily form the local banking system to finance its growing fiscal deficit, which 
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not developed enough to allow huge borrowing by the government. The high government 
borrowing from the financial sector led to the crowding out of the private sector 
borrowing. This further depressed the private sector's chances for growth (Beaudry and 
Sowa, 19994). As in Costa Rica, government borrowing in Ghana was accompanied by a 
high monetary expansion that fuelled inflation. IS 
During the period beginning from 1983, the four lSI countries dependent on international 
labour migration received mass repatriation of their external migrants from the Middle 
East and Nigeria, at different time intervals. In all these countries, over one million 
migrant workers were repatriated in the first mass exodus. In Ghana, the mass exodus 
took place in 1983, when one million Ghanaians were involuntarily returned to Ghana 
from Nigeria, where most had little prospects of securing a decent livelihood (Mensah, 
1993). Similarly, Egypt, Sudan, and the Philippines experienced mass returns of over one 
caused expansion in the money supply. Money supply expansion or contraction was tied to the surplus or 
deficit position of the balance of payments. During the early growth period the government had avoided 
indiscriminate expansion in the money supply by holding inflation in check. The expansion in the money 
supply in the mid-1960s was not matched by growth in production. Thus Ghana shifled ITom a position of 
virtually zero inflation at independence to 20 percent by 1965 (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). The falling 
price of cocoa and the bad reserve position meant a foreign exchange shortage. 
Tbe first obvious signs of the decline in the economy appeared in 1964, with queues forming in shops and 
the stadiums for basic imported commodities like sugar, milk, soap (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). The harsh 
economic conditions precipitated the 1966 coup that toppled the Nkrumab regime. The subsequent 
governments that succeeded the Nkrumah regime did not however imp lement any economic programmes 
for a long-term solution to the economic problems of weak foreign exchange earnings and sluggish 
manufucturing growth. Successive governments continued along the path of ad hoc economic solutions that 
satisfied the public's demand for consumables. The lack of a proper economic direction is cited as the main 
cause that led to the crisis of the early 1980s in Ghana (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Mkandawire and Soludo, 
1999). Such observations are also visible in Lesotho today. The only difference is that Lesotho continues to 
enjoy sound growth in its manufacturing sector. The government policies however, remain ad hoc (see 
Chapter 2). 
IS In 1972, when the military regime of the National Redemption Council led by General Archeampong 
rejected some of Ghana's external debt, the country was blacklisted (by [FIs) as not creditworthy. This 
meant that for most of the 1970s and early 1980s Ghana could not attract external loans. It also meant that 
Ghana had a relatively small external debt in comparison to other developing countries. Tn 1970, Ghana's 
debt service was 1.1 percent of GNP and 5 percent of exports. By 1982 the ratios were 0.2 and 6.8 percent 
respectively, compared to 13.4 percent of GNP debt service for other sub-Saharan countries (Beaudry and 
Sowa, 1994: 362). In 1982 Ghana experienced a devastating drought year and wild fires, which destroyed 
crop furms and crops that resulted to every conceivable item, including electricity, water and food being in 
short supply (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). At the same time, about a million Ghanaians were 
repatriated ITom Nigeria. This led to a refugee plight and famine situation in Ghana that ultimately resulted 
to the introduction of the Economic Recovery programme (ERP) in 1983 . 
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million working age population in the early 1990s from the Middle East, following the 
Gulf war (UNRISD, 2000). The mass sudden involuntary mass return of such large 
numbers of the working age populations in these countries translated into inunediate 
population and unemployment growth (UNRISD, 2000). These countries also 
experienced sudden decreases in the estimated inflow of remittances during this period. 
Remittances: share ofGDP. 
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Figure 4.2 
Note: a) Remittances calculated in millions US$. Real GOP is calculated from current 
international prices. 
--+--'''' 
b) On the legend scale, EG represents Egypt, Phi represents the Philippines, Sud 
represents Sudan, Cr represents Costa Rica, lnd represents Indonesia, and Gh represents 
Ghana. 
Sources: IMF Balance of Payments Statistical Yearbook (Annual); IMF, 1999; Penn World Data, 
2000. 
Figure 4.2 above indicates that remittances as a share of GDP were very important in 
Egypt, Sudan and the Philippines, especially in the 1980s. The data however, needs to be 
viewed with caution. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note from Figure 4.2 the dramatic 
decline in remittances as a share of GDP in the above-mentioned countries since 1992. 
This could either be presenting the effect of mass repatriation during the Gulf war of 
1990, or, as in the case of Lesotho, it could be showing the collapse offormal recording 
of remittances in these countries. Nevertheless, it is frequently reported that the early 
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1990s signified a time of great remittance loss in these countries (Adams, 1991; Mensah, 
1993; UNRISD, 2000). The UNRISD report estimated the total loss of remittances to 
Egypt, Sudan, and the Philippines due to the Gulf crisis to have cumulatively amounted 
to about 27 percent of the total world remittance during that period (UNRISD, 2000). The 
UNRISD (2000) migration report, Ghana lost over US$ 7.5 million in 1983 as a result of 
the mass expUlsion of its citizens from Nigeria. 
In term of GDP share, figure 4.2 indicates that remittances inflows into Egypt fell to half 
their 1992 share by 1993. In Sudan, remittances fell from 5 percent of GDP in 1989 to 
nothing by 1993. The Philippines shows a case of collapse of remittances as a share of 
GDP in 1993 from 1992. As noted before, this collapse could as well be a reflection of 
the collapse in official records of remittances in 1993. The overall effect of the mass 
repatriation of the early 1980s and early 1990s in these countries was the increased 
pressure put on economies that were already ailing. The point put across here is that such 
huge remittance losses resulted in the further weakening of these economies that were 
mostly dependent on external migration for their growth. 
Both short-term and long-term measures were put in place by international assistance and 
the governments of the migrants, to assist in their reintegration into the domestic 
economy. The main short-terms measures included among other things, the provision of 
transport from the destination to the home country by the government of the migrants. 
Programmes and measures related to resettlement of miners were generally less 
successful. Most migrants felt that they did not have a position in the domestic economy, 
and many attempted to return to the destination country as soon as they were deported 
(Adams, 1991; UNRISD, 2000). 
Longer-term measures to integrate migrants back into the domestic economy were 
undertaken within the general macroeconomic policy of export-led industrialisation. 
Although generally these countries had resisted implementing the structural adjustment 
programmes associated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
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Bank,16 the pressures of rising populations and unemployment led to their eventual 
concession with the lMF in the early 1980s (Ghana) and early 1990s (Egypt and Sudan). 
Thus the overall immediate and long-term consequence of the economic decline of the 
1980s and early 1990s in these countries was the general impoverishment of the 
population. Most indicators point to a decrease in the standard ofliving.17 For example, 
in Costa Rica, the gap between the poor and the increased from 16 times more earnings 
for the richest 10 than the poorest 10 percent to 31 to one by 1990 (lCG, 1997: 28). 
Poverty rates fluctuated between 1980s and 1990s. The percentage of households living 
in poverty increased from 18.5 percent in 1987 to 23.8 percent in 1992. The increase in 
poverty rates was due to reduction in government social spending and increase in sales 
tax, in order to reduce its fiscal debt. Thus generally, people's purchasing power 
decreased in these countries following the economic crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Besides the decrease in material standard of living, the general quality of life also 
decreased (Ertur and House, 1993; Gindling and Berry, 1994; Marais, 1994; Shaban et aI, 
1995; Pangestu, 2000).18 
16 The Philippines EOI phase was not adapted within the structural adjustment programmes oftbe IMF and 
World Bank, although this may have changed later (Pangestu, 2000). Like Costa Rica, the Philippines had 
already embarked on export-led growth with export-processing wne (EPZ) manufacturing as early as the 
1970s (Esquivel et ai, 1998; Pangestu, 2000). 
17 In Ghana, both rural and urban poverty increased dramatically during the economic crisis years, despite 
the earlier higher reduction of rural poverty below urban poverty in the mid-1960s, due to increased 
government expenditure in rural development projects. The 1980s high rural poverty was a result of under 
payment of cocoa farmers. The index of food production per capita in 1971 was 100; it dropped to 72 
percent in 1982. Poverty increased, with the number of urban people living below the poverty line rising 
from 30 - 35 percent in the late I 970s to 40 - 50 percent by the mid-1980s. For the rural people, the 
situation was even worse: the percentage of people living below the line in rural areas rose from 60 - 65 
percent in the late 1970s to 62 -72 percent by the early 1980s (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994: 363). The price 
distortions that affected the whole economy were particularly harsh in the cocoa sector. The government 
through the Cocoa Marketing Board determined the price of cocoa based on the world price and the 
exchange rate of the cedi. During the lSI phase, the cedi was fixed to the pound sterling and was grossly 
overvalued. This meant that cocoa farmers were grossly underpaid. As the price of cocoa decreased in the 
late 1960s, Ghana's foreign exchange fell exacerbating the decline in the farmer 's earnings. This led to 
farmers adapting diversifYing mechanism. into maize production for instance, as the price of other food 
crops rose relative to cocoa. Non-farm and non-formal wage employment in the urban areas and even 
outside the country in particular rose in Ghana in the 1980s (Marais, 1994). Some of the farmers were 
reported to have smuggled cocoa across the border to Cote d'lvoire where they obtained higher prices for 
their produce (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). 
18 For example, in Costa Rica and Ghana the incidence of infectious disease increased dramatically in late 
the 1980s. The recorder figures for malma in Costa Rica jumped from 110 in 1982 to 1142 in 1990 and 
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Aside from deteriorating living standards, the signs of the ailing economies manifested 
themselves in several ways. In the Philippines, gender inequality increased, with women 
occupying low-status and low-paying jobs in cross-border trade and migration with the 
neighbouring South East Asian economies. Between the period 1970 and 1995, there was 
little increase in the female labour force participation rate, which rose only from 46.6 
percent in 1970 to 47.1 percent in 199519 (pangestu, 2000: 7). This is because many 
Filipino women were employed outside the country, in the neighbouring economies 
(AWORC,1999). 
The increased pace of urbanization in these counties in the late 1980s was thus reinforced 
by the disproportionate attraction of urban centres for the migrants returning from the 
Gulf oil producing countries and Nigeria (Marais, 1994; Shaban et al, 1995). The rapid 
increase in urbanization in Egypt in late 1980s correspond to the rapid outflow of 
migrants to the Gulf over the period 1975 - 85 and the decline in that migration in the 
late 1980s (Leonor, 1985; Shaban et al, 1995). In contrast, in the case of Ghana, rural 
dwellers first attempted to frnd employment in the urban domestic market before 
pursuing emigration (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). The suggestion here is that out-
migration of an inter-regional migration operated as an approximate substitute for rural-
urban migration in Egypt, to the extent that rural migrants headed directly abroad instead 
of seeking local urban employment, and urban workers migrated abroad as rural migrants 
moved into local urban centres. 
Thus, generally, the 1980s and early 1990s came to symbolize an era of civil wars and 
human rights atrocities in these counties, with the exception of Costa Rica and Ghana, 
who were established and new democracies respectively (see figure 4.1). Sudan, which 
displays the worst-case scenario in our comparative country analysis, witnessed an 
4646 by 1992 (ICG , 1997: 29). In Ghana people developed the protruding clavicles or "Rawling's" disease 
(Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). The deterioration of the public' s health reflected the public health service's 
inability to cope with the mounting economic pressures. 
19 On a separate note, on average, women's wages in the Philippines were only half of men's between 1987 
and 1991 (Saith, 1998; Pangestu, 2000). As in the case of Lesotho, this implies that women (whether 
migrants or otherwise) on average receive lower income than men, which then suggests that women are the 
ones who bear the grunt of economic deterioration in these countries. 
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absolute collapse of the domestic economy and the political jurisdiction (Ertur and 
House, 1993).20 Workers were the most affected by these outcomes. Most of them fled 
the country and sought refugee status in the neighbouring economies and in the first 
world countries (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). These workers became known as both 
economic and political refugees.21 
The bottom line here is that like in the case of Lesotho, the above-mentioned countries 
relied on external labour and external trade markets that left them vulnerable to external 
shocks. The overall outcome of the lSI strategy for the country case studies was a 
negative bias against agriculture diversity (except the main foreign exchange earners), 
and inefficient and high cost production of manufactured goods. Growth of the lSI 
industries also tended to be concentrated in urban areas so that the benefit to labour and 
poverty reduction were limited. The temporary reduction in rural poverty was largely due 
to other polices (such as the rural and infrastructure development measures) and 
remittances from abroad rather than the lSI policy. However, as in Lesotho, these rural 
development projects were not successful in reducing rural poverty, particularly during 
the crises era. Rural workers were increasingly forced to give up their lands to larger 
commercial agriculturalists and most migrated to the urban areas in search of better 
economic prosperity. 
The lSI phase thus symbolized a classical Lewisian economy in these countries, with 
labour moving from the lower wage rural locations to the higher wage urban locations. 
Nevertheless, the wage equalization assumption inherent in the Lewisian dual labour 
20 ChIonic corruption also witnessed the collapse of governance and other institutions that were put in place 
at independence to manage the internal sector of the economy in these countries. Similarly, the decrease in 
government revenues from migrant workers' remittances led to an end in the provision of social services. 
such as subsidized education, health care, and social security that had ensured the minimal survival of the 
poorest and the marginalized groups in the country (Ertur and House, 1993; Shaban et ai, 1995). At the 
same time, government officials after witnessing the collapse of the judicial system began to divide the land 
holdings among themselves (most of the time under the guise of ethnicity entitlement), and in the process, 
pushed a mass of the population from areas where they had a livelihood to areas where they had no 
entitlements and thus were forced to destitution. Other forms of crime also accelerated within these 
economies during this period of economic crises (Ertur and House, 1993). 
21 Thus, roughly speaking, the 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise in economic refugees from Sudan and 
other similar developing countries that suffered sever economic crises in the early 1980s and early 1990s 
(Ertur and House, 1993; IMF, 1999). 
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market model did not materialize with increased labour migration. On the contrary, 
increased labour migration led to increased income inequalities between the rural and 
urban locations. The high rates of poverty and income inequality in the 1980s suggest a 
non-wage equalization. Most rural migrants in urban areas and non-migrants in rural 
areas became absorbed in survivalist economic activities (either in the rural areas or in 
urban areas) that produced only for subsistence purposes. The high rural urban migration 
that occurred in the 1980s is associated with push fuctors from the rural economy. These 
incidents mark the turning point of these economies towards the Todaran economy 
associated with risk, urban unemployment and push migration from the rural areas. The 
introduction of the export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) was meant to correct for these 
negative overshoots of the lSI phase, under the Todaran neoclassical framework of 
policy. 
4.4. Export-led industrialisation and structural adjustment programmes, late 1980s 
- present 
During the lSI strategy, particularly following the economic crisis of the 1980s, all five 
countries began to introduce measures to encourage export orientation industrialisation 
(EOI), either under the structural adjustment progranunes implemented in Costa Rica, 
Ghana, Egypt, and Sudan; or through more aggressive comparative advantage trade in 
more higher labour-skill and capital-intensive industries, as in the case of the Philippines. 
The impetus to promote exports was the limits of the lSI policy, imposed by domestic 
market size as well as adverse external developments, which underscored the need to earn 
foreign exchange. 
The more successful countries during the EOI phase so far, were the countries that 
associated with lower corruption and established democratic governance. Once again 
Costa Rica stands out as the best example here. Nonetheless, Ghana and the Philippines 
also performed much better during the EOI phase in terms of reducing corruption and the 
role of public sector in the domestic economy, and improving their private sector 
participation in the domestic market. On the other hand, Egypt and Sudan, who delayed 
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the process of government reform and continued to rely on the external labour market and 
external aid for growth much longer than other lSI countries, have not experienced much 
change in their economic situation. Both countries still maintain highly centralized and 
corrupt governments and both have a huge public sector influence in the domestic 
economy, with the government behaving as the employer oflast resorts. 
As in the Lesotho case, the initial emphasis of export-oriented policies was on unskilled 
labour-intensive manufactured, which at the time was in accordance with the poor 
economic situation of the country and the comparative advantage ofthe economic base. 
The measures were to a large extent introduced to offset the export bias created from the 
protection system that came about from the lSI policy. The government introduced 
instruments such as duty drawbacks or exemptions for imported inputs, export-processing 
zones (EPZs/ FTZs/ industrial zones i2 export subsidies and credit, and investment 
incentives, to attract foreign investment into the country, and generate domestic 
investment. In four of these countries, with the exception of the Philippines, the EO! 
strategy was pursued under the structural adjustment progranunes (SAPs) following the 
insistence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank?3 
Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in Costa Rica were introduced in 1983 
immediately following the economic crisis of 1982 - 1983 (Gindling and Berry, 1994; 
22 Many different terms have been used to define the zones and some that may seem to apply to a single 
phenomenon correspond in fact to different regimes and activities (e.g., Chitrakar, 1994; World Bank, 
1998; Pangestu, 2000). For the purpose of this thesis, EPZs are understood as geographic zones, including 
industrial sites! zones (Free Trade Zones, FTZs) established outside the customs territory of a particular 
country, where products can be stored, processed and manufactured without the payment of import duties, 
and with the intention of exporting most of the output (Kanyenze, 1998). The limit of our definition is that 
the geographical area does not compromise the entire country. This definition therefore excludes Singapore 
and Hong Kong, where the entire territory is fundamentally an EPZ (Wilkinson, 1994; Esquivel et ai, 
1998). Furthermore, our definition limits the primary purpose of the zone as manufacturing for export. This 
requirement implies that the more than 200 free-trade zones that exist in the United Sates and zones like 
Manaus in Brazil, more of an "import processing zone" than an EPZ (Esquivel et ai, 1998), are also 
excluded. Although some may argue that this is a rather limited definition, it does include most of the 
export-oriented regimes in the Costa Rica, the Philippines, Ghana and Lesotho, and we consider it the most 
appropriate for our purposes. 
23 To be fair to the two international institutions, the IMF and World Bank insisted on the adaptations of 
SAPs largely because, as discussed earlier, the economic situations in these countries was somewhat 
desperate, and was creating other constraints in the political and social spheres. 
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ICG, 1997). The country adopted a gradual phasing out strategy of the lSI policy by 
initially implementing stabilization measures on the macroeconomic situation and then 
introducing structural adjustment measures that promote exports of non-traditional 
agriculture production24 (Gindling and Berry, 1994). As in Egypt, the public sector in 
Costa Rica was then the largest employer of the labour force and the employer of last 
resorts during the global recession period, following the fall in the coffee and oil world 
price. At the same time, the country had also just signed a deal to receive substantial 
foreign aid from the US under the USAlD-funded private institutions (lCG, 1997). Thus 
even during the crisis period, Costa Rica could still afford delaying structural adjustment 
measures. However, when the national inflation level reached 109 and GNP fell a further 
7 percent by the end of 1982, the Monge government had no choice but to sign the IMP 
loan agreements (lCG, 1997). At the same time, the USAID-funded private institutions 
insisted upon the privatisation of public owned enterprises, including the banking system, 
a new agricultural strategy particularly geared towards the production of luxury 
agricultural export crops (known as the "Agriculture for change" programmes) for the 
U.S. market (mostly at the expense offood production for the domestic market).25 
In 1985, the Costa Rican government introduced the structural adjustment loan I and II 
(SAL I and SAL II) programmes from the World Bank, that amounted to over US$100 
million by 1989, to support longer-term changes in the economy. The conditions attached 
to these loans mirrored those of the USAID-mandate programme: cuts in government 
spending, privatisation of state-owned entities, and a reorientation of production away 
from satisfYing domestic needs and toward non-traditional agricultural and 
manufacturing exports, mostly in EPZ-type of production (lCG, 1997). However, Costa 
24 In 1980 prior to the introduction of the SAPs, Costa Rica's relationships with the IMF and the World 
were not very smooth. In that same year President Carazo expelled the IMF from the country following his 
refusal to comply with the strict measured dictated by the Fund, which included the devaluation of the local 
currency and drastic cuts in government spending (ICG, 1997). 
2S These institutions, which duplicated the function of state entities and became known collectively as 
USAID Parallel State, constituted a private agricultural college, an investment company, an export-
promotion institution, and a finance company (ICG, 1997). These institutions were reported to have drained 
resources and authority from the government (ICG, 1997). At the same time, USAlD gave little assistance 
to the country's social service programmes (lCG, 1997). 
130 
Rica's stabilization period was not as successful as anticipated by the government and the 
IFls26 
In terms of employment, EPZs were set up to generate foreign investment and create 
employment for the domestic labour, particularly the small farmers who were displaced 
from their farms during the enlargement of the non-traditional agricultural estates in the 
late 1960s. The expansion of non-traditional industrial exports had been an integral part 
of Costa Rica's adjustment programme. The country's "industrial reconversion" 
programme began as part of the governments 1986-1990 National Development Plan, and 
was deepened with World Bank support under the SAL II agreement (Gindling and 
Berry, 1994; ICG, 1997). The industrial reconversion program pushed exports through 
the promotion of both maquiladoras (export-assembly plants) and free-trade-zones 
(FTZs). As in Lesotho, incentives for the maquiladoras and the companies in the FTZs 
included tax exemptions on income and profits, as well as imports and exports 
preferential interest rates, the right to transfer capital, and priority in construction of 
necessary infrastructure (lCG, 1997; Kanyenze 1998). By 1993, Costa Rica had eight 
privately owned EPZs/ FTZs27 with 134 companies, mainly in textile, electronics and 
agro-industries (ICG, 1997: 27). These companies employed a total of24 200 workers 
(Esquivel et ai, 1998: 23). The success ofEPZ development was, however, never attained 
in Costa Rica. 
It appears that the costs incurred by the government in setting up and operating the EPZs 
outweighed all the gains from employment and foreign exchange earnings (lCG, 1997). 
26 Although macroeconomic stability was attained by the early 1990s, Costa Rica's burden actually 
increased under the SAPs stabilization. Foreign aid debt rose from US$2.7 billion in 1987 to US$3.9 
billion in 1993 (ICG, 1997: 25). This rise occurred despite the country' s participation in the "Brady Plan" 
debt-relief scheme under which Costa Rica was to buy back much of its outstanding commercial debt at a 
discount (ICG, 1997). At the same time, although exports increased under the stabilization period, sharp 
increases in imports crowded out the benefits of increased exports, and gains from the CACM (Gindling 
and Berry, 1994). The Costa Rican trade deficit increased from US$134.9 billion in 1984 to US$65 I billion 
in 1994 (lCG, 1997: 46). This suggests that the SAPs in Costa Rica never succeeded beyond the 
stabilization phase of its SAP policy. 
27 The first two EPZ zones in Costa Rica were established in the early 80s in two port cities in the country, 
Puntarenas and Limon. As with many zones in economically depressed areas of other nations, the two 
EPZs there were not a success. Only a small number of firms located there and the zones have had 
continuous legal and infrastructure problems (Esquivel et aI, 1998). 
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To start with, the EPZs were normally situated in the national park lands, in isolated and 
conserved environmental parks of the country. This led to a high rate of deforestation in 
Costa Rica in the late 1980s and early 1990s (lCG, 1997). In addition, the EPZs reported 
a low occupancy rate, with most of the sites being encroached by informal settlements of 
displaced workers, further diminishing the value of Costa Rica's national parks (that were 
hailed among the finest in the world in the 1970s). The low occupancy rate involved a 
higher than normal operational cost (lCG, 1997). Moreover, after the establishment of the 
EPZs the government expanded the customs bonded warehouse schemes to embrace 
other areas to encourage the development of manufacturing processing for exports. This 
measure, however, defeated the incentive to locate industries within a bounded zone 
(lCG, 1997). Lastly, the availability and quality oflabour in Costa Rica decreased in the 
mid-1990s, in comparison to the initial years of the SAPs. This is due to the fact little 
value adding and training of workers was being performed in the EPZs in the mid-1990s 
(ICG, 1997; Esquivel et ai, 1998). The assistance extended to the zone enterprises in 
dealing with various government agencies also decreased between 1983 and 1995 (lCG, 
1997). 
Consequently, less foreign investors were attracted to Costa Rica in the 1990s as 
compared to the late 1980s28 (Esquivel et al, 1998). The industries that were more likely 
to be found in the EPZs in the 1990s were labour-intensive lightweight manufactures, 
most commonly textiles and garments, electric and electronic products and components, 
food processing, metal products and machinery, optical instruments, and sporting goods 
and toys29 (Esquivel et al, 1998). Thus, although Costa Rica is usually sited as a SAP 
28 Nevertheless, the extension of financial and tax incentives to foreign investors in Costa Rica occurred at 
the same time as the IMF and World Bank were calling for cuts in subsidies and rise in interest rates. The 
lack of unionisation of labour also led to appalling conditions being inflicted on the labour force of the 
EPZs, associated with deteriorating wage pays and long hours of work (lCG, 1997). 
29 Costa Rica has the most diversified export-oriented industries in Central America. Nonetheless, as in alJ 
other Central American nations, textile firms represent the largest sector accounting for 37 percent of all 
firms and more than 62 percent of employment in manufacturing. The electronics industry is the second 
largest sector, accounting for about 15 percent of firms and employment. Many of these electronics firms 
are relatively new investments, with at least 20 of the 35 established in or after 1995. MachinerylMetal and 
PharmaceuticaVMedical products are the next largest sectors, accounting for 10.2 and 4.3 percent of firms 
and 3.9 and 2.6 percent of employment, respectively. The remaining firms correspond to a large variety of 
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success story among the lSI countries (e.g., World Bank, 1998; Esquivel et ai, 1998), the 
above evidence points out that the success has been shallow and short-tenn. In general, 
the situation in Costa Rica, of poor labour skills and low wage employment, is not 
different from the other lSI examples used in this analysis. 
Ghana's export orientation programme was implemented under the SAPs upon the 
insistence of the IMF and the World Bank. Like Costa Rica, Ghana pursued a gradual 
SAP plan of stabilization and then adjustment. Stabilization was pursued immediately 
following the 1983 economic crisis, under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). 
Because the situation was more urgent in Ghana, in comparison to Costa Rica, authorities 
in Ghana were forced to implement the SAPs in the early 1980s.30 Unlike Costa Rica, 
stabilization in Ghana was more successful. 31 
In tenns of employment generation, the implementation of EPZs in Ghana produced 
similar outcomes as in Costa Rica, with initial advantages of availability and quality of 
labour diminishing over time, as well as the efficiency of administration. In both cases, 
there were thus no long-run benefits from pursuing the EPZ model of development. The 
costs incurred by the government in setting up the EPZs and the inefficiency of such 
industries in generating sufficient employment, technological transfer, linkages with the 
domestic economy, and foreign investment, offset the gains achieved in foreign exchange 
earnings through exports. In Ghana in particular, the high costs of imported intennediate 
activities, including services, commercial activities, jewellery, and footwearneather products (Esquivel et 
ai, 1998: 35). 
)0 Political instability and rampant corruption carried over from the early lSI growth period had 
encompassed the entire economy by the early 1980s (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). 
II Between 1983 and 1985 inflation fell from 122 percent to 10 percent per annum. GNP growth per capita 
rose from - 7.1 percent to 1.5 percent annually. Cereal production tripled between 1983 and 1984 and the 
production of starchy staples rose 40 percent (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994: 365). However, the 
macroeconomic conditions were attributed to good weather as much as the success of the SAPs. Between 
1985 and 1994 per capita GNP grew at annual rate of I to 2 percent. Besides growth, the other most notable 
changes following the implementation of the ERP were the achievement of a trade surplus in 1986 and a 
government budget surplus in 1987 (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999). The ERP' s 
lasting effect on inflation has, however, been less impressive. Since 1985 inflation accelerated to reach 40 
percent by 1988 (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). Money supply also increased following the continuous 
depreciation of the cedi. This translated to price increases particularly in the urban areas. 
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inputs tended to raise the costs of production in the industrial zones, which had to be met 
by the government (Marais, 1998). Nevertheless, the latter half of the 1990s witnessed an 
increase in Ghana's share of mining production out of the total mining production in Sub-
Sahara Africa (Marais, 1994), indicating the fact that Ghana has in fact not been very 
successful in diversifying its industrial base out of the traditional sectors into the 
manufacturing and services areas.32 Nonetheless, Ghana's performance during the EO! 
phase seems to indicate a success story albeit with increasing pressures on low wage 
employment, lack of job security, and enclave nature of the manufucturing base. 
In Egypt and Sudan, SAPs were implemented much later than in Costa Rica and Ghana. 
Egypt only embarked on structural adjustment measures in the late 1980s (Shaban et ai, 
1995), and Sudan in the early 1990s (Ertur and House, 1993). The outcomes of both of 
these programmes are thus not yet clearly defined, although the trend has been towards 
improving macroeconomic stabilization, particularly reducing inflation and government 
debt. Money supply has however expanded following depreciations of the local 
currencies, resulting in higher prices, particularly in the urban areas33 (Ertur and House, 
12 As in Lesotho, mining activity in Ghana continues to be externally supported and contributes marginally 
to local employment (see Beaudry and Sowa (1994) for a further discussion on Ghana's main export and 
employment sectors). 
33 Since the mid-1980s, the public sector has remained the largest employer and the employer oflast resort 
in Egypt and Sudan (Shaban et ai, 1995; Cohen and House, 1996). The public sector also set the wage floor 
for large enterprises and prevented wages for very scarce skills from rising. Furthermore, the public sector 
had effects on the general economic climate of the domestic economies, such as, on investment polices 
which placed emphasis on industrialisation, and on the sort of employment and expectation of employment 
which these policies created. In the private sector, wage determination was theoretically based on market 
forces, but was directly and indirectly influenced by the government. The direct influence was through 
wage legislation which set the minimum wages for industry and agricultural. Indirect influence was the 
competition of the public sector wage scale. The private sector could attract labour ofa certain quality only 
if its wages were at least equal to public sector wage (including all fringe benefits). Otherwise, the private 
sector would get its labour requirement at lower wages only when a surplus existed (Leonor, 1985; Cohen 
and House, 1996). 
It is therefore not surprising that public invesbnent played a major role in the growth of aggregate 
investment in the early] 9905 in these countries. However, such investment was not sustainable. In Sudan, 
invesbnent collapsed all together by the late 1990s, whereas Egypt managed to sustain the trend through 
foreign aid assistance. One feature of boom invesbnent was the poor response of domestic capital. In the IS 
years of industrial diversification, such capita did not constitute much. In effect large magnitude of capital 
flight was the order ofthe industrial diversification (Ertur and House, 1993; Shaban et ai, 1995). One factor 
was the hostility of indigenous governments to domestic capital, even as they pursued foreign capital. 
These governments regarded domestic capital as a potential political threat to the ruling elite. 
Consequently, the potential indigenous investors (many of whom in Sudan for example, had made money 
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1993; Shaban et ai, 1995). The fact that these two economies could delay further 
industrial diversification measures until the late 1980s and early 1990s implies that these 
two economies were particularly attuned to the boom-bust growth associated with 
remittance-induced growth.34 The availability of remittance income allowed adjustment 
to be delayed, as in Costa Rica, where adjustment was delayed not due to remittances but 
due to foreign aid from the United States, or in Ghana, where adjustment was delayed up 
to the point when the political instability and economic corruption had become too deeply 
imbedded in the country.35 It thus appears that the main reason for economic adjustment 
in these countries was not a direct result of successful industrial diversification, but 
rather, a response to external shocks, poor political domestic climate, and rampant 
domestic economic corruption. 
The model ofEOI development pursued in the Philippines differed from the above four 
case studies, in the sense that EO industrialisation in the Philippines was pursued under 
the strategy of comparative advantage development and competition, as opposed to the 
structural adjustment programme implementation. However similar to the other case 
studies, the type of export-oriented industries in the Philippines compromised largely of 
EPZ-type industries associated with light manufucturing, employment of large-scale 
cheap labour (mainly women), and low-wages (Pangestu, 2000). And like in Lesotho, the 
Philippines offers an incentive package to its foreign investors that includes low 
corporate tax, flexible labour regulations, an English-speaking and literate (skilled) 
labour force and a dynamic consumer market and 100 percent foreign ownership in 
almost all sectors ofthe economy (Chitrakar, 1994; Pangestu, 2000). 
through rent seeking and corrupt practices in governments) were forced to keep most oftheir wealth abroad 
in safe Swiss bank accounts, for instance (Ertur and House, 1993). A relationship evolved between business 
and the ruling elite that was characterized by rivalry rather than by partnership . Such a relationship makes 
the development of indigenous entrepreneurship still difficult in these countries today (Mkandawire and 
Soludo, 1999; World Bank, 1999). 
J4 The boom growth period of the Maghreb countries occurred in the 1970s up to the late-1980s. The bust 
growth has been happening in the most part of the 1990s. 
" The accounting on Sudan and Egypt is briefly presented here because these are the most recent cases of 
EO!. 
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EOI in the Philippines was basically undertaken within a two-phase process. The focus 
during the first phase of the Philippines' EOI was on the labour-intensive export oriented 
industries that were similar to those pursued by the other country case studies under the 
IMF and World Bank SAPs, such as textiles and garments, and electronics (notable 
assembly and semiconductors). A number of policies were adopted to encourage export-
oriented industries and to attract foreign investment. These include among other things, 
subsidized export credit; tax incentives and subsidies related to exports; investment 
incentives; and duty free imports for exporter (Chitrakar, 1994; Pangestu, 2000). 
The government also invested in physical infrastructure for industrial development, 
especially the establishment of industrial estates and Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in several 
regions of the country. As a result many multinational companies (MNCs) located in the 
export processing zones designated for export production, such as the Bataan export 
processing zone (Chitrakar, 1994).36 The Bataan EPZ was set up in 1971 and has been the 
most successful in terms of attracting foreign investment. In 1982 only 30.2 percent of 
firms in EPZs were own by the local Filipino producers. The rest of the firms belonged to 
Japanese and American foreign investors (Chitrakar, 1994). 
In terms of the contribution of the EPZ to the exports from the country, the EPZ are 
reported to have contributed only 11.1 percent of non-traditional exports in 1994, even 
though the total non-traditional production from the country was 50 percent in 1982 (an 
increase from 14 percent in 1973) (Chitrakar, 1994: 206).37 Moreover, the amount of 
foreign exchange earned by the firms in the EPZs was relatively insignificant and 
negative in 1983 (Chitrakar, 1994). Chitrakar (1994: 207) reports that of the total equity, 
74 percent was domestic and 26 percent foreign; of the total borrowing, 92 percent was 
J6 In 1994, the Philippines had seven EPZs, namely Bataan, Mactan, Baguio City Cavite, Pampanga, Leyte 
and Tabangaa, that were mostly unsuccessful (Chitrakar, 1994). These covered a total area of 1320 
hectares. The Leyte and Tabangao were special EPZs as they were set up to promote especially large 
projects. 
J7 In terms of site utilization, the EPZs in the Philippines were less than a quarter full in the 1980s 
(Chitrakar, 1994). 
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domestic and only 8 percent was foreign. This is attributed to the economic crisis ofthe 
1980s and the flight from the country by many foreign investors 3 & 
In terms oftechnological transfer, the general trend has been that apart from the transfer 
of managerial know-how, the net impact of technology transfer was also insignificant 
(Chitrakar, 1994; Sachikonye, 1998; Pangestu, 2000). This was because of the type of 
products manufuctured and the nature of product process employment (Sachikonye, 
1998). As in Lesotho and the other countrY case studies discussed above, the backward 
and forward linkages of EPZs in the Philippines were limited. The domestic resource 
utilization rate of firms in the Philippines EPZs was estimated to be 10 percent of total 
inputs in the late 1980s (Chitrakar, 1994). Like in Costa Rica and Ghana, most EPZs in 
the Philippines relied on imported intermediate inputs at the expense of domestic inputs. 
This made the overall production of exports in these firms rather expensive, with the 
domestic governments having to finance the difference in terms of financial and labour 
incentives to the foreign investors (Kanyenze, 1998). 
In terms of the need to reduce pressure on urban areas, the main advantage of the EPZs in 
the Philippines was the fact that they were not located in the congested urban areas. 
However, in terms of the need to generate employment, the Bataan EPZ for example (and 
because it is the largest, oldest and relatively most successful) has fuiled to benefit rural 
workers because of the relative scarcity of cheap, young female workers in the zone area 
(Chitrakar, 1994). 
Overall , the EPZ model of EO industrialisation has not been successful in any of these 
countries. Numerous fuctors contribute to the dismal performance, inter alia, wrong 
location, low occupancy, policy changes, low labour efficiency, inadequate institutional 
support, and bad timing ofEPZ model implementation. In addition, the SAPs and EPZs 
have drained resources from the governments of these countries in the form of much-
18 The estimated loss to the Philippines from domestic borrowings by transnationals (TNCs) in the Bataan 
EPZ between 1984 and 1990, for instance, was large enough to cancel all of total gains from employment 
generation and foreign exchange earnings (Chitrakar, 1994). 
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needed revenues, and increased the rate of imports, particularly food imports to the point 
that these economies were transformed from net exporters offood to net importers by the 
early 1990s. 
In terms of the dual labour market analysis, the early industrialisation lSI phase and 
subsequent switch to EO industrialisation did not see wages (incomes) equalizing 
between rural and urban areas . In addition, rural-urban migration has not slowed down or 
ceased in these countries. Neither has international labour migration. Conversely, ruraI 
urban migration and out-migration have been on the increase since the 1980s, particularly 
with the deepening application of the EPZ model of development. This implies that 
income expectations and not actual differentials when the principal functional motivation 
for internal and international labour migration. Nevertheless, given the fact that poverty 
levels increased in both rural and urban areas suggests that other push and external 
factors were driving the migration streams in and from these countries since the 1980s. A 
deeper analysis of the impact of EO I and SAPs on the labour markets reveals that similar 
to Lesotho, internal and external labour migration in these countries was in effect not 
motivated by actual or expected incomes in destination but by deteriorating conditions in 
ruraI areas. This is also where the migration story comes out. 
4. 4. 1. Labour migration during the EOI pbase 
As explained so fur, early capitalism (lSI phase) or "lean" industrialisation (Sachikonye, 
1998) relied on the reproduction of the peasantry. The post-colonial institutions of the 
mid 20th century in Costa Rica (Gindling and Berry, 1994), the Philippines (Martin, 1993; 
Goss and Lindquist, 1995), Ghana (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994), Sudan (Ertur and House, 
1993; Cohen and House, 1996), and Egypt (Leonor, 1985; Shaban et ai, 1995) all 
supported lean capitalism and the reproduction of the peasantry. Since the early 1990s 
however, lean capitalism has been increasingly replaced by informalisation of migration 
and the increasing employment of flexible labour in the domestic market. Flexible labour 
and temporary employment perpetuate the reproduction of an unprotected informal 
labour force in the world. The present dilemma is that there are currently no institutions 
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available to oversee the rights of these workers, neither at the global level nor at the 
national level. At the national level, past emigration policies are increasingly becoming 
inefficient in representing migrant workers abroad, and are pushing new categories of 
migrants into an illegal state. At the global level, there is currently inconsistency 
regarding labour regulation requirements among the formal institutions (WTO, ILO, 
World Bank, IMF) and how this is translated to citizenship privilege concerns at the 
national level, and how this principally implies limited regulation of international labour 
migration in the global economy. However, concern here is that workers and especially 
migrant workers are ever more vulnerable in the unregulated global economy. 
The implementations of the EPZ model of industrialisation and the SAPs have generally 
benefited a narrow commercial interest at the expense of the majority domestic labour 
force, and especially the poor. Given the fact that most of the labour force in these 
countries was situated in agriculture, the introduction of non-traditional exports impeded 
the ability oflocal furmers and producers to compete with the foreign investors, in terms 
of credit and market availability.39 
For Costa Rica's small producers, the "Agriculture of change" introduced by the USAID 
under the SAPs implementation had been a complete disaster. To begin with, the 
emphasis on export production has led to a deepening dependence on imported food, 
particularly U.S. food that competes with local production. Secondly, most of the 
pesticides and other agrochemicals required for the production of the new non-traditional 
crop exports have adverse environmental effects.40 
19 Traditionally, Costa Rica's national banks had been the main source of credit to farmers . However, 
between 1983 and 1987, credit for the agricultural sector plummeted from 80 percent to 20 percent oftota! 
credit extended by the banking system. At the same time, Costa Rica was persuaded by the World Bank, 
the IMF and the USAID to cut funding for the National Production Council (CNP), which was the most 
important institution guaranteeing the country's food self-sufficiency, by fixing the buying and selling 
prices of basic grains (ICG, 1997). The result of these measures was that small furmers were either forced 
to work for big producers or to sell their land and migrate to the cities (Gindling and Berry, 1994). Small 
landholders were transformed into landless labourer located mostly in the cities, particularly in the squatter 
settlements in the national park zones (ICG, 1997).39 Consequently, foreign investors and some local elites 
came to dominate the both the production and export of non-traditional crops (Gindling and Berry, 1994). 
40 For instance, the ICG (1997: 27) report sites that a rural education organization in Costa Rica found that 
the rate of domestic and wild animal deaths increased in melon production with the increased used of 
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Thirdly, and more serious consequence of the SAPs programmes has been the generation 
of low quality employment in Costa Rica. Even though unemployment rates in Costa 
Rica remain relatively low in comparison to other developing countries (Gindling and 
Berry, 1994), the quality of jobs currently available could lead the country into a very 
different kind of development than in the past. According to the ICG report (1997) the 
1980s generated a high proportion of jobs of inferior quality, of great instability and low 
income. The result of this is that by the 1990s, employment levels had risen again (to 
their pre-crisis levels), but so too had poverty, to its pre-crisis levels (due to the decrease 
in incomes)4I. In addition, labour rights in the FTZs have been undermined 42 
The export orientation in the mid-1980s and into the 1990s in the Philippines was 
characterised by more rapid out-migration of unskilled labour, intensive exports, into 
specialized and high shares of high technology goods, and strong trade-investment links 
imported agrochemicals. The implication here is that such chemicals are most likely to be harmful to 
humans as well , although research regarding the use of the agrochemicals on human remains limited (ICG, 
1997). Moreover, the introduction of agrochemicals and large-scale non-traditional export manufacturing 
was accompanied by a rise in extensive soil erosion, sewage damage and chemical run-offs into rivers, and 
indiscriminate dumping of industrial waste. At the same time, health standards in urban areas deteriorated 
with poor households and squatter dwellings being at risk of consuming the contaminated natural waters 
(lCG, 1997). 
41 The main effect of the SAPs and EPZs in Costa Rica had been the growing gap between the rich and the 
poor in the country. Furthermore, poverty levels have fluctuated between the late 1980s and the 1990s. For 
example, the percentage of households living in poverty increased from 18.5 percent in 1987 to 23.8 
percent in 1992 (lCG, 1997). In 1994 an attempt to raise the standard of living of the population, the 
government increased the minimum wage. However, such measures failed to make up for the loss of 
purchasing power that resulted from the high inflation of the early 1980s and the drastic social expenditure 
cuts of the late 1980s. The deteriorating living standards have increased the crime rate and the rate of public 
protest in Costa Rica, particularly in the mid-1990s, which poses a threat to the political stability of the 
country (ICG, 1997). 
42 The establishment of "solidarisla" associations funded by monthly contributions from member workers 
and employers. The associations usually have savings and loan plans and sell consumer goods, as well as 
offering health services and access to housing, recreation, investment, small-enterprise creation, and 
pension programmes (ICG, 1997). Though in the future these associations may develop into proper 
employment security associations and offer similar job benefits and perks as full-time employment, 
currently, however, such associations deny workers the right to strike by functioning on the belief that 
workers, management and producers have a common interest_ In addition, these associations are not legally 
permitted to represent workers in collective bargaining. Nevertheless, according to the ICG report, the ILO 
found that companies had used direct settlement with such groups of workers to undermine unions and 
collective bargaining agreements (ICG, 1997: 28). 
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with the South East Asian economies and Japan (pangestu, 2000). These links constituted 
a high rate of subcontracting relationships and a high degree of intra-East Asia links, 
particularly in terms of employment of skilled labour. This meant that like Ghana, the 
Philippines export structure had become less diversified and more interdependent to 
external factors, which exposed the country to greater risk ofadverse developments in the 
terms of trade decline and excess capacity. However, given the fact that the Philippines 
also relied heavily on U.S. MNCs and markets, it was not as adversely affected by the 
Asian crisis of the 1997 as the rest of the ASEAN economies, in terms of its export share 
declining during the 1996 - 1998 period (pangestu, 2000). Thus employment levels in the 
manufacturing sector in Philippines in the late 1990s were not adversely affected by the 
Asian financial crisis ofl9971 98.43 
Generally, the rapid phase of EOI in the Philippines, which required skilled labour, 
translated to greater income inequalities. This is because the universal primary education 
policy pursued by the country led to a scarcity of skilled labour with secondary education 
and above, which translated to the minority skilled labour force experiencing much more 
rapid wage increases than the majority unskilled labour force (Saith, 1998; Pangestu, 
2000). Despite an increase in government investment in training during the early 
industrialisation phase, the focus until the early 1990s was on primary education and 
tertiary education (particular to migrant workers44) (Leonor, 1985; Martin, 1993, 1995; 
Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Saith, 1998). Secondary education was not prioritised for the 
domestic labour force. As a result even by the late 1980s only 10.5 percent of the labour 
43 This period of rapid globalisation in the Philippines was accompanied by an increase in income 
inequality and poverty, particularly in the 1988 - 1991 period (Pangestu, 2000). The rising inequality 
during this phase of EO I in the Philippines was due to the capital inflow and boom mentality that preceded 
the 1997 Asian crisis. Given the high level of interconnectedness of the Philippines economy to the rest of 
the Asian region, the gains from the rapid growth that followed the successful industrialisation in East Asia 
was translated to the benefit of urban area at the expense of rural locations throughout the Asian region, 
which led to increased income inequalities in the Asian economies, including the Philippines (Saith, 1998; 
Pangestu, 2000). The crisis in effect has corrected the inequality in the sense that it hurt mostly those who 
benefited the most from the boom such as foreign Asian investors and local elites (Saith, 1998; Pangestu, 
2000). 
44 The logic here was that by providing migrant workers with higher skills, the Philippines would then have 
a comparative advantage of skilled migrants over other labour sending countries. Nevertheless, most 
migrants form the Philippines remained absorbed injobs for which they were overqualified (Chin, 1997), 
such as domestic work, etc, in the destination countries in Eat Asia, the U. S., and the Middle East. 
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force has a secondary or vocational education (pangestu, 2000: 26).45 The labour market 
in the Philippines is thus divided across skills and wealth. The richer are the ones who 
can afford to send their children to school and to own land and other social amenities in 
the urban areas. This feature of a socially stratified urban structure was noted earlier in 
the lSI discussion (section 4. 2.1). The suggestion her is that urban inequality is unlikely 
to disappear in the Philippines (and the other lSI countries) even with micro level policy 
to developing the urban areas. This is because, as pointed out before, the Third World 
sector in these counties is not a state of transition (as assumed by the functionalist 
policies) but a permanent entity of the world systems and modes of production, with its 
own dynamic social relations that reinforce its existence over time. 
In contrast, the labour market in Ghana is not divided along skills but is divided along 
gender lines. The concept of urban inequality is nevertheless similar to the Philippines 
situation. The only difference here is that the urban Third World are predominantly 
female. Women in Ghana are mostly associated with petty commodity production. The 
switch from IS industrialisation to EO industrialisation forced a lot of women involved in 
consumption-type agricultural production to migrate to the towns, particularly the capital 
city, Accra, in search of paid employment to complete their agricultural production. In 
the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the rate offemale child labour at expense of girl 
" A large proportion of the labour force only had primary education and thus earned low incomes. In tum 
they could not afford to send their children to secondary schools since the cost of education was high 
relative to their incomes (Leonor, 1985 ; Pangestu, 2000). In addition, children of secondary age were 
generally needed to help with farm work or earn additional income (Leonor, 1985). The change in 
education policy in the 1990s towards secondary education led to a sharp increase of secondary enrolment, 
but this has yet to significantly affect the labour market. Currently, as demand has shifted to skilled labour 
in the country, those with secondary school enrolment continue to benefit more in terms of experiencing 
higher wages than those with only primary school enrolment (Saith, 1998; Pangestu, 2000). 
In addition, access and the quality of primary education provided to rural locations in the Philippines 
deteriorated between 1970 and 1990 (Pangestu, 2000). According to Pangestu (2000), about two thirds of 
primary school children did not complete their primary education during the period 1970 to 2000. Whereas 
in Manila nearly 100 percent of students completed their primary education, in Mindanao and Eastern 
Visayas, less than 30 percent of students completed their primary education during that period (Pangestu, 
2000: 27). This has led to the overall level of attainment of basic knowledge to decline in the country, with 
the school system becoming socially regressive since children to poor families have access to only public 
schools and suffer all the consequences regarding quality. Despite the fact that it is public education, 
parents are still expected to contribute up to a third of their child's education (Pangestu, 2000). 
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education, particularly in rural areas, rose as a result of decreasing household incomes. 
Young girls were made to work in the household production at the expense of their 
education so as to increase the overall household income. This has led to the lower 
education of young girls and women in Ghana, and their subsequent overwhelming 
occupation of petty commodity production46 (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Marais, 1994). 
One effect ofliving in Accra, the capital city, is that formal employment does not provide 
a premium for individuals working in Accra, and informal sector workers earn less than 
elsewhere in Ghana (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). This indicates a Harris-Todaro type of 
equilibrating mechanism, where migration decisions are based on the comparison of a 
probability weighed sum of earnings in the formal and informal sectors. Since the 
probability of finding employment is greater in Accra, equilibrating migration flows 
cause the informal sector jobs in Accra to receive less than average earnings. This 
suggests that infonnal sector workers in Accra may be among the most disadvantaged 
(Beaudry and Sowa, 1994: 389). 
The lack of job premiums and the disadvantaged position of informal traders in Accra 
have resulted to the city turning into a major source of migrant workers. This trend is 
further perpetuated in relation to international labour migration. Between 1982 and 1987, 
net migration out of Accra accounted for almost 60 percent of net outward migration in 
Ghana (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994: 399). Ghanaian female emigrants are nonnally 
involved in petty commodity cross-border trade (Ward, 1990). This suggests that the 
most adversely affected by the structural adjustment programmes are the young, informal 
sector workers in urban areas, particularly those working in Accra. Emigrants from 
Ghana also includes older workers retrenched from public and protected private sector 
over the course of adjustment, who have been forced to integrate into the infonnal sector 
(UNRISD, 2000). 
46 Informal workers in Ghana operate under a highly structured network that receives regular consultation 
from the government. Nevertheless, micro-credit lending to the informal sector has not been successful in 
Ghana. Most lending institutions regard the market women as a high risk and tend to cbarge them high 
premiums on their loans, which has discouraged such workers from seeking formal credit (Beaudry and 
Sowa, 1994; Marais, 1994). 
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Since women are less able to influence their immediate economic reality, this implies that 
they face a reduced set of opportunities in the domestic labour market. Since the infonnal 
sector businesses are mostly female-owned and employ mostly women (Beaudry and 
Sowa, 1994: 400), female-headed households have probably been the most severely 
affected by the ERP (Marais, 1994). 
In Sudan and Egypt, employment in the public sector was not determined by skills but by 
infonnal relations and social networks. Although in both economies workers received 
proper training and education with certificates and degrees, the level of government 
corruption was so high that it overshadowed all legal employment institutions. The 
fonnal mechanisms to employment were particularly absent in Sudan, where war and 
rampant government corruption were the order of the day. Nevertheless, the presence of 
war at beginning of the 1990s witnessed large flows of refugees, both economic and 
otherwise, from Sudan to the rest of the Africa region and to other countries of the world. 
Sudan is currently attempting to refonn its political jurisdiction. However, chronic 
corruption and inadequate legislation continue to threaten the success of such refonns. 
Moreover, the earlier civil wars produced visible inequality in the distribution of resource 
in the country, with the entire southern Sudan region being depleted of all necessary 
resources to function as a society, and the northern part of the country (which is relatively 
smaller than the south) having all the available political, economic and legislative and 
social resources required to function as a society (Ertur and House, 1993). 
The general trend and experience with industrial diversification in these economies has 
been the switch from a Lewisian type economy towards the Todaran economy. The early 
lSI phase was largely identified by the Lewisian two-sector economy, whilst the 
structural adjustment era and the EO industrialisation introduced the third sector, the 
infonnal urban sector, into the dual labour market and transfonned these economies to a 
Todaran type world. As in Lesotho, the type of migration, both internal and external that 
occurred was a result of the collapse of the traditional and external sector, and the 
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inability of the modem sector to generate employment47. As in Lesotho, generally trade 
liberalization here resulted in sectoral shifts in employment, with a reduced agriculture 
labour force, a reduced public sector labour force and an expanding private sector 
employment. However, the private sector has developed segmented into "protected" 
employees and the unprotected informal sector. 
The implication from the experiences of the case studies is thus that there is a high rate of 
labour market discrimination in these countries48• Generally, sectoral shift in employment 
has resulted in increased levels of unemployment in these countries. The reduction of 
public sector employment led to the shedding of many jobs, primarily those occupied by 
the lower grade employees, who in the discriminating labour market were mostly women. 
These workers have been pushed into the unprotected private informal sector, as opposed 
to being absorbed by the protected private sector. In Ghana, this labour force developed 
into an organized industry that sells perishable goods at stadiums. Nevertheless, they are 
normally vulnerable to price and employment adjustments in the domestic labour market 
(Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). In Egypt and the Philippines, where women are particularly 
the most protected by the government, they are the ones likely to be most affected by the 
restructuring process. In the Philippines, such workers opted to emigrate to the NlEs in 
search of jobs. Most found work in occupations that they were overqualified for, such as 
domestic work and nursing49 (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: Lui and Chiu, 1999; Chin, 1997; 
47 Generally none of the five country case studies had developed comprehensive social security and 
unemployment insurance schemes to respond to unemployment, disabilities and aging during the early 
phase of economic growth. Each country had some sort of social security scheme as well as special 
programs targeted at the poor, and redistribution programmes to address income inequalities. However, 
such programmes were less effective and often had limited coverage, such as participants of state provident 
fund in the Philippines (Pangestu, 2000). In other countries, state workers and workers in large enterprises 
were protected such has in Ghana and Costs Rica. Essentially, and particularly in the Philippines and 
Ghana, people still relied more on the informal safety nets such as friends, relatives neighbours, and 
informal credit networks rather than formal schemes. The lack of special social programmes for workers 
and especially the poor adversely affected by the economic shocks and risks was also felt during the 
economic crisis of the I 980s. The implementation of the EOI phase thus carried over this weak social 
security systems in these countries. The failure of the SAPs to identifY the needs of the poor and workers is 
a reflection of the larger lack of social security programmes in the industrialisation policy of lSI phase that 
is now contributing to pressures in the urban labour market (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Cohen and House, 
1996; Pangestu, 2000). 
48 According to neoclassical economics, labour market segmentation is directly linked to labour market 
discrimination (see Sloane, 198 I for a complete discussion). 
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Martin, 1993). In Egypt such workers became incorporated into the pool of urban 
unemployed, as these women did not have the same opportunity as the Filipina women, 
due to religious factors (Leonor, 1985; Shaban et ai, 1995). There was not a large demand 
that would absorb Egyptian women in the regional labour market. Consequently many of 
them have become involved in urban informal employment or have remained openly 
unemployed (Shaban et ai, 1995). 
In addition, the turning point of the economy and trade liberalization also altered the 
structures of the former regulation institutions in these countries. The most affected were 
the traditional cultural institutions and systems of governance. Moreover, migrants and 
women in general have become more marginalized and powerless in these societies. In 
the Philippines and Costa Rica, land is individually owned (Ranis, 1992; Martin, 1993; 
Gindling and Berry, 1994; Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Saith, 1998). However, the high 
incidence oflandlessness (Gindling and Berry, 1994; Goss and Lindquist, 1995) implies a 
monopolization of land tenure by the rich private sector. The high incidence of 
landlessness is further matched by a high incidence of unemployment. This implies that 
migrants, who are increasingly landless and amongst the poorest in the society lack 
power within the society to determining their livelihood. Migration is thus more of a 
survivalist action than a creative initiative (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Martin, 1995; 
Chin, 1997). In Ghana, a matrilineal society, women are the legal owners ofland and not 
the men as in Lesotho (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). Nevertheless, they lack political 
influence and usually occupy low-income jobs. The high utilization of female child 
labour (7 - 16 years of age), particularly in the rural areas is associated with women's 
lack of education which itself results in the marginal position of women in the domestic 
labour market (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Marais, 1994). 
49 Domestic worker migrants from the Philippines to Malaysia are usually exploited by employers, despite 
the Philippines having established a branch of migrant workers rights association in Malaysia. This is 
because domestic worker migrants from the Philippines originally operated within informal recruitment 
migrant networks that were located outside the formal government-owned migrant recruitment institution, 
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) (Chin, 1997). Thus, when the POE A extended its 
networks (its institutions concerned with improving migrants conditions in the destination areas) to the 
destination areas, female domestic workers were not considered, because they remained as "illegal" 
migrants within the formal migration institution (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Chin, 1997; Tacoli, 1999). 
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In Sudan, land is involuntarily "owned" by the military government, particularly in the 
less violent northern region. In the southern region, the on-going civil war has deformed 
all means of authority and governance (including the market structure). Rebels and 
government can both claim ownership to land. The civil society fuces a collapse of their 
exchange entitlement (Sen, 1981; D'reze and Sen, 1989), as they are left landless and 
incapable of performing any form of a livelihood in the region due to the on-going 
violence (Ertur and House, 1993). 
All the cases outline a power structure that is very centralized. Migration pressures thus 
results from the lack of power (information and opportunities) of the migrants to 
influence their immediate reality. This implies that the pattern oflabour migration of the 
late 20th century is a push migration. 50 The suggestion here is that these countries are 
experiencing a negative flexibility oflabour. 
From a theoretical stance, liberalization and the increasing risk and uncertainty associated 
with international and internal migrations have brought to the forefront of the migration 
study the importance of social capital in influencing economic development. The partial 
integration of peasant workers in the market economy of the five country case studies 
implies that some of the current market economy production and labour has remained 
permanently embedded in petty commodity mode of production, with distinct social and 
cultural procedures from the capitalist mode of production and the consumer culture. 
Migration in the late 20th century is clearly not as entirely individually motivated as 
assumed by the Lewis model and the neoclassical methodology. There are risks and 
50 The example of the Patidar caste group in India in the 1930s provides for a good contrast. The poor caste, 
the Patidar, migrated in order to accumulate rural wealth and the rich did not migrate because it would have 
costed them their role as leaders in entrepreneurship . Supply-side pressures to migrate here resulted not 
from the lack of power, choice or information as in the above-mentioned cases, but from the ability to 
move upward within the caste system, made possible by the functioning of the caste system (i.e., the 
diffusion of information). As the poorer became less poor, they acquired the social ethics of the caste group 
above them, who in tum adopted the behaviour of the higher caste group. Ultimately, the highest group 
became increasingly westemised in their social ethics and etiquette (see Chandra, 1997 for details). This 
example outlines a pull migration pattern, whereby migration is voluntary and motivated by the availability 
of economic employment! "betterment" in the destination. 
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uncertainties associated with migration that imply that migrants are vulnerable to their 
socio-economic settings, which then influence migration decisions. Also, under structural 
adjustment, migration pressures are increasingly supply-side driven, and thus migration is 
more push than pull migration. Migrants are thus more economic refugees than fortune 
hunters (Martin, 1995). 
Generally, economic liberalization and the switch from the Lewisian-type economy to a 
Todaran-type economy, associated with risk and uncertainty created a mismatch in skill 
requirements (demand) and availability (supply) in the domestic labour markets. The 
large and expanding size of the unprotected private informal sector is an indication of the 
skill mismatch and labour demand. To address the above constraint, governments in these 
countries adapted informal sector development schemes, which have so far produced 
mixed results.51 
Clearly although the development of institutions and mechanisms to enhance economic 
and legal capabilities of workers are crucial for the effective development of a country, 
irrespective of the geographical or occupational patterns of outflows, such types of 
measures remain mostly unilaterally determined in the current global economy, and thus, 
do not consistently produce the desired outcomes. The point being put forward here is 
that unilateral state control over labour immigration and increases costs for both the 
migrant and countries implementing the unilateral "functionalist" policies, by creating a 
dual labour market of prospective employees, with employers being less able to 
distinguish the skill and legal (in terms of external migration) status of migrants. The 
outcome of the dual labour market has been the increasing numbers of unskilled and 
undocumented (in terms of external migration) migrants. 
" For example in patrilineal societies, such as in Sudan and the Philippines (Ertur and House, 1993; Goss 
and Lindquist, 1995; Cohen and House, 1996) informal sector development reform programmes have been 
less successful (Cohen and House, 1996; Chin, 1997; Lui and Chiu, 1999) than in a matrilineal society such 
as in Ghana (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994). 
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4. 4. 3. Institutional structure surrounding the changing pattern of international 
labour migration 
The accountability of gains from emigration is conducted under very rigid legislative 
systems in these countries. The Philippines example is applied here to demonstrate the 
above point. The institutional structure in the other labour exporting countries is 
analogous to this example in the sense such institutions are increasingly pushing 
international migrants into a position of illegality and criminality. In the Philippines, the 
direct recruitment of migrant workers by overseas employers is illegal (Martin, 1995). 
The state determined that migration is better controlled and benefits (i.e., remittances 
accruing to the state) more likely to accrue to the Philippines if the process occurs 
through licensing recruitment agencies (Martin, 1993, 1995; Goss and Lindquist, 1995; 
Saith, 1998). This has created an official sanctioned form oflabour migration from the 
Philippines, whereby overseas employers contact the recruitment agencies who typically 
send agents overseas for recruitment. The agencies must then receive permission to 
recruit labour for given contracts from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 
(POEA). Otherwise, employers have to get direct permission from the government to 
allow the POEA to recruit labour for them. Private recruitment agencies are 
organizational entities that depend upon access to specific bundles of "allocative" and 
"authoritative" resources and, most iroportantly, control over information that allows 
them to negotiate the modalities of interaction within the migrant institution52 (Goss and 
Lindquist, 1995: 337). 
Recruitment permits require that private agencies hold sufficient capital to set up their 
establishments, post bonds required by the state, and sustain contract-seeking and labour-
52 Since 1982, labour export has been promoted and regulated solely by the Philippine Overseas 
Employment Agency. This agency has further established recruiting, legal and licensing and travel 
accountability agencies and offices in the regulation of emigration (Martin, 1993; Goss and Lindquis~ 
1995; Chin, 1997; Lui and Chiu, 1999). However, the goverrunent has not fuired too well in its aim to 
promote the rights and welfure of migrant workers (Chin, 1997). This is largely due to the application of 
unilateral decision-making practised by the Philippines and the labour-receiving countries, and the lack of 
accountability of social gains from migration (Saith, 1998). The spill over from migration that precipitated 
into the social structure (such as the development of micro-enterprises in rural and semi-urban areas using 
resources generated by emigration) was largely not accounted for by state policy (Saith, 1998). 
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recruiting operations. These organizations must then obtain official authorization from 
state agencies, a process that often requires good political connections, command of the 
law and the language of legal institutions that regulate recruiting activity, as well as 
having knowledge of the practices of international employers and regulations of national 
and foreign governments (Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 338). All these requirements 
increase the expense of private recruitment agencies. These expenses become passed onto 
the worker in various fees (Martin, 1993: 643). This led to the evolution of illegal 
recruitment operations and illegal migration flows in the Philippines particularly in the 
late 1980s, which undermined the ability of the state to account for all out-flows of 
populations, and inflows of gains from migration (Saith, 1998). 
In an attempt to reduce the levels of illegal migrations and increase its ability (power) in 
managing international labour migration in the late 1980s, the Philippines government 
further curbed the number oflicensed private recruitment agencies. These agencies, while 
literally the agencies of overseas employers and subject to state control, also acted as 
concierges within the migration institution, by managing the modalities that condition 
access for individuals seeking employment abroad (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). 
Representative of recruitment agencies thus exercised considerable discretionary power 
since qualified applicants were usually only one of many in a large pool of migrants and 
selection depended upon maintaining interaction with these agents (Goss and Lindquist, 
1995). Thus, the curtailing of their operations in effect leads to increased illegal channels 
of emigration, that exploited potential emigrants, and increased the vulnerability of 
migrants in the destination area, by eroding their representation rights (since such 
workers, e.g., domestic workers, were not recruited by government officials, they had a 
lesser chance of being represented by the official government legislative institutions set 
up in the destination country) (Chin, 1997; AWORC, 1999). 
Moreover, illegal recruitment remains a serious problem for the Philippines because of 
the effects it has on interstate relations and foreign currency earnings (Martin, 1993). The 
latter is normally perceived, by analyst of Filipino emigration, as the more important 
challenge since it outlines the principle rationale for state promotion of overseas contract 
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labour (see for example, Martin, 1993, 1995; Goss and Lindquist, 1995: 339). The 
Philippines (like Lesotho, Egypt, Ghana, India, and Thailand) has established an 
organized remittance system and (like Lesotho, South Korea and Bangladesh) imposes a 
mandatory remittance of a proportion of all overseas eamings through government-
approved banks. For land-based workers, this varies from 50 to 7 percent of wages, and 
for ship-workers, it is as much as 80 percent (Beaudry and Sowa, 1994; Goss and 
Lindquist, 1995). Nevertheless, recent analysts of labour migration from the Philippines 
(for example, Saith, 1998; Pangestu, 2000) also point out that the threat to international 
relations is also critical, as bad relations with other countries may undermine foreign 
investments inflows to the country. Thus, in the case of the Philippines, the past 
emigration policy is increasingly pushing migrants into an illegal status. S3 
4. 5. Conclusion 
The chapter has analysed the relationship between international labour migration and 
industrial diversification in five developing countries. The conclusion arrived at is that 
unlike the predictions of the neoclassical school of thought intemationallabourmigration 
pressures have not abated with increased industrial diversification in the chosen country 
case studies. Neither has international flow oflabour led to reduced poverty and income 
ineqUality. The IS phase of industrialisation was accompanied by higher government 
53 The United States justifies the maintenance of a unilateral immigration policy within NAFTA (i.e., 
Mexico) and between its trade arrangements with Latin America, as an insurance taken against the likely 
deterioration in the American social capital due to interaction with immigrant flows from these countries 
(Lopez and Schiff, 1998; Schiff, 1998). Nevertheless, most immigrants from the Americas hold a higber 
social capital symmetry to the U.S.'s social capital than immigrants from Europe or Japan, for example, in 
terms of their ability to adapt to the immigration country's language, social norms, religion, politics and 
economic relations. But the U.S. usually prefers less oftbese workers compared with workers from Russia 
or Japan, for instance. This is because emigrants from the South (or Latin) American countries are usually 
perceived to have lower skills (human capital, measured in terms of education attainment level) than their 
counterparts from Russia and Japan (Berry and Sabot, 1978; Funkhouser, 1997). Ironically, the 
conventional response by the U. S. under NAFTA agreements has been to promote foreign aid assistance to 
these countries in order to counter the high immigrations (Weintraub and Diaz·Briquets, 1992), rather than 
promoting a regional attempt at improving the skills of (these) immigrants (Schiff, 1998; Schiff and Lopez, 
1998). Meanwhile, the pace of migration from the Latin America region into the U.S . has not decreased 
witb the application of stricter immigration polices by the United States (Guardian Weekly, 2000). What is 
different is the fact that the rigidity of the U.S. unilateral stances is increasingly forcing Mexican and Latin 
America migrants into the United States into an illegal and criminal position. 
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expenditure on social services, particularly universal primary education, in the hopes to 
reduce labour skill disparities and thus reduce income inequality. Nevertheless, the IS 
phase of industrial diversification was also accompanied by greater out-migration of 
labour to destinations in industrialized or oil-rich countries. The remittances obtained 
from this emigration established real revenue gains and foreign exchange availability for 
the sending governments. Most governments in tum pursued emigration as an integral 
part of the development policy, with the exception of Costa Rica. At the same time, the 
non-tradable sectors in these countries also benefited from the remittance revenues, but 
almost always at the expense of the tradable sectors. As a result, a Dutch disease 
phenomenon was also witnessed. During the world economic crises of the 1980s and 
early 1990s, these countries were forced to borrow heavily from IFIs to finance their 
growing fiscal deficit. This eventually led to the switch from lSI towards EO! and trade 
liberalization. However, increased economic liberalization led to increased migration, 
particularly rural-urban and out-migration, with greater income and poverty disparities 
between the rural and urban migration. This suggests that these countries are current 
caught in a low-growth path associated with irnmiserising growth and negative flexibility 
of labour. The important point here is that so far EO! and SAPs have not as yet produced 
the expected results. 
The qualitative analysis given in this chapter provides for a dynamic theorisation of 
migration that contrasts the static neoclassical theorisation. The analysis given above 
denotes the study of migration as a part of the global systems of production. Whereas the 
pre-crisis out-migration was largely driven by external forces (or the industrial 
diversification of developed countries), the post-crisis out-migration is largely due to 
internal industrial diversification (particularly the switch from IS to EO industrialisation) 
and increased informlisation of employment in the domestic labour market. International 
labour migration during the EOI and structural adjustment phases is largely accompanied 
by increased segmentation of domestic labour markets. Labour market segmentation is in 
turn a result of cumulative forces of market imperfections and inappropriate political 
institutions that in tum are influenced by the historical IS industrialisation adapted at 
independence. In terms ofthe dual labour market theory, the development of segmented 
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labour markets during the EO phase of industrialisation and the shifts into informal type 
of employment arrangements and increasing temporary labour migration implies that 
there is a high risk factor associated with shifts in sectoral employment inherent in the 
industrial diversification process. This differs from the classical analysis under the Lewis 
model, which does not include a risk factor in the analysis of shifts in sectoral 
employment and labour migration. 
As indicated above, economic liberalization produced migration push factors in the rural 
areas. The switch from traditional agriculture production, principally for domestic 
consumption purposes, to non-traditional agricultural and non-agricultural production for 
export, led to increased rate oflandlessness of peasant farmers who were pushed out of 
their lands by the expanding large industrial estates. These farmers were forced to find 
paid employment in the urban areas either within the domestic market or in the 
neighbouring economies, where most became absorbed into the foreign industries 
associated with the Export Processing Zones. The risks associated with out-migration 
include the informalisation of migrants as well as increased unemployment of migrants 
and returning migrants. Employment in the EPZs is generally short-term in the sense that 
the industries producing in the manufacturing sector are mostly the "fly-by-night" type. 
During the economic crisis of the 1980s (that lasted up to the late I 980s) most of the EPZ 
industries shut down and forgone the economies that were experiencing the crisis. 
Income inequality and poverty rose in these countries, so too did migration, as a response 
(survivalist) strategy to the domestic employment crisis. Nonetheless, EOI has not 
managed to reduce the rates of poverty, income inequality or migration. In effect, deeper 
EOr has led to deepening poverty, income inequality and out-migration. The employment 
associated with the EPZs growth has been largely of low-skill and low-income 
employment, which poses serious implications as to the type of growth path these 
countries are currently embarking upon. More importantly, deeper EOI has led to the 
feminisation of manufacturing production and increased informalisation of urban 
employment. Since the early 1990s, returning migrants are increasingly either forced to 
join the informal sector or become openly unemployed. The transfer of skills acquired 
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while abroad has been marginal and the prospects offinding employmentin the domestic 
labour market diminishing. 
The point put across here and the main lesson for Lesotho is that international labour 
migration needs to be analysed within the larger context of the macro policy framework 
and also within a regional, if not global perspective. The lessons for here are the need to 
recognise that the process of industrial diversification in a labour-sending country clearly 
and directly influences international labour migration, as much as remittance-induced 
growth influences the diversification process in the labour-sending country. This suggests 
that external and internal migration need to be analysed from a regional perspective, 
given the new international division of labour, which influences the macro policy 
framework. Both the lSI and EO! phases in our five country case studies led to greater 
internal and external labour migration, and increases in income disparities and the 
poverty incidence. Chapter two identified a similar diversification pattern for Lesotho. It 
has already been established in this chapter that EPZ industrialisation has been the 
principal path for EOI development and has so far proven costly for the countries that 
adapted it. Chapter five will now investigate, using quantitative data analysis, the 
relationship between EO industrialisation and international labour migration in Lesotho, 
noting in particular the emerging patterns of unemployment and migration. 
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Table 4.1 
Private unreguited transfers as shares of ImQorts and ex(:!orts, 1970 ~ 1985. 
Private unr~ulted transfers (millions of U.S. dollars}, 1970 -1985 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Lesotho 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Ghana -10 -9 -3 -6 -4 24 -4 -6 -5 -3 -3 -4 -1 -2 21 33 
Sudan -1 -1 4 6 5 2 37 37 66 116 209 323 107 146 277 249 
Egypt 33 38 110 123 310 455 842 988 1824 2269 2791 2230 2116 2481 3683 3216 
The Philipi 29 34 80 84 123 165 146 146 184 230 • 
Ration of unregulted transfers to ImQorts, 1970 -1985. 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Lesotho • • • 0.071 0.056 0.067 0.061 0.043 0.033 0.039 0.054 0.065 0.071 0.091 
Ghana -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.008 -0.01 -0.006 0.03 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 0.037 0.052 
Sudan -0.004 -0.003 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.005 0.063 0.056 0.117 0.226 0.303 0.407 0.267 0.284 0.534 0.563 
Egypt 0.04 0.045 0.135 0.123 0.185 0.29 0.523 0.501 0.941 0.936 0.724 0.558 0.527 0.672 0.953 0.836 
The PhlliPI 0.027 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.046 0.073 0.059 0.047 0.057 0.05· 
Ratio of unreguited transfers to exeorts, 1970 -1985. 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Lesotho • • 0.071 0.056 0.067 0.061 0.043 0.033 0.039 0.054 0.065 0.071 0.091 
Ghana -0.023 -0.027 -0.006 -0.01 -0.006 0.03 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 0.037 0.052 
Sudan -0.004 -0.003 0.012 0.014 0.013 0.005 0.063 0.056 0.117 0.226 0.303 0.407 0.267 0.284 0.534 0.563 
Egypt 0.04 0.045 0.135 0.123 0.185 0.29 0.523 0.501 0.941 0.936 0.724 0.556 0.527 0.672 0.953 0.838 
The Philipi 0.027 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.046 0.073 0.059 0.047 0.057 0.05· • 
Note: Worker remittances listed under unrequited private transfers in the balance of payments accounts consists of income earned by migrants who have been abroad for more than one year. 
Lesotho thus reports la..ver records of unrequited private transfers in comparison to the other countries, because Lesotho is largely invloved in oscillatory labour migration. 
Source: Keely and Tran, 1989: 508 - 522 
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CHAPTERS 
EMPIRCAL ANALYSIS OF THE EMERGING MIGRATION PATTERNS: 
LESOTHO, 1986 - 1998 
5. 1. Introduction 
This chapter conducts the empirical and quantitative analysis of the emerging pattern of 
both internal and external migration in Lesotho, between 1986 and 19981, and how these 
emerging patterns relate to the changes in employment opportunities in the modem and 
external sectors of Lesotho's economy. To recap the employment story in Lesotho, 
Chapter 2 established that migrant mine labour employment opportunity largely 
detennined external migration in Lesotho, while modem sector employment 
opportunities determined internal migration patterns. Chapter 2 also recognized that 
modem sector employment is largely footloose. Moreover, Chapter 2 found that Lesotho 
faced a significantly large and growing informal sector within the urban areas and a 
growing youth unemployment problem. From Chapter 2 it was established that 335900 
population of the working age population was residual (i.e., neither employed inside or 
outside the country) out of a total working age group population of about 1.4 million. 
This chapter picks up the story from Chapter 2's unemployment portrait and argues that 
the high unemployment level in the country is contributing to the emergence of push 
migration. The data for migration and unemployment used in the chapter is drawn from 
Lesotho's population census reports, labour force surveys, and employment reports that 
are conducted by government officials and international development organizations? 
1 I would like to acknowledge the supervision of Mr. David Fryer in conducting the relevant statistical tests 
and other computational analysis of the chapter. The use of statistical computation analysis in the chapter 
was conducted in order to give a quantitative representation of the migration story and not to display the 
ability to conduct statistical computations. J reserve the rights to any errors in presenting the statistical 
computations. 
2 In Lesotho, labour force surveys are dependent on donor funding. Between the late 1980s and 1990s, only 
two comprehensive labour force surveys have been conducted. These were for the years 1986 and 1997. 
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The aim of this exercise is to determine the relationship between the high unemployment 
in the country and emerging pattern of push migration. This is in agreement with the 
proposition given in Chapter I, which stated that external and internal migration in post-
1986 Lesotho is a push migration with a Third World development path. 
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section one gives the introduction. Sections two 
deals with the unemployment story. Sections three and four relate the emerging pattern of 
push internal (section three) and external migration (section four) to the unemployment 
story. Section five gives the summary and conclusion of the chapter. 
5. 2. Unemployment pattern 
The unemployment story in Lesotho is not very clear. Official documents tend to record 
only open unemployment.3 But as indicated in Chapter 2, there is a lot of hidden and 
disguised unemployment, 4 especially in the rural areas. 
Population census reports in Lesotho are also dependent on donor funding. However, unlike the labour 
force surveys, the popUlation census reports have been undertaken every ten years since 1976. Data 
comparison is thus limited by this factor. 
3 The labour force survey for 1986 (Bureau of Statistics, 1990: 40 - 50) attempted the documentation of 
hidden and disguised unemployment, by reporting on the multiple activities of the unemployed labour force 
and inactive population (particularly students and homemakers). However, such an exercise proved to be 
somewhat too ambitious for a Lewisian economy with classical surplus labour supply The reporting of 
multiple activities required the use of the current status (week of reference) indicator, which was not 
compatible with the main usual status (past 12 months) accounting conducted in the labour force survey 
and other labour force reports (e.g, Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1997). 
4 In this thesis, hidden unemployment is defined as the economically active population (also known as 
discouraged workers) that is neither officially unemployed nor employed, but that shows up among the 
economically inactive population. Disguised unemployment is defined as the economically active 
population that is engaged in the survivalist projects associated with the informal sector. Economically 
active popUlation or the labour force is the population that is ten years and over that is officially reported as 
either employed or unemployed. The government of Lesotho officially defines the economically inactive 
population (Bureau of Statistics, 1982, 1990, 1996; Ministry of Labour and Emp loyment, 1997, 1998) as 
the population ten years and over, that is either involved in studies, homemaking. retirement! disability, or 
other. The other category is ambiguous, implying the existence of hidden unemployment. 
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Unemployment and NEipop rates: 1996 districts 
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Figure 5.1 
Note: The employment! unemployment and labour force participation rates are measured ITom the 
1996 population that was 10 yrs and over.' 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Bureau of Statistics, 1996c: 53 
Figure 5.1 above indicates the rate of unemployment against the non-employed share of 
the population by district and gender. The NEI pop graph is the proportion of the 
population (of the gender district graph) reported as not having any work. Firstly the 
graph and MU shows how unemployment rate (UER) varies with NEI pop. The point 
labelled FU shows the district unemployment rates respectively. The graph also tells the 
story of the non-labour force participation rate (NLFPR), whlch indicates the rate of 
5 The economically active population in Lesotho for 1986 was 12 years and over and in 1996, it was ten 
years and over (Bureau of Statistics, 1990; 1996c). The increase in the young population involved in 
economic activity indicates either the measurement of such activities as herding, or the possible increase in 
child labour in the country. In any case, the trend in economic activity between 1986 and 1996 has been a 
decrease in the traditionally male-dominant activities (such as farming) and a rise in new activities such as 
manufacturing, and services that are more female-oriented . Economic activity in construction is largely 
male-dominated, but the numbers of employed males in formal construction remains relatively small 
(Ministry of Economic Planning, 1997b; Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c). This implies that 
perhaps the type of construction activity witnessed in the country is largely associated with consumption 
(e.g. , home construction, etc). 
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dropouts from the labour force at high NE/ pop levels. These are represented by the 
points labelled FNL and MNL respectively. 
The official records for unemployment in 1996 for example, indicate that total 
unemployment rate (UER) on average was 22 percent, while the average female UER 
was 24 percent for females and the male average UER was 20. Overall, women tended to 
record a higher UER rate than males. The district that recorded the highest UER was 
Mohale's Hoek, with 31 percent total UER, 28 percent male UER, and 39 percent female 
UER. The district with the least UER was Mokhotlong, with 15 percent total UER, 14 
percent male UER, and 17 percent female UER. However, the average rate of the not 
employed population for Mokhotlong was 67 percent, with males recording a high of 53 
percent, and females over 80 percent of total population. The non-labour force 
participation rate (NLFPR) for Moktlong was on average at 60 percent, while the male 
NLFPR was 45 percent and the female NLFPR was 76 percent. The low UER rate for 
Mokhotlong and the high NLFPR could imply that this district was very rural in the sense 
that a lot of the population was predominantly occupied in subsistence economic 
activities, (e.g., livestock herding, firewood collection, fetching water, etc.) and therefore 
not recorded as officially unemployed. But at the same time, it could also indicate high 
unemployment in rural areas (the NE/ pop and UER graphs), suggesting that these 
workers were not included in the official unemployment records. 
The NLFPR graph describes the working age population that is not economically active. 
In the official labour force records, this category includes students, homemakers, retired/ 
disabled, and other. In this analysis, we are most interested in the homemaking and other 
categories. According to the NLFPR graph in figure 5.1 above, the rate of rural female 
labour force participation is very low. Two hypotheses are proposed for in explaining 
this observation. The first hypothesis explains that the low rural women labour force 
participation could reflect the involvement of rural women in traditional subsistence 
economic activities, associated with surplus labour and the Lewisian economy. 
158 
But, why is the rural/ female unemployment rate so high, and why is, for example, urban 
male labour force participation so low? An alternative hypothesis proposes that rural 
females are not traditional, but simply have low employment probabilities leading to a 
discouraged worker effect. There are fewer employment opportunities (NE/ pop 
increases), unemployment does increase, but not proportionately. The graph shows that 
increasing NE/ pop has a stronger effect on non-participation than it does on 
unemployment. This suggests a hidden unemployment phenomenon, whereby in a 
situation where there is low or no official employment opportunities, greater numbers of 
workers are likely to drop out of the labour force where, we assume, some are likely to 
engage in non-official economic activities. 
For example, the fuct that women recorded a high of76 NLFPR for Mokhotlong implies 
that many appear to be homemakers involved in subsistence production activities, but the 
official unemployment record does not necessarily indicate that this is a choice for 
women. The empirical evidence contained in figure 5.1 seems to suggest that, on average, 
Lesotho has a higher rate of hidden and disguised unemployment than open 
unemployment, especially among female workers. Overall women tended to record 
higher NLFPR than the total NLFPR, indicating than women in Lesotho are 
predominantly occupied in homemaking activities. However, the high figures of female 
participation in homemaking seem to be because there are (still) few jobs for women in 
Lesotho (Chapter 2 section 2.5) [t seems as if women are "staying out" of the labour 
force not because they are homemakers or subsistence farmers in the traditional sense, 
rather women are homemakers because they face fewer job opportunities in the labour 
market. 
The NLFPR and NE/ pop graphs indicate that if the NE/ pop rate (i.e., by increasing 
jobs), the rate of unemployment does not full proportionately. This suggests that ifone 
extra job is created in the modem sector, it does not lead to one less unemployed worker 
in Lesotho, even though official records may indicate otherwise. Putting it another way, it 
would appear that if one extra worker is laid offin the job market, it does not lead to one 
extra unemployed in the official records. The implication here is that these workers 
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dropped out of the labour market. This is suggested by the gradients of the NLFPR and 
NE/pop graphs. Figure 5.1 allows us to make inferences from the cross-sectional data, 
which we would not have been able to do if the economy was still traditional.6 The fact 
that both the male and female NLFPR lie on the same gradient of the NLFPR graph 
suggests that if there were more jobs available in the country, there would be as many 
women as men willing to enter the labour force. This implies that workers choose to stay 
outside the labour force because of lack of jobs. Thus, figure 5.1 seems to suggest the 
discouraged worker effect, whereby workers drop out of the labour force due to the lack 
of employment opportunities in the domestic labour market. Most become absorbed into 
low quality consumption production outside the official economic activities. 
Moreover, according to figure 5.1 above, the urban male labour force participation rate 
seems to be low, with, for example, about 40 percent of working age men in Maseru 
staying out of the labour force. This indicates that the high rates not employed population 
also occurs in the urban areas. This phenomenon could either be due to the fact that there 
is generally traditional "subsistence" employment, which does not get officially recorded 
as employment, or once again, that there is very high hidden unemployment in the 
country. For example, for females, at NE/pop is equal to 80 percent, the official 
unemployment rate (UER) range is about 18 to 36 percent. This suggests very hidden 
unemployment in rural areas. This is not surprising, given the revelation in Chapter 2 that 
rural areas are shedding workers. It is likely that hidden unemployment in rural areas 
generated increased rural urban migration in the Lesotho in the 1990s. However, the lack 
of job opportunities in the modem sector, as suggested by the high urban male NLFPR 
and UER implies that this type of migration is likely to be a push migration. 
Unfortunately, figure 5.1 above is limited to the analysis of discouraged worker and 
hidden unemployment. One cannot infer any other manifestations of a collapsing 
economy, such as the emergence of the informal sector (i.e., disguised unemployment) 
from figure 5.1 above. Nevertheless, the Central Bank of Lesotho and the Ministry of 
6 The idea here is not to take the projections of the calculations too literally. There are obviously bound to 
be marginal errors related to the computation of figure 5.1. Nevertheless, the main point of figure 5.1 
remains clear. 
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Labour and Employment in Lesotho have recently become concerned with the rise in 
infonnal economic activity, particularly in and surrounding the urban areas of the 
country, that are largely situated outside the fonnal economic activities (Foulo, 1996; 
Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c). In addition, a recent survey conducted by 
the Sechaba consultant group on rural economic development reported that the majority 
of rural dwellers in Lesotho drop out of the labour force and settle into the rural slums 
with little or no marketable economic activities (Sechaba Consultants, 1994). These 
revelations, together with the analysis of discouraged worker effect, suggest that the 
majority of the non-labour force participation population in Lesotho is situated in 
infonnal economic activities, or the so-called "survivalist" activities generally associated 
with the Third World economy. The observed rise in rural-urban migration, suggested in 
Chapter 2, is thus likely to be a push migration. The fact that both rural and urban areas 
seem to project low labour force participation implies that the urban areas in Lesotho are 
likely to develop into urban slums, or become an extension of the rural slums. 
The important point explained by is a discouraged worker effect. The discouraged worker 
effect suggests that in a labour market where there are no or decreasing employment 
opportunities, more workers are likely to drop out of the labour force as one worker gets 
laid off. This is because the laid off workers have little incentive to look for work, when 
the employment probabilities are so few. The overall impression from this exercise is that 
the employment crisis in Lesotho is much more worse than official unemployment 
statistics suggest. 
5. 2. 1. Y outb unemployment 
The variables (graphs) used to reveal the complete unemployment story in figures 5.2a 
and 5.2b include the following: the official unemployment rate (Urate) graph; official 
unemployment including the category of other (U inc!. Other rate) graph; the not 
employed, student, retired/ disabled, or homemaker population (NESRDHI pop) graph; 
and the not employed population (NE/ pop) graph. 
161 
The picture for male and female unemployment by age groups seems to mirror the above 
district unemployment story. Figure 5.2a and 5.2b indicate that on average, male workers 
record lower official unemployment rates than female workers. This suggests that women 
face fewer job opportunities in comparison to their male counterparts. For example, at the 
prime working age groups of 25-44 and 45-59, only 21 and 15 percent of male workers 
were recorded as officially unemployed. On the other hand, considering the same age 
categories for women, there were 24 and 16 percent women officially recorded as 
unemployed. 
In addition, figures 5.2a and 5.2b indicate greater female hidden and disguised 
unemployment (for instance the unemployment plus other graph for female lies above 
that for males). Figure 5.2b below also indicates that open unemployment (Urate graph) 
appears to be higher for female workers between the age groups 15-19 and 20-24 than for 
male workers. This implies that either more young male workers are involved in official 
employment (and therefore have a higher child labour official record) or that young 
women workers tend to be involved in informal types of jobs associated with the 
homemaking activities that do not officially get included as employment. 
The not employed/ student! retired! disabled/ homemaker (NESRDHI pop) graph for 
male workers increases sharply between the ages 15 - 24 and peaks at 34 percent, while 
for females is a gradual rise that peaks at 22 percent. Similarly, the unemployment rate 
(urate), unemployed plus other (U incl. other) graphs for males have sharper gradients 
compared with the female graphs, which have more gradual inclinations. This suggests 
that young males in Lesotho face a higher unemployment problem than older male, but 
women in general face the highest unemployment. The implication here is that male 
workers have traditionally had better employment opportunities in Lesotho. This is 
changing however, witnessed by the rise in male youth unemployment. The recent 
generation of EPZ employment is increasing the numbers of female workers, although 
generally, male workers still dominate the employment scene in Lesotho. 
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Male "prime age" unemployment is low because of the mining in South Africa and old 
manufacturing in Lesotho. With the decrease in mine employment in South Africa, we 
can expect a rise in the prime age of male unemployment. This suggests that in the near 
future , unemployment is likely to impact more directly on men, who in the past were 
protected by mine employment. 
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It can also be inferred from figure 5.2 above that official recording for unemployment in 
Lesotho generally only captures open unemployment and tends not to capture hidden and 
disguised unemployment. The story being told by the overall unemployment analysis is 
that the increase in joblessness is resulting into a push migration that, as we shall see 
later, is distinctly rural-urban (internal and external urban) migration. The increased male 
youth unemployment, especially in urban areas, and greater female hidden and disguised 
unemployment is direct evidence of the lack of jobs in Lesotho, and is also leading to a 
gender specific migration pattern, whereby women tend to dominate the internal 
migration, while male dominate the external migration. Official labour market analysis 
reveals in Lesotho maintains that even though on average more women tend to migrate 
internally than men, they appear to do so for non-economic reasons, such as marriage, as 
they tend not to participate in the labour force (e.g., Bureau of Statistics, 1990; Ministry 
of Labour and Employment, J998c). However, our analysis indicates otherwise. Both 
figures 5.1 and 5.2 (a and b) above suggest that the low labour force participation by 
women workers is a direct result of the lack of employment opportunities for women in 
Lesotho. Thus, it would appear that even in the 1990s, women in Lesotho still face fewer 
employment opportunities than men. 
5.3. Internal migration and urbanisation 
There are three measures of internal migration in the study oflabour migration. These are 
net, gross and place-to-place migration rates. Net migration is calculated from the 
difference between the place-to-place migration rates, while gross migration is calculated 
from the sum of place-to-place migration rates. 
5. 3. 1. Net and gross migration 
The simplest measure of migration, with which we start, is NMa, d, net migration from all 
other districts (a) into the specific destination (d). This is calculated as Ma,d/Mo,a, 
where Ma,d is migration from all other districts (a) into the specific destination (d), and 
MO,a is migration from the specific origin to all other destinations (a). 
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Table 5.1 
Net migration fNMa4l from aU other districts (a) into a specific destination (d). 
1986 and 1996 
1986 1986 1986 1986 1996 1996 1996 1996 
In and Out In- Out- Inlout Urb(J!.o[!. In- Out- In/out Urb/pop 
mig by mig mig mig mig 
district, 
1986 and 
1996 
Ma,d MO,d Ma,d MO,d 
Butha- 8903 10345 0.860609 0.0612 9870 11120 0.88759 0.112863 
Buthe 
Leribe 28304 21225 1.333522 0.0547 36180 21353 1.694375 0.171467 
Berea 19845 21256 0.933619 0.1446 39894 22116 1.803852 0.201858 
Maseru 50456 31408 1.60647 0.2943 67978 38017 1.788095 0.352454 
Mafeteng 21300 24167 0.881367 0.0553 22834 27817 0.820865 0.1 01557 
Mohale's 17390 19549 0.88956 0.041 17502 21139 0.827948 0.095963 
hoek 
Quthing 5317 13035 0.407902 0.0319 7088 12697 0.558242 0.075622 
Qacha's 5087 10069 0.505214 0.0655 5462 8855 0.616827 0.06397 
Nek 
Mokhotlong 4191 11066 0.378728 0.0258 3774 12322 0.306281 0.045911 
Thaba- 11429 10102 1.13136 0.0173 10574 45720 0.231277 0.034129 
Tseka 
Total - 0.102 - 0.168 
Source: Ma,d and Mo,a are reported In Bureau of StatIstIcs (1996b: 74), for 1996 and 1986 data. 
For example, in 1986, 19 845 people living in Berea had moved in from other districts of 
Lesotho, and 21 256 had left Berea for other districts. This means that Berea was 
experiencing net out-migration, which is reflected by the in/out figure having a value less 
than one. It is interesting to note that by 1996, Berea was experiencing significant net in-
migration. It is also interesting to note that the ranking has changed little between 1986 
and 1996. Maseru, Leribe and Thaba-Tseka were the three main districts experiencing 
greater in- than out-migration (all had an in/out ratio of greater than 1) in 1986. 
Unsurprisingly, but with the exception of Thaba-Tseka, districts with an in/out ratio of 
greater than 1 in 1996 were again, Maseru and Leribe. Berea had also gained more people 
in 1996 than in 1986. This is probably associated with the fact that Berea shares a 
transportation corridor with Leribe and Maseru, a point to which we will return to later. It 
is interesting to note that Thaba-Tseka had lost more people to other districts in 1996 as 
compared to 1986. To an extent, this is to be expected. Thaba-Tseka was constructed in 
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1979 as a pilot project for rural development, with the aim of developing the rural areas 
so as to decrease pressure on migration to the three main town districts of Maseru, Leribe 
and Berea (Tsietsi, 1996b). Unsurprisingly, the project has so far failed, indicated by the 
high out-migration rate of probably rural dwellers from Thaba-Tseka. Unsurprising 
because, as indicated in Chapter 2, rural development in Lesotho has so far tended to 
follow a "mish-mush" of top-down and bottom-up approaches that nevertheless exclude 
the participation of the local rural dwellers in the planning and implementation stages. 
Most rural dwellers thus remain irresponsive to any initiatives by the district officials to 
developing the rural areas. A good example of this is the 1994 failure of the LHDA to 
relocate displaced people from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) rural 
locations into other locations in the Lesotho. This resulted in unplanned settlements into 
the border of Maseru and particularly along the "transport conidor" (Coverdale and 
Pottinger, 1996). The implication for the possibility of reintegrating returning migrants is 
that such a project is unlikely to succeed in Lesotho. Although this may sound 
pessimistic, if the experience of the LHWP relocation programmes is any thing to go by, 
then there is a need to reconsider reintegration policy of displaced and migrant 
populations in Lesotho. 
In terms of urbanisation rate', the most urban districts by 1986 were Maseru and Leribe. 
But these districts recorded low urbanisation rates of only 29.43 percent and 14.46 
percent urban respectively. Moreover, the third most urban district by 1986 had an 
urbanization rate of only 6.55 percent urban, with the reminder of the districts having 
urbanisation rates of between 5 and I percent. The total country urbanisation rate for 
1986 was 10.2 percent. This suggests that Lesotho was predominantly ruraI in 1986. This 
is consistent with "Lewisian" story. 
Even in 1996, total country urbanisation rate was still only 16.8% urban. There was also 
little change in the ranking. All districts appear to have experienced significant increasing 
urbanisation with the exception of Qacha's Nek, which experienced a decrease in its 
urbanisation rate. This pattern suggests people are moving out of rural areas, many out of 
7 To calculate the urbanisation rate, district urban population was divided by total popUlation ofthe district. 
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the district, leaving the residual more urbanised. This is why (for example) Thaba-Tseka 
is becoming more urban, despite an in/oul ration of 0.2. It is thus interesting to note that 
there is a strong relationship between in/out and urbanisation rate. The picture for 1996 
suggests that internal migration was more of a rural-urban migration than in 1986 (where 
the urbanisation rates were weak). From our results, it is clear that Maseru, Leribe and 
Berea are the most urban district in Lesotho, and the only districts experiencing net in-
migration (in/out is greater than 1). This is unsurprising, given the fact that most of the 
modem sector's EPZs are situated within these towns (Chapter 2). What is surprising is 
the low rates of urbanisation recorded by each of these urban districts, particularly 
Maseru.8 If our results are to be taken as a clear indication of what is happening in 
Lesotho, then it is likely that the rates of urbanisation are higher than what we have 
estimated. 
The "urban corridor" around Maseru, associated with EPZ industrialisation and urban 
slum formation is likely to contribute to the rapid expansion of Maseru (to other adjacent 
districts) in 1996 as compared to 1986. It is thus not surprising that Mafeteng is 
urbanising rapidly, but was still only 10.16 percent urban in 1996, so, the probable 
dominating factor is rural out-migration, (hence in/out less than I) . Mafeteng is also 
adjacent to Maseru and does not have EPZs. It is likely that the corridor between Maseru 
and Mafeteng is developing into a "rural slum" area, situated outside municipal 
boundaries. This raises the question of whether boundaries have "kept up" with the 
observed patterns of migration and urbanisation, given linear, "outward" pattern of peri-
urbanisation in the country.9 The suggested emerging migration pattern is analysed in 
detail in figure 5.3 below. \0 
8 A possible explanation for the perceived low urbanisation rates could be due to an error contained in the 
original government data. This could be due to different measurement of the district areas between 1986 
and 1996 (see for example, Bureau of Statistics, 1996c: 26). 
9 The 1980 Lesotho government gazette reported the Maseru urban area was 135 square kilometres while 
for Maputsoe (urban town of Leribe) it was 10 square kilometres. By 1995, the Maseru urban area 
compromised 354 square ki lometres, while that of Maputsoe, was 54 square kilometres (Bureau of 
Statistics, 1996c: 26). This could be due to either underestimation in 1980, or due to modern sector activity 
expanding to the adjacent districts from Maseru. Chapter 2 pointed out that the main industrial sites in 
Lesotho are situated in Tsetsane, Maputose and Ha Nyenye, all accessed by tarred road and with installed 
power, water, sewerage and telecommunications facilities . Clearly then the effect of modern sector 
167 
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Figure 5.3 displays the relationship between urbanisation rate and net migration for 1986 
and 1996. The Y-axis depicts the in-migration rate over the out-migration rate. The X-
axis depicts the urbanisation rate. Using the same unbroken line on the graph (despite the 
differentiation of the 1986 data by broken lines on the legend), we can infer the 
difference of net migration in 1986 (the shorter line) and 1996. In 1986 and before, 
Lesotho was very rural, with most of the population largely involved in "subsistence" and 
"classical" agriculture production. According to figure 5.3 above, the pattern of migration 
industrialization has been concentrated in the main urban districts of Maseru, Leribe and Berea. People are 
more likely to migrate into these towns in search of better social as well as economic amenities. such as 
transportation and communication, health and education services, housing with proper water and sanitation 
systems, etc. This is probably why in the migration story we are seeing higher numbers of in-migrants and 
urbanization of particularly Berea and Leribe in 1996 as compared to 1986. The implication here is that 
internal migration in 1996 was largely influenced by the EOI and employment opportunities in the EPZs. 
This is probably also why we see time and time again government and other official records and research 
on urban development in Lesotho reporting greater female internal migration in the 1990s, (for example, 
Bureau of Statistics, 1996b; Ministry of Labour and employment, 1998c; Sechaba Consultants, 1994, 
1995). 
10 A recent study on the dynamics of urbanisation (Marais, 1993) in Lesotho also suggests that the reported 
level of urbanisation in the country is probably underestimating the process. Complementary to our 
analysis, this study points to the artificial maintenance of the land tenure system as the root of the apparent 
low urbanisation records in Lesotho. The suggestion here is that official city boundaries are thus not 
keeping up with the changing reality in the country. 
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in 1986 is more ofa ruml to rural migration. The 1986 data displays a lower R2 value than 
the 1996 data, of 0.23 compared with 0.9 in 1996. 
Using the 1996 data in figure 5.3 above, we can see a clearer rural to urban migration-
the 1996 gradient is stronger than the 1986. Thus in 1996 Lesotho was witnessing the 
emergence of urbanisation and urban regions. Figure 5.3 also indicates that in 1996, 
Thaba-Tseka, Mokhotlong and Qacha's Nek were the most rural districts, with 
urbanisation rates of3.41, 4.59 and 6.44 percent respectively. Maseru, Berea and Leribe 
were the least rural districts, with urbanisation rates of35.25, 20.19 and 17.14 percent 
respectively. This implies that Maseru experienced the most net migration between 1986 
and 1996. Maseru is also the fastest urbanizing district in Lesotho. As pointed out before, 
this is not surprising given the fuct that Maseru is the hub of Lesotho's modem sector 
activities. What is surprising is the low urbanisation rank in Qacha's Nek produced a 
faster out-migration rate for 1996. The data suggests that between 1986 and 1996, there 
were more people who left Qacha's Nek than who moved into that district. This suggests 
that as a result, the district has become slightly more ruml in 1996.11 The story is reversed 
for Leribe district, where there was a high urbanisation rank that is associated with a 
larger in-migration rate for 1996. These results are not surprising and are in agreement 
with the general overall population analysis outlined in Chapter 2 which indicated that 
more households were moving into the lowlands and away from the mountain regions 
(Qacha's Nek and Thaba-Tseka are mountainous districts). 
II The outcome could be related to the fact that Qacha's Nek is adjacent to Thaba-Tseka, the project 
district, and the high out-migration could thus be due to the relocation ofQacha's Nek birth population into 
Thaba-Tseka. Also, during the functioning of the classical migrant labour system, migrants were recruited 
from the most rural districts (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Mochebelele and Nelson-Winters, 2000). Most 
relocated their families next to the borders soon after that (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998). It is 
also reported that the households of migrant mineworkers in Lesotho are the most mobile households 
within the country (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c). 
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Moreover, the emergence of a clearer urbanisation picture in 1996 indicates the turning 
point of the Lesotho economy from a Lewisian surplus economy towards a Todaran 
economy, with urban unemployment. '2 
We also used the same data to calculate Gross migration between two pairs (for example 
Leribe and Berea) is (ML,B+ MB,L) and net migration between pairs is (ML,B-MB,L)' There 
45 cells in the gross and net migration matrices. However, this analysis did not yield 
further insights, so we do not report it here. 
Next we calculated the place-to-place migration (or in-and out-migration rates). The data 
for this analysis came from matrices determined using the same data as in table 5.1 and 
figure 5.3 above. The matrices show detailed place to place-place, designated Mo,d 
(where 0 stands for origin and d for destination). For example they show, as separate 
observations, the number of people born in Leribe who moved to Berea (ML,B) and the 
nurnberofpeople born in Berea who moved to Leribe (M8,L)' where L andB represent the 
origin and destination in each flow. There are ten districts, so there are 90 migration 
cells. Also, we have 1996 and 1986 data, and female and male data for 1996. 
Unfortunately we did not have gender breakdown for 1986. We then pooled the data and 
ran regressions. Pooled data had 180 cells. 
S. 3.2. Place-to-place migration 
It is critical to precisely define what we mean by rates of place-to-place migration. More 
specifically, it is important to choose carefully the popUlation base with respect to which 
the rate is calculated, that is, the denominator. This is considered to be the population 
universe that is "at risk" of migrating. For the out-migration rate from district d, the 
existing population is clearly the appropriate one to use: gomrd=GOM,tIPOPd. However, 
as Goetz (2000) points out, when calculating rates of in-migration, the existing 
population is already in place and, therefore, does not qualifY as being "at risk" of 
12 The lack of job opportunities in the urban areas analysed in section 5.2 also suggested the emergence ofa 
Todaran economy in Lesotho, with a large structural unemployment problem, particularly in the in modem 
sector. 
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migrating into the region. Instead, the population outside the region should, theoretically, 
be used as the base. This detail is usually ignored in applied studies, and instead the same 
population is used in the calculation rate for in-migration as for out-migration: 
girnrd=G%IPOPd. 
To compare the rate of in-migration between 1986 and 1996, estimated equation 5.1 
using OLS with pooled data for 1996 and 1986. 
LnMo.d- ao+ o..(AdJ) + 0.,(1996) + MLnPo) + P,(LnRU) +p,(I996.RU) +P.(Adj.RU) + P6,(Po .I996) ... (5.1) 
MO.d is the number of migrants leaving the origin district (0) for the destination (d). Pd 
and Po are the populations of the destination and origin districts respectively, Adj is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if 0 and d are have a common boundary. 1996 is a 
dummy that takes value 1 for 1996 data and 0 for 1986 data. RU is a variable that 
captures the difference in urbanisation between the destination and origin.13 
Table 5.2 show what ttl (the effect of adjacency) is positive and significant at the 1 % 
level. This means that, all other things held constant, there is much more migration 
between adjacent districts than non-adjacent districts. 14 Also, unsurprisingly, Po (origin 
population) has a positive and significant effect. 
We can use the estimated parameters from 5.1 to derive separate equations for 1996 and 
1986, by setting the dummy variable "1996" equal to 1 for 1996 and 0 for 1986. Thus, 
setting 1996= 1 yields the function for 1996. 
Ln(M,-",Pd) = <lo + o..(AdJ) + 0., + (P,+P,)(LnPo) + (P, + P,)(LnRU) + P.(Adj.RU) .. . . ...... .. ...... (5.1, 996) 
Both 132 and 133 are positive and statistically significant. The sum of the parameters is 0.7. 
In 1996 people were more likely to migrate from rural to urban than between urban or 
between rural pairs. The rural urban variable represents a host of economic factors, such 
" Calculated as Ln(UJ Pd)-Ln(UJ Po) where Ud and U. are the urban populations of the destination and 
origin districts respectively. 
14 Other studies use distance by road (Goetz, 2000). Given the lack of road maps in Lesotho, we used 
adjacency to measure the flow of population between districts. 
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as wages differences, employment probability differences, access to services, access to 
transportation, the lure of the "bright lights," etc. Setting 1996=0 yield the function for 
1986. 
Ln(Mo.iPd) = f1.(J + u,(Adj) + P,(LnPo) + P2(LnRU) + P4(AdfRU) . . ..... . .. . .... (5.1'986) 
In 1986 we can see that although RU had a significant and positive effect (0.2), it was 
much weaker than in 1996. We can explore whether the observed change in patterns of 
migration are statistically significant by considering the difference between these last two 
functions. 
Ln(Mo,iPd) = U2 + P3(LnRU) + P5(LnPO) .. .. .......... .. .. .. .. .. ........ .. ......... (5.1,996-,986) 
We can see that P5 is positive and statistically significant (at the I % level). P3 is 
significant (at the 1 % level) and positive. This means that, in 1996, migration was much 
more strongly rural urban (note also that population has a significantly stronger effect in 
1996). The negative coefficient on U2 indicates that there was significantly more 
migration in 1986 that is not explained by other factors. Taking these observations 
together, we can conclude that there was similar volumes of migration in the two years, 
but that in 1996, the migration was much more "specific" and better explained by the 
model. 
Equation 5.2 considers out-migration [Ln(Md,JPo). The only significant determinants of 
out-migration are Adjacency and destination population. It appears that in-migration is 
much better explained by the "economic" variables underlying urban-rural difference 
than out-migration. 
Equation 5.3 considers the effect of gender on internal migration. Unfortunately data is 
only available for 1996. M takes value 1 for males and 0 for females. Note that males 
are significantly less likely to be engaged in internal migration. The interactive variables 
(RU.M and Adj.M) were not significant, suggesting that there is no difference between the 
pattern of male and female migration, only the level. If female migration was 
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significantly effected by such social factors, we would expect many women to be 
migrating between rural areas. We would thus expect female migration to be significantly 
less effected by RU difference (RUM would be positive and significant). Although the 
coefficient is negative, the effect is extremely weak and insignificant. 
Table 5.2 
Re!!ression Derformed on deDendable variable' LnM d . o . 
Parameter 5.11996 5.IJ986 5.11996. 1986 
Uo -15.4** -10.6 -20.9** 
(-7.31) (-4.71) (-13.6) 
(1 I (Adj) 1.76** 1.81 ** 1.81 ** 
(16.7) (14.7) (12.3) 
(12(1996) -6.49* -2.06 -
(-2.14) (-0.62) 
-
(13(M) - - -0.32* 
- -
(-2.51) 
I3ILn(po) 0.80*· - 1.27** 
(4.57) - (9.90) 
132Ln(RU) 0.20* -0.05 0.42* 
(2.48) _(-0.57) .0.38) 
133(1996.RU) 0.50** 0.16 -
(4.58) (1.24) -
134(AdjRU) -0.18 -0.02 -
(-1.84) (-0.21 ) -
135(Po.96) 0.54* - -
(2.13) - -
136 Ln(Pd) - 0.40* -
- (2.14) -
137(pd.96) - 0.17 -
- (0.62) -
138(RUM) - - 0.07 
- - (0.72) 
139(Adj.M) - - -0.06 
- - (-0.28) 
R" 0.70 0.60 0.72 
N 180 180 180 
.. .. Note: n denotes the number of observatIons. Ongmal data for the above analysIs IS from the 
Bureau of Statistics, 1996a: 205. T-statistics are given in parentheses .•• indicate 
significant at the I % level. • indicates significant at the 5% level. 
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As indicated earlier in figure 5.3, the most urban districts in 1996 were Maseru, Leribe 
and Berea, whilst the most rural districts were Thaba-Tseka, Mokhotlong and Qacha's 
Nek. These results are expected. As indicated in Chapter 2, modem sector employment 
opportunities in Lesotho, although limited, are largely located in urban areas, in 
particular, Maseru and Leribe districts. It is thus not surprising that these two districts are 
rapidly gaining population from the other districts. At the same time, rural areas are 
shedding workers, especially to Maseru, Leribe and Berea. From the projection given in 
Chapter 2 and the above analysis on emerging pattern of migration, it is clear that internal 
migration in Lesotho is largely fuelled by expectations of better economic livelihood in 
urban areas as well as push migration (lack of economic activities) in rural areas. The 
implication here is thus that Maseru, Leribe and Berea are most likely developing into 
slum urban centres, given the low job opportunities and high in-migration rates. 
The place-to-place migration analysis also tells us that there is greater rise in rural-urban 
migration in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. This is not surprising, as Lesotho is 
changing from a completely agrarian into a Third World economy. Similar observations 
were indicated from the comparative country analysis of Chapter 4, where the 
Philippines,' Ghana's and Costa Rica's switch from lSI was identified with increased 
rural-urban migration. And like in the above-mentioned country case studies, greater 
rural-urban migration in Lesotho is being accompanied by increases in unemployment 
and underemployment. 
S. 3.3. Urban poverty 
Urban poverty in Lesotho is often measured on the basis of either access to shelter or 
other urban services (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Ministry of Labour and Employment, 
1998c) or in terms of the actual incomes and expenditures. 15 
IS In theory. the assessment of the access to shelter and other urban amenities indicates the extent to which 
the urban popUlation is "deprived" of certain basic urban services. It is generally assumed that deprivation 
indicates the number of poor (in relation to those below a certain level of income or the poverty line) 
because deprivation is deemed to result from lack of access to basic needs or purchasing power (Sen, 1981 ; 
Lisk, 1985). 
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Evidence in support of worsening living conditions in the wake of urbanization in 
Lesotho is striking.16 Already in the 1976 over half the districts in the country were 
estimated to have more than 40 per cent of their population in slums and squatter 
settlements (Chapter 2).17 In 1997, over 20 percent of the urban households were 
estimated to be living without proper housing, sanitation or water resources (Ministry of 
Labour and Employment, 1998c). Moreover, over half of the urban population in 1996 
was reported not to participate in the labour force (Chapter 5). The causes underlying the 
above trends have been attributed to one major factor: the "corridor development" that 
resulted in the unprecedented growth in urban population, especially in the Maseru 
On the other hand, considering supply side pressures, the theoretical assessment of actual incomes and 
expenditures indicates deprivation as a result of the failure of the supply side. For example, where housing 
supply of adequate quality is not forthcoming even those above the poverty line may have no choice but to 
live in substandard housing. Under this perspective, if the aim of development is to raise the level of real 
incomes of the population to a certain minimum level (i.e., poverty line defined in tenns of income) at 
which they can afford the minimum acceptable quality of shelter and other services then what matters is 
poverty measured in terms of actual income or expenditures. A headcount of number of persons (or 
families) having incomes below this level would indicate the size of urban population lacking the basic 
services (Lisk, 1985). 
One problem in using this approach should be noted at the outset. The data sources from various household 
surveys in Lesotho do not adopt a common measure of poverty line. This makes comparability between two 
household survey sources impossible. In fact, most household surveys have data only on the distribution of 
population or households by income (or expenditure) (for example, Bureau of Statistics, 1988; 1997). If 
one had an estimate of minimum income necessary per person (or household) to be able to afford the 
minimum quality of shelter and other services, then one could use it with the above data and obtain an 
estimate of the urban poor. Moreover. most available data in Lesotho, tend to use a very conservative 
definition of poverty i.e., income necessary to buy the minimum food (in terms of calories per person per 
day) plus other non-food items (usually estimated as a fraction of what is spent on food) (for example, 
Bureau of Statistics, 1988). This measure of income being much lower than what one would consider 
necessary to obtain minimum acceptable quality of shelter and other urban services. Clearly, such a poverty 
line measure would yield a conservative estimate oflhe number of urban poor. 
16 Among the various factors that influence the urban environment in Lesotho are included: industry and 
households in densely inhabited areas; toxic and non-toxic wastes (from industrial and other sources) that 
degrade land and water resources; poor and insufficient waste disposal systems which inflict serious health 
risks and increase the threat of epidemics (particularly TB, HIV and AIDS); heavy reliance on biomass 
materials as the main energy source for domestic needs, especially by tbe poor, which is held responsible 
for a variety of health problems (particularly among women); increasing share of urban population living in 
marginal and environmentally vulnerable locations largely due to scarcity of land and inappropriate human 
settlement policies; inadequate water supplies of acceptable quality pushing households to draw water from 
sources that are increasingly polluted; and poor city maintenance causing a variety of atmospheric pollution 
and traffic congestion (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; Bureau of Statistics, 1996b; Ministry of Labour and 
Employment, I 998c; The Gold Crisis Team, 2000). 
17 The incidence of rising landlessness in the 1970s suggests that pressure to migrate to urban areas is a 
direct result oflhe collapse of the traditional rural development. 
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district. Urban population in Maseru increased most rapidly between 1986 and 1996. 
Most of this popUlation came from other districts, especially in the more mountainous 
rural locations, as well as returning mine migrants. Given the inevitable switch to export-
oriented industrialisation (EO!) policy in Lesotho, it is therefore not a coincidence that 
government officials sought to slow down if not arrest the growth of urban popUlation in 
the past, through the land tenure system, but without success. Some authorities may have 
deliberately decided not to act for fear of worsening the urban situation, as it would 
attract more migration from the countryside (Marais, 1999; Chapter 2). 
"Functionalist" policy makers are increasingly reporting that Lesotho is currently faced 
with a serious welfare challenge resulting from rapid urbanization (e.g., IMF, 1996; 
Ministry of Economic Planning, 1997b; Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c). As 
was suggested earlier, the pace of urbanization in the country has indeed accelerated 
significantly between 1986 and 1996. The consequences of urbanization in terms of 
deteriorating living standards are in fact already visible (Chapter 2). In most districts, 
investment in infrastructure including housing has failed to keep pace with the growth in 
population, which has a direct negative consequence on the living conditions as well as 
productivity of labour and other resources. The result has been the accelerating pace of 
urban slum, mainly along the transportation corridor of the three most urban districts, 
Maseru, Leribe and Berea. The need to improve the coping strategies and make the 
urbanization process more efficient and equitable through urgent action cannot be 
overemphasized 
Thus, given increasing urbanization, Lesotho is faced with a new challenge: how to arrest 
the decline in urban living conditions and urban slum formation? The situation is likely to 
get worse because of population growth and migration. As pointed out in Chapter 2 the 
urban population in Lesotho is expected reach three times the figure of its 1976 level. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, much effort has gone into building capacity within the 
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government to cope with the problem of rapid urbanisation. 18 This suggests that urban 
Lesotho is soon likely to become the source of external migration. 
5. 4. External migration 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, past external migration in Lesotho was largely driven by 
individual migration. Men left their families to go for temporary contract employment in 
the South African mining industry. At the same, an insignificant number of women were 
engaged in external migration. To analyse the emerging pattern of external migration in 
Lesotho between 1986 and 1996, we conducted a cross-sectional examination of the 
characteristics of migrants in 1986 and 1996. The data used was obtained from the labour 
force survey of1986 (Bureau of Statistics, 1990) and population census reports of1996 
(Bureau of Statistics, 199611, 1996b, 1996c). To standardise for the difference in the 
population accounting of the two sources, we calculated the shares of the independent 
variables from the given total population and based our examination on these outcomes. 
" Although the share of urban population is relatively small in Lesotho, urban poverty seems to have risen 
rapidly in recent years, not only because of growth in urban popUlation but also as a result ofthe worsening 
employment situation discussed earlier in the thesis. What is even more disturbing is the fuct that urban 
poverty in Lesotho is expected to increase, and increase more rapidly than in rural areas in the near future. 
More importantly, the prospects of reducing urban poverty do not look too encouraging in Lesotho, given 
the implementation of structural adjustment programmes. 
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Table 5.3 
Migration status. 1986 
Categories Internal migrants External migrants 
Age 
12-19 13894 (28%) 2650 (2%) 
20-34 22429 (45%) 89117 (54%) 
35+ 13298 (27%) 73877 (45%) 
Employment status 
Not completed education 32849 (66%) 134667 (81%) 
Contract employment 9577 (19%) 125724 (76%) 
Net cash income «M250) 4863 (10%) 51516 (31%) 
Remittance «M250) 4565 (9%) 60626 (37%) 
Total 49621 165644 
Note: Shares presented on table 5.3 are for the share of age and employment status of migrants 
out of the total populations ofintemal and external migrants. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Bureau of Statistics, 1990: 56 . 
Table 5.3 indicates that in 1986 there were generally more external migrants than internal 
migrants. Most external migrants were involved in contract employment that was likely 
linked to mine labour employment in South Africa. Generally 31 percent of external 
migrants earned incomes of greater than M250.0019 compared with only 10 percent of 
internal migrants. This is again likely due to mine labour employment in South Africa. In 
addition, migrant mineworkers display a higher ability to remit cash than internal 
migrants. Out of the total employed Basotho mine migrants in South Africa, about 81 
percent had not completed any form of education. In contrast, only 66 percent of 
employed internal migrants had no formal education. Thus in 1986, uneducated or semi-
educated male migrant mineworkers dominated external migration in Lesotho. The 
availability of mine employment opportunities fur males with low education seems to 
have affected the male incentive to stay in school. The rise in Basotho mine labour 
recruitment in South Africa had a negative on the male incentive to stay in school, in the 
sense that younger males came to expect employment in the mines and thus did not 
acquire the need to obtain complete formal education (Ministry of Labour and 
Employment, 1998c). 
19 Lesotho uses both Maloti and Rands. These have the same value (Chapter 2). 
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In tenns of human capital (skill) of migrant workers, the picture for 1996 seems to have 
changed a lot, particularly for male external migrants working for wages. 
Eduacation status of wage workers Inside and outside Lesotho: 1996 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Bureau of Statistics, I 996a: 133 - 134, 1996c: 66. 
Figure 5.4 displays Lesotho's working population, both inside and outside the country, by 
education status and gender. The legends MWWE and FWWE depict external male and 
female wage earners. MWWI and FWWI depict male and female internal wage earners. 
According to figure 5.4 above, about 71.4 percent of total female external migrants 
working for wages (FWWE) had only primary education level compared with only 54.3 
percent of total male external migrants working for wages (MWWE). More interesting, a 
higher share of external male migrants working for wages had primary education (54.3%) 
in comparison to males working for wages internally (45.1%). Similarly, the share of 
female wage earners outside the country with primary education was higher 24.3 percent 
than the share of female wage earners inside the country. The fact that female wOlkers 
record a higher education attainment level than male workers (whether employed inside 
or outside the country) seems to depend on female workers facing fewer low-skill 
employment opportunities than male workers in the southern African region, which then 
generates the incentive for their continuation of education. 
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Nevertheless, the most important information from figure 5.4 above is the fact that 
external wage earners seemed to have lower education attainment in comparison to 
internal wage earners. It is striking that over 50 percent of external male migrants had 
only primary education while only about 12 percent had secondary education. Only I 
percent of external male migrant wage earners had university education. Similarly, over 
70 percent of female external wage earners had only primary education, while only 17 
percent had a secondary education, and 2 percent had a university education. Moreover, 
more than 30 percent of the external wage male wage earners have not gotten any form of 
schooling, compared with 27 percent of internal male wage earners. Similarly, 12 percent 
of the external female wage earners had not gotten any form of schooling, compared with 
only about 3 percent of internal female wage earners. It is thus striking that external wage 
earners have lower education than internal wage earners, and yet, and in particular for the 
males, they (external wage earners) face better employment opportunities (and receive 
higher incomes) compared to the internal wage earners. 
In terms of age of migrant mineworkers, the picture for 1996 seems to have changed 
significantly. 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from Bureau of Statistics, 1996b: 104. 
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Figure 5.5 indicates the 1996 absenteeism rate of the working population in Lesotho by 
rural and urban locations and gender. The absenteeism rate is the number of the working 
population that is currently not in the country divided by the total working population. In 
1986, it seems likely that external migrants came from rural areas, because the country 
was essentially rural. According to figure 5.5, rural males of the age group 25 - 44 and 
45 - 59 still have the highest absenteeism rate in the country.20 Furthermore, urban males 
of the same age groups display the second highest rate of absenteeism in Lesotho. This 
implies that even in 1996 mine labour employment was still significant to the 
employment of male wage earners in Lesotho, particularly for the older and rural males. 
With respect to the "younger" and more urban, the overall profile suggests that there is 
little recruitment of mine migrants (so existing migrants are moving through the age 
distribution). With respect to the female absentees, the overall profile suggests that the 
"new" migration is probably increasingly feminised given that unemployment is youth-
biased. 
Figure 5.6 displays the sectoral employment opportunities for Basotho migrants in South 
Africa for 1984 and 1996, roughly ordered in more "classical" sectors Oeft) to more 
"new.,,21 Comparison of external sector employment opportunities for Basotho migrants 
between 1984 and 1996 indicates a rise in less formal employment in 1996 that is largely 
less male-dominated22. The Y-axis displays the log scale of the numbers of external 
migrants in Lesotho. The X-axis displays by sectors, the employment opportunities 
available to Basotho external migrants. 
20 It is unfortunate that the data does not allow a more detailed breakdown of age groups. 
21 "Classical" in the sense that these sectors were associated with the lSI phase (i.e., mining and 
agriculture), and "new" in the sense of Eo!, i.e. , 3-D services (Saith, 1998), and "Third World." 
22 Note that the lines cross, indicating that "classical" is generally decreasing and "new" is increasing. 
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Sectoral employment of Basotbo migrants in Soutb Africa, 1984 and 1996. 
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Figure 5.6 
Note: Community service in 1984 compromised mostly of domestic work. The data for 1996 has 
excluded the category of fIrst-time jobseeker in the above analysis so as to be able to 
make the comparison with the 1984 data. Thus, the total on the above chart does not 
include flIst-time jobseekers. 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Swaziland Central Statistical OffIce, 1986: 
9.10; and the (Lesotho) Bureau of Statistics, 1996c: 64. 
Figure 5.6 indicates that mine labour employment in both 1984 and 1996 was a 
significant employment opportunity for Basotho migrant workers. It is also interesting to 
note that there were more Basotho migrants engaged in the services and less formal 
employment in South Africa in 1996 than in 1984. This seems to suggest that there has 
been a relative decrease in formal employment opportunities for Basotho migrants in 
South Africa in the 1990s as compared with the 1980s. For example, according to figure 
5.6 above, there is about 10 percent decrease in the numbers of Basotho migrants 
employed in the electricity and gas sector in South Africa in 1996 as compared with 
1984. At the same time, the numbers ofBasotho migrants employed in the community 
service sector in 1996 appears to have increased by 22 percent since 1984. Rearranging 
the data for 1996, as done in table 5.4 according to the female share of employment 
shows that the emerging external employment opportunities in the less formal service 
sector3 are mostly female-dominated, or at least less male dominated?4 
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Table 5.4 
External migrant population by gender and industry, 1996 
External migrant population by gender 
Industry Males Females Total Female share 
Mining 93463 727 94190 1% 
Trausport! Communic. 2453 70 2523 3% 
Construction 2729 162 2891 6% 
ElecJWater 278 20 298 7% 
Otber 2137 587 2724 22% 
Agric. 3379 1251 4630 27% 
Jobseeking (1st time) 1724 873 2597 34% 
Manufacturing 1667 1332 2999 44% 
Finance/ insurance 187 157 344 46% 
Community service 6284 11244 17528 64% 
Wbolesale/ retail 567 1318 1887 70% 
Total excL mining 21405 17014 38421 40% 
Grand total (incl. mine) 114868 17741 132611 14% 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Bureau of Statistics, I 9965c: 64. 
Note: Female share is obtained by diving the female population by the total population of external 
migrants for 1996. 
Table 5.4 indicates that generally in 1996 Basotho women tended to dominate in the less 
"classical" and less formal employment opportunities in South Africa. This confirms the 
earlier deduction that the services sector in South Africa is mostly feminised. 
According to table 5.4 above, 34 percent of all first time job seekers in South Africa from 
Lesotho were women. Given that the grand total of female external migrants is 14 
percent, this suggests either that more Basotho females are migrating to South Africa 
because of the rise in service sector employment opportunities. Alternatively, it could be 
that most Basotho female external migrants in South Africa are faced with 
unemployment, given the fuct that mine employment still dominates in the country. 
23 Associated with Saith's (1998) 3-D (dirty, demeaning! degrading, and dangerous) service sectors, 
including domestic work, "Third world", and immoral. 
24 Note that the ordering is similar to the "c1assicaJ"-"new" discussed above, with feminisation increasingly 
associated with the "new." 
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Although the share of female external migrants remains small relative to the share of 
male migrants (including mining), there is a clear picture of a rapid increase in the share 
of female migrants in the 1990s compared with the 1980s, particularly in the non-primary 
and non-traditional sectors. The domination offemale migrant workers in non-traditional 
employment opportunities in Southern Africa is similar to the femirrisation of domestic 
work and community service employment observed in Chapter 4 in the Philippines 
(South Asia) and Ghana (West Africa)?5 
The overall external migration story so fur seems to imply that male migration is 
decreasing due to the decrease in mine employment in South Africa, while female 
migration is on the rise, although it is still relatively small in comparison to current male 
migrants. The overall picture for emerging trends oflabour migration both internal and 
external in Lesotho is that individual migration is decreasing while household migration 
is increasing. The implication here is that there are more uneducated!semi-educated! low-
skilled workers outside the country than inside, especially males. Yet male workers in 
general still tend to face better employment opportunities and earn a better income than 
female workers, both inside and outside Lesotho (Chapter 2 section 2.5 and table 5.4 
above). 
5. 5. Conclusion 
The switch from import-substitution industrialization (lSI) to export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI) in Lesotho has been accompanied by increased rural-urban 
migration and external migration. Outside the country, here has been a general decline in 
mine employment opportunities for Basotho workers in South Africa, but this has been 
offset by emerging employment opportunities in the service sector, particularly less 
fonnal or casual job opportunities that are also more feminised. Inside the country, the 
main employment sectors in the modem sector are the manufacturing and construction 
sectors. The rapid expansion in exports of manufacturing (EPZs) and construction (the 
" It is also interesting to note that unlike the EPZ sector in Lesotho. South Africa's manufacturing sector 
still employs more male than female Basotho workers. 
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LHWP2~ production witnessed in Chapter 2 has generally not been matched by similar a 
pattern in employment in the two sectors. Currently the modern sector in Lesotho appears 
to display little ability in absorbing the rapidly expanding labour force. New entrants into 
the labour market are to a large extent greeted with unemployment. For men, the most 
immediate problem is youth unemployment. Unemployment for the age group 25 - 45 for 
male is 38 percent compared with 32 percent for females of the same age group. 
At the same time, rural dwellers are becoming pushed out of agriculture, indicated by the 
stagnation in employment in this sector in the 1990s. Thus, despite a lack of urban jobs, 
there appears to be a greater rural-urban migration, with females making more moves 
than males . This is perhaps because there are still more male migrants outside the country 
than female migrants . 
Most of the female working age group, however, does not participate in the labour force. 
This implies that many women either remain as homemakers or continue to study longer 
due to the lack of employment opportunities for them in the domestic market. But, 
according to our analysis, the main difference between males and females, and rural and 
urban in Lesotho is the general lack of job opportunities. Evidence given above has 
suggested that if there were more job opportunities in the country, both males and 
females would participate more in the labour force . This implies that non-labour force 
participants in Lesotho are more likely discouraged workers than traditional subsistence 
labourers. 
For those women who migrate outside the country, they are mostly absorbed in the less 
formal service sector employment, regardless of their education attainment. In general in 
the southern African region, female workers face fewer employment opportunities than 
male workers?7 This is not a unique situation to the southern African region. As seen 
26 Lesotho Highlands Water Project. 
27 For example, in 1994 in South Africa, females represented only 30.4 percent offormal employment 
(Statistics South Africa, 1997). 
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earlier in Chapter 4, recent Filipino migrant workers tend to be educated (skilled), female 
workers who become absorbed injobs in which they are overqualified. 
In contrast, male workers both internal and external report a lower education attainment 
level in comparison to female workers. Yet male workers in general (whether employed 
in Lesotho or South Afiica) have access to more employment opportunities and record 
higher income earnings and have less education in comparison to female workers. This is 
particularly relevant for external male workers who report higher earnings than their 
counterpart internal workers. This is because mine employment still represents an 
important employment avenue for male workers in the southern Afiican region. 
The fact that low-skilled workers still lice better employment opportunities than high-
skilled workers suggests that EO! in Lesotho has not been very successful in generating 
employment and improving the standard ofliving in the country. This situation is similar 
to the current situation in Costa Rica, where deepening structural adjustment has resulted 
in low-skilled employment, little technical transfer of skills, and deteriorating standards 
of living. Similarly, structural adjustment in Ghana and the Philippines has not been 
accompanied by higher skills and higher standards of living. Instead, in all the above 
cases, including Lesotho, the results of structural adjustment and EOr have been the 
ferninisation of manufacturing and service production, in which the workers are poorly 
paid and easily exploited; a rise in female external migrants and increased rural-urban 
migration with few employment opportunities for new entrants into the domestic labour 
market. 
This implies that the emerging migration pattern, together with emerging informal sector 
and even unemployment in these countries, is a push migration generated by contracting 
traditional and external sector employment, and more importantly, the inability of the 
modem sector to absorb retrenched workers (from the external and traditional sectors) 
and new entrants into the domestic labour force. As a result, a Third World sector appears 
to be mushrooming, dominated by underemployment and hidden unemployment. In 
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Lesotho, this sector is becoming female-dominated, while in Egypt and Sudan it is male 
dominated (particularly by older former external male workers). 
In swnmary, the story being suggested here is that it is likely that since 1996 things are 
likely to have deteriorated in Lesotho. Chapter 2 reported that 21 percent of Baostho 
migrant mineworkers were retrenched in 1998 alone, with a further 11 percent in 1999, 
and 12 percent in 2000. This suggests that the mass retrenchment in southern Africa 
seems to have begun in 1998. However, for Lesotho, this suggests a possible 
deterioration in the current employment situation in the country. One of the evidence for 
this hypothesis, given in Chapter 2, is the reported frequency in political instability in the 
country since 1998. Moreover, the fuct that urban poverty seems to have increased 
significantly in the 1990s also supports the hypothesis that Lesotho's current economic 
situation is likely to worsen. Given the small size and enclave nature of the EPZ 
manufacturing, and the decreasing employment in the traditional and external sectors, the 
suggestion here is that Lesotho is likely developing into a slum economy, with urban 
areas becoming the source of external migration. 
The point here is then that international labour migration is thus not likely to decrease in 
the southern African region, regardless of increased trade liberalisation and openness 
within the domestic economies. This then suggests that current classical institutional 
structure and unilateral regulation of international migration in southern Africa are thus 
likely to push migrants into illegal and criminal status. Chapter 6 explores the 
institutional structure surrounding international labour migration in southern Africa. 
Although the discussion is limited to the study of institutional structure surrounding mine 
labour migration between Lesotho and South Africa, references to some of the other 
southern African regional economies suggest similar inferences. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE SURROUNDING INTERNATIONAL MINE 
LABOUR MIGRATION BETWEEN LESOTHO AND SOUTH AFRICA 
6. 1. Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the institutional superstructure surrounding international mine 
labour migration between Lesotho and South Africa. The aim of this chapter is three-fold. 
First, the chapter aims to document the changing institutional structure supporting 
international labour migration and its benefits between Lesotho and South Africa. 
Second, the chapter intends to demonstrate that power relations rather than development 
goals inappropriately determine the legal institutional infrastructure. Third, the chapter 
points towards the suggestion that even a rational migration policy cannot work in 
isolation in managing international labour migration between Lesotho and South Afiica. 
There are three main types of institutional structure surrounding international mine labour 
migration between Lesotho and South Africa. These are financial, legal and recruitment 
institutional structures. Organizations involved in the management of migrant mine 
labour between Lesotho and South Africa, such as the Employment Bureau of Africa 
(TEBA), and the Chamber of Mines (COM) play dual roles of financial and recruitment 
institutions. The formal recruitment organization is TEBA, which is run by the COM and 
which represents the legacy of a monopsony. The main legal institutions revolve around 
the legal agreements of the classical migrant labour system; the union representation of 
mineworkers, mainly NUM; and the recent SADe Protocol on the Free Movement of 
Persons within the Southern African region. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section is this introduction. Section two 
analyses the financial and recruitment institutions. Section three examines the legal 
institutions, and section four offers the summary and conclusion of the chapter. 
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6. 2. Financial and recruitment structures; the COM and TEBA institutions 
Organizations involved in the management of migrant mine labour between Lesotho and 
South Africa, such as the Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA), and the Chamber of 
Mines (COM) respectively play dual roles of financial and recruitment institutions. COM 
is the parent institution of TEBA. Under the classical migrant labour system, the dual 
nature of these institutions worked to the detriment of migrant mineworkers. Migrant 
mineworkers were subjected into non-negotiable yearly contracts and had to participate 
in the classical deferred pay scheme. The dual roles of these institutions largely benefited 
the ruling class of Lesotho and the employers and government officials in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, with the current sustained decrease in the price of gold and the increase in 
small-scale mining production in South Africa, the dual roles of these institutions are 
beginning to focus more on the needs of the mine workers and less on the needs of the 
government officials. Basotho migrant mineworkers are increasingly benefiting more 
from the dual roles of these two institutions, particularly the TEBA institutions, at the 
expense of the ruling class in Lesotho. Nevertheless, the dual role of COM continues to 
favour the interests ofthe South African government officials over those of mine workers. 
COM and its networks are also the only fonnal financial and recntitment institutions of 
the mining industry. 
6. 2. 1. Recruitment structure 
The South African mining industry consists of six major mining houses and a number of 
independent (marginal) mines. The six major mining companies which control almost the 
total mineral production are the Anglo American Cooperation, Gencor, Barlow Rand, 
Anglovaal, Gold Fields of South Africa, and Johannesburg Consolidated Investments 
(COM, 1999). Most of these companies maintain significant holdings in other sectors of 
the South African economy. Stocks in these companies are traded in the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange and international stock markets. Currently, ninety-eight mining 
companies belong to the South African Chamber of Mines (COM). COM is an employer 
organization which was fonned in 1889, and which represents mining houses and mining 
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companies. Its membership consists of independent mmmg finance corporations, 
individual mines and mining houses. Together they account for over 85 percent of South 
Africa's mineral output (COM, 1999). In 1999, out of the 560 000 employees in the 
mining industry, 522 000 were members of COM (COM, 1999). In 1999,37 percent of 
all COM employees were foreign workers (COM, 1999). 
COM provides an extensive advisory service function to its members as well as the 
industry on cooperative basis, in areas such as industrial relations (negotiating contracts 
with labour unions); education and training (particularly conducting research); security 
(especially promoting safety in the workplace) and health care (running hospitals and 
clinics for mine workers); technical, legal, and communication services; and the provision 
of statistical data (COM, 1999). 
In 1996, all non-core activities of the Chamber were consolidated in the COM Services 
Company, in an attempt to reposition the Chamber to concentrate its activities on policy 
advocacy and advisory support to members (COM, 1999). The Services company 
provides services to the South African mining industry, which benefits COM members 
and non-members, and to the community outside the mining industry, mainly in training 
and examination administration; publicity promotion, safety management; and visitation 
to operational gold-mines. The Services Company of COM also provides supporting 
infrastructure, including staff and accounting services to various organizations such as the 
Mining Industrial Engineering Trades and Training Board and various pension funds. 
These institutions are the latest subsidiaries to the COM. COM also has networks with 
refinery companies, such as the Rand Refinery, the world's largest gold refinery; 
NUFCOR, one of the world-s largest continuous producers of uranium oxide; as well as 
the principal medical facility of the mining industry, the Selbypark Medical Centre 
(COM,1999). 
Chapter 2 outlined a recent trend towards streamlining production in the mining industry. 
With the recent growing expectations in wage increase within the national union of 
mineworkers (NUM), greater costs to the mining industry are likely, and more shedding 
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of workers is a possible outcome. Industrial analysts (for example, Philip, 1991; Head, 
1995; COM, 1999; Mbendi, 2000), predict that rising wages in the mining industry is 
likely to increase discrepancies between NUM and COM. In order to cope with these new 
developments, the role of COM has recently changed towards more of a financial and 
policy advisory. Beneficiation is one ofthe avenues that COM is currently pursuing as a 
means to reduce such discrepancies within the mining industry (Philip; COM, 1999). The 
current policies of COM are for the stabilization in the mining industry, related to longer 
contract terms, and in the long run, a stable workforce living close to the mines (Philip, 
1991). This implies that COM is gradually moving away from the recruitment of migrant 
labour and more towards recruitment and management of domestic and urban labour. 
The main subsidiaries of COM is TEBA and TEBA Cash, which provide recruitment 
services and efficient and cost-effective banking services to mineworkers' compensation 
benefits for accidental injury or death arising out of, and in the course of employment. 
TEBA is a South African labour recruitment agency (broker) that was previously known 
as the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA). TEBA recruits mine 
workers from the southern African regional economies for the South African mining 
houses, essentially for underground and surface work (TEBA, 1999). The TEBA 
recruitment organization is a division of COM and was historically set up so as to prevent 
competition for labour and its upward pressure on wages (Head, 1995). The Black 
Labour Act of 1964 stipulates the framework within which TEBA is to recruit 
mineworkers. According to this Act, the terms of employment "shall be at the discretion 
of the employer, and may change from time to time" (TEBA, 1999: 1). Employers in the 
mining sector using temporary workers have traditionally been able to exert sufficient 
power over the regional state officials to avert large-scale prosecution for their use of 
temporary labour. Historically, the employers exercised little concern in enquiring about 
the origins of their temporary workforce as long as the labour was cheaply available. 
Currently, employers are more concerned about the skill of their labour force (Head, 
1995; Crush, 1997; COM, 2000). In the past, mineworkers recruited by TEBA, were 
provided with cheap, substandard but free single hostel accommodation upon their arrival 
191 
in the industrial sites. Currently TEBA offers cheap rented accommodation to miners, 
which is to be paid by the miners (philip, 1991; Head, 1995). 
Under the classical migrant mine labour system, migrant minewOlxers were subjected to 
involuntary one-year contracts. The contracts also dictated the types of work migrant 
mineworkers were hired to perform in the mining industry. Clause 11 (a) (ii) of the Black 
Labour Regulation Act of 1964 stipulated that in the situation where a miner may wish to 
do other work other than surfuce and underground labour, tbe miner was entitled to apply 
in writing to another mining company. In the case where the offer was rejected or there 
was no such alternative, the mining contract of that miner then became terminated 
(TEBA, 1999). In addition, the clause also stated that the contract of a miner could be 
terminated by the employer if for any reason the employee refused to perform the work 
he had undertaken to do (TEBA, 1999: 2). In terms of the days and hours of work, miners 
were required to work the seven days of the week and on holidays, upon the instruction 
of their employers. The employer also determined the hours of work per day. 
Mineworkers were also paid for overtime (TEBA, 1999). Such arrangements left 
mineworkers dependable upon the "goodwill" of their employers and do not give them 
much legal representation in the mines. 
The role of TEBA has evolved significantly since the evolution of the classical migrant 
labour system. Whereas in the past TEBA was the sole recruiter of all foreign labour, 
currently the organization is one of the numerous brokers of mine labour in the southern 
African region, although it is still the only formal recruitment agency of foreign mine 
labour (Head, 1995; Crush, 1997). Moreover, TEBA is no longer simply the recruiting 
arm of the COM. The survival of TEBA today depends not on the industrial subsidies, 
but on payments paid for services rendered. Its labour processing activities are thus only 
one of its functions. This function is also diminishing in importance, given the rise in 
small-scale mine production (COM, 1999). TEBA also runs the Manpower Data Centre, 
an archive of computerized records on the structure and composition of the mine labour 
force that the COM and individual mines confer with for a fee (Head, 1995). TEBA is 
hoping to extend this service into the formal administration of personnel management for 
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individual mines III the future (Head, 1995). According to Head (1995) such 
formalization of mine management through TEBA would guarantee the continued 
existence ofTEBA as it will make it both indispensable to the mining industry. 
TEBA is also looldng into transforming itself into a development agency. Here, the 
organization hopes to use its developed physical and human infrastructure located across 
the southern Africa region to implement development aid funds at the community level 
(Head, 1995). Such a role would make the organization one of the few pioneering 
agencies in the area of a regional grass-root development initiative (that is currently left 
to the SADC organization). This implies that the monopoly of TEBA in mine labour 
recruitment is likely to continue in the 21 ~ century. 
Nevertheless, and to large extent, the key function of TEBA in conjunction with the 
bilateral labour treaties is the deferred pay scheme. 
6. 2. 2. Financial structure: the classical deferred pay scheme 
In Lesotho, the deferred pay scheme was set up in 1974 to ensure that a defined amount 
of money paid to the migrant mineworkers was invested in the domestic economy 
(Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c). The deferred payment scheme was thus in 
theory" a vehicle to maximize the benefits of migrant work for Lesotho" (Sparreboom et 
al, 1997: 12). The scheme was also meant to increase the appreciation for savings among 
mineworkers. The principal reason behind the emigration policy in Lesotho was the 
generation of wealth at the national level, particularly through the deferred pay scheme. 
Nevertheless, the classical deferred payment scheme, although it mainly benefited the 
ruling class at the expense of the migrant mineworkers, did not produce the stated 
outcome. 
According to the Lesotho Act No. 18 of 1974, section 5 9( a) and (b), cited in Sparreboom 
et al (1997), the Deferred Pay Fund was administered by a Board of Trustees responsible 
for: "investing Fund resources on the advice of the Managing Director of the Lesotho 
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Bank in such a manner that the securities shall be available on demand; make 
arrangements for interest accruing from the moneys invested to be paid as soon as 
practicable to employees at a rate equal, or approximately equal, to the rate payable by 
the Savings Bank of the Lesotho Bank on normal deposits made therein" (Sparreboom et 
ai, 1997: 8). 
The Principal Secretary of Labour and Employment chaired the Board of Trustees. 
Presently, the Board is also made up of representatives from the Lesotho Bank, the 
Ministries of Labour and Employment, Agriculture, and Finance of Lesotho, and the 
Ministry of Labour of South Africa (Sparreboom et al, 1997). Employers are sometimes 
allowed to make statements in the meetings of the Board of Trustees, and employees are 
also represented, on an individual basis and not through union. 
A revision of the Deferred Pay Act in 1979 stipulated that 60 percent of the basic wage 
should be deposited at the Lesotho Bank, with the exception of pay during the first thirty 
days of the contract. However, it was also stipulated, under section 5 (3) of Act No. I of 
1979, that, in the case ofan emergency: "the employee may make a written request to his 
employer that the sum of money, to be specified in the request, shall be paid from the 
deferred pay standing to his credit to the person named in that request" (Sparreboom et ai, 
1997: 8). 
Deferred pay (Amendment) Order No. 1 of 1989 specified that moneys in the Fund that 
were not immediately required for payment should be invested in treasury bills or other 
securities issues or guaranteed by the government (Sparreboom et ai, 1997). A 
subsequent Order of the Amendment, Order N 18 of 1990, decreased the percentage 
dererred pay to thirty percent of the wage, following complaints from migrant 
mineworkers (Sechaba Consultants, 1995, 1997; Foulo, 1996). Under this Amendment 
Act, employees could voluntarily agree to a percentage up to fifty percent to be paid to 
the Fund. No deductions were allowed in respect of the first and the last thirty days of 
contract. At the same time, two withdrawals per contract period were permitted, each not 
exceeding fifty percent of the deferred pay standing to an employee' s credit. The Board 
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decides on the interest rate payable on the accounts at the Lesotho Bank (Sparreboom et 
ai, 1997). As we show below, the highly restrictive and involuntary nature of the Fund 
however, usually ended up hurting the interests of mineworkers and their families whilst 
it attempted to promote that of national wealth accumulation. As we demonstrate below, 
the money collected is deposited into the TEBA Cash account, from which miners have 
conditional access but from which the Lesotho Bank has full control and access. 
6. 2. 3. Financial practice of the deferred pay scheme in Lesotho 
In principle, Lesotho miners recruited by TEBA receive their income on an individual 
savings account with TEBA in South Africa, known as TEBA Cash. TEBA Cash is a 
private commercial South African savings bank to which TEBA offices in Lesotho serve 
as agents. Withdrawals from the accounts can be made at the mines. According to 
Sparreboom et al (1997), interest rates paid on the accounts compare well to those on 
savings accounts of other commercial banks in South Africa. Most miners remit part of 
their wages to TEBA offices in the different districts of Lesotho at their own initiative. If 
need be, relatives in Lesotho can make a request for a remittance at a TEBA office 
(Sechaba Consultants, 1997). TEBA then informs the miner, and at his consent money is 
transferred to the relative at a commission fee rate paid to TEBA (Sparreboom et aI, 
1997). 
The mining companies then transfer the required 30 percent of their total wage bill to a 
collective account (the Fund) at the Lesotho Bank. The rest of the money remains in 
TEBA Cash. Employees can make a maximum of two emergency withdrawals before the 
end of their contract from the Lesotho Bank. The purpose ofthe withdrawal has be stated 
on a form, and approved at the discretion of the mining companies (Santho and 
Sejanamane, 1991), while the "emergency" content of the withdrawal has to be checked 
by the Lesotho Bank (Sparreboom et aI, 1997). At the end of their contract, miners 
receive a deferred pay certificate from the mine. This they take to TEBA, who then 
identifies the miners and gives them an interest certificate. Two TEBA employees at each 
TEBA office carry out this task. TEBA assumes the costs of this process. With this 
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certificate, miners can go to the Lesotho Bank and withdraw the remaining balance of 
their incomes. 
After 1990, the interest paid on deferred wages became subjected to substantial changes. 
In 1997, the interest paid was 8 percent (Sparreboom et ai, 1997). In practice, miners did 
not receive all their income on an account with TEBA Cash under the classical deferred 
pay scheme. 
6. 2. 4. Potential benefits of the deferred pay scheme in Lesotho 
According to Sparreboom et al (1997), the size of the Deferred Fund is the measure of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the scheme in mobilizing resources. Sparreboom et al 
(1997) report that in 1993, total income of miners amounted to RI.5 billion. 30 percent of 
monthly wages were deferred, but no wage was deferred in the first and last month of a 
contract. This means that 10/12 times, 30 or 25 percent of yearly wages should have been 
deferred, i.e., in 1993 a total amount of R388 million should have been deferred. 
Assuming that all deferred pay is withdrawn at the end of the miner's contract, on 
average, only half of the deposits, or 12.5 percent of the total miner's income would be 
available in the Fund, i.e., an amount of RI94 million (Sparreboom et ai, 1997: 9). 
However, miners are entitled to two emergency withdrawals per year. Assuming all 
miners make full use of this provision, Sparreboom et aI (1997) calculate that on average 
only 6.7 percent of yearly wages would be available as resources in the Fund, that is 
R104 million (Sparreboom et ai, 1997:10). However, the Ministry of Economic Planning 
(1997b) provides figures on the size of the Fund that are much lower (figure 6.1 below) 
and declining, as are withdrawals. 
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Figure 6.1 
Size of the Deferred Pay Fund and interest rates, 1990 - 1994 
(Qel!osits, withdrawals, accrual and fund in Million Maloti} 
Year Withdrawals Fund Averal::e Interest Interest 
Interest I!aid commercial 
Received savings 
1990 239.9 78.7 13.0 15.5 
1991 160.3 57.0 13.0 13.0 
1992 137.8 533 11.5 13.0 7.1 
1993 169.6 51.6 7.7 13.0 6.0 
1994 121.8 473 8.2 6.0 
Note: Data on withdrawals refers to the third quarter; interest rates refer to the first quarter. The 
interest paid is less than the interest received at the first quarter. This is because the interest paid 
is a fixed charge by the Bank, while interest received is the gains to the Fund from the Bank. 
Sources: Ministry of Economic Planning, 1997b: 6; Sparreboom el aI, 1997: I O. 
A number of factors may explain the discrepancy between the estimate by Sparreboom et 
al (I 997) and the actual figures of the Fund. Firstly, the lower deposits and withdrawals 
may be partly due to the fact that a considerable number of mineworkers did not 
participate in the Fund, which indicates a lack of enforcement in the classical deferred 
payment scheme. A recent study by the Sechaba Consultants (1997) on response of 
mineworkers to the deferred payment scheme indicated that over 50 percent of migrant 
mineworkers interviewed did not to participate in the classical scheme. Moreover the 
numerical accounting of mineworkers involved in the scheme by Sparreboom et al (1997) 
is not consistent. On their first estimate mentioned above, the authors report that about 
9000 mineworkers were involved in the classical deferred pay scheme. However, on 
another occasion, the authors report that approximately 8000 mineworkers were involved 
in the scheme in 1994 (refer to section 6. 2. 2. 3 below). Yet we have evidence that there 
are more than 9000 mineworkers recruited by TEBA from Lesotho (refer to section 63. 1 
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below). The discrepancy in the accounting of the numbers of mine workers contributing to 
the Fund is a reflection of massive non-compliance by mineworkers . 
Secondly, the discrepancy in the accounting by Sparreboom et al (1997) and the official 
Central Bank records might be due to high operation costs of the classical scheme, which 
reduced fund balances. Unlike the Lesotho Bank that administers individual accounts for 
non-mine and non-migrants, the Fund of the Lesotho Bank manages a collective account 
of migrant mineworkers. As the number of yearly transactions per miner is limited to 
three (two emergency withdrawals and one final withdrawal), the administrative costs 
involved in withdrawals are fairly low for the Fund. However the operational costs are 
higher in a collective account. A second source of costs is likely linked to the control and 
follow-up of non -compliance fraud. According to Sparreboom et al (1997), currently, it is 
not determinable as to whether all mining companies that employ Basotho miners 
participate in the scheme. Sparreboom et al (1997) report that the last payment of 
deferred pay by mining companies is usually a major cost item for the Fund in terms of 
foregone interest. A third possible source of costs is the interest differential on deferred 
pay. Sparreboom et al (1997) explain that since the Board of Trustees meets only a few 
times per year, the rate applied to miners may lag behind the rate earned on government 
securities during a period of decreasing interest rates. The Fund would then incur a 
negative interest increase. 
Given that the stock of capital employed by the Fund is relatively small, and the costs 
associated with the operation of a collective account are high for the Lesotho Bank, it can 
be deduced that the potential benefit of the classical deferred pay scheme to Lesotho is 
quite limited. 
6. 2. 5. Criticism ofthe classical deferred Day scheme 
From a fiscal point of view, the Lesotho government viewed the deferred pay as an 
implicit tax on migrant miners (Sparreboom et al, 1997). Given the uncertainty of the 
gains to be maximized from the regional trade arrangements, such as the SACU 
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arrangement, and the small contribution by incomes tax, the Lesotho government relied 
on the taxing of migrant labour as a convenient way to broaden its tax base. In addition, 
the scheme was a source ofloans for the government (Foulo, 1996; Ministry of Economic 
Planning, 1997b). 
Nevertheless, the savings opportunity offered by the classical scheme was only 
temporary, since miners were expected to withdraw their savings at the end of their 
contract. Furthermore, the savings opportunity offered was not necessarily attractive, in 
the sense that miners could not adjust the size and terms of their savings to suit their 
circumstances. Neither could they withdraw from the Fund if they found a more suitable 
opportunity elsewhere (Sparreboom et aI, 1997; Sechaba Consultants, 1997). Moreover, 
there was no mechanism to ensure that the interest paid on deferred pay was competitive, 
particularly regarding the emerging investment opportunities in South Afiica. 
Theoretically, the deferred pay scheme was created for a larger proportion of miner 
income to be invested in the domestic economy. More local investment was one 
possibility to improve the overall economic situation in Lesotho. The small-scale sector 
appeared to have much more potential for the use oflocal inputs and labour (Foulo, 1996) 
through their involvement in local business enterprises. Nevertheless, currently no 
mechanisms exist to ensure that the Fund is in fact used for investment in the private 
sector (Sechaba Consultants, 1997). Although discussions on facilitating miners or 
returning miners to start a business have been going on for some time now (see for 
example, Philip, 1991; Matlosa, 1991; 1998; The Gold Crisis Team, 2000), presently 
there is little support for them to set up or develop a business in the private sector, with 
their own savings. Savings from remitted income and investment in the local economy 
are key concerns for the maximization of benefits from migrant labour in Lesotho (Foulo, 
1996). However, the classical deferred pay scheme makes only a limited contribution to 
domestic savings and investment. 
Moreover, judging from the protests of the National Union of Mine workers (NUM), to 
which most Basotho migrant mineworkers are members, the classical deferred pay 
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scheme is not particularly popular. Its abolition was one of the infamous showdown 
negotiations that occurred between NUM and the mining companies in 1991'. The 
union's main grievance with the classical scheme is the obligatory and inflexible nature 
of the system (Philip, 1991). The union also feels that the scheme is discriminatory in the 
sense that only migrant mineworkers, and particularly from Lesotho and Mozambique, 
are subjected to this type of regulation (Sparreboom et aI, 1997). In comparison to the 
other labour sending countries, Lesotho's and Mozambique's participation rates in the 
scheme appear to be much higher than those in Botswana and Swaziland. For example, 
the deferred pay in June 1995 in Botswana was R138 thousand with 84 participants; in 
Swaziland the deferred pay was R97 thousand and the number of participants was 49; 
while in Mozambique the deferred pay was RI9119 thousand with 4479 participants; and 
Lesotho's deferred pay was Rl2526 thousand with 8951 participants2 (Sparreboom et al, 
1997: II). This is because the number of mine workers involved in deferred pay scheme 
in Botswana and Swaziland were fewer in comparison to the numbers of Basotho and 
Mozambican mineworkers. However, the amount deferred by Tswana and Swazi 
mineworkers was larger than the amount deferred by Basotho and Mozambican 
mineworkers.3 
It is also frequently reported that with regards to the Lesotho case, miners do not actually 
know what the deferred pay is used for (Sechaba Consultants, 1995; 1997; Sparreboom et 
al, 1997). This is due to poor communication between the miners and the government 
officials. On the one hand, miners realize that they are not the ones who have access to 
loans from the Fund; their spouses are supposed to be the main beneficiaries (Sechaba 
Consultants, 1997). On the other hand, the Lesotho Bank is reported to have " a 
conservative lending policy and does not generally lend for the purpose of consumption 
or investment in small businesses" (Sparreboom et ai, 1997: 11). 
, About 60 percent of Basotho miners were fired during the course of the negotiations, after which the 
mining companies re-hired most after reaching an agreement ofa set wage (Foulo, 1996). 
2 Note the discrepancy in the accounting of Basotho mineworkers involved in the Fund. The figure of 8951 
participants is different from the earlier estimate of9000. Refer to section 6.2.2.2 above. 
) Contribution of miners from Botswana on average was R 1600 each compared to R 1400 each for 
Lesotho. 
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The above analysis points out that the lack of accountability of the classical deferred pay 
scheme and the non-transparent nature of the revenues and costs involved have lead to 
the increased loopholes and non-participation in the Fund, of Basotho migrant 
mineworkers. Given the mct that the deferred payment account is a collective account, it 
is reported that some senior miners find loopholes to avoid participation in the scheme, 
while "illegal" mineworkers are excluded (Sparreboom et al , 1997). Mining companies 
also try to avoid participation in the Fund. Most companies are reported to be always late 
when it comes to making payments to the Fund (Sparreboom et ai, 1997). 
6. 2. 6. New developments in the deferred pay scheme 
In 1997, in an attempt to make the scheme less costly and more effective, the Lesotho 
Bank, TEBA, and the government of Lesotho, together implemented the replacement of 
the collective account with individual accounts for each miner in the mines (Sparreboom 
et al, 1997). This was a move towards decreasing the costs of enforcing the deferred pay 
scheme by ensuring the participation of all Basotho miners. In addition, in theory, the 
individual accounts were supposed to mcilitate the prevention offiaud by means of easier 
detection of unwarranted withdrawals. Individual accounts were also viewed to be more 
attractive to miners as they would theoretically abolish the need for a miner to withdraw 
the remaining balance at the end of his contract. The Lesotho Bank could thus in theory, 
retain miners as clients even after the completion of their contracts in the mines 
(Sparreboom et al, 1997). 
In October 2000, TEBA (Cash) was awarded a banking license, which allows the Fund to 
be transformed from an informal banking service into a full-term and formal commercial 
bank (Bank Monitor, 2000). Nevertheless, the number of TEBA registered miners from 
Lesotho has been on the decline since the early 1990s (Foulo, 1996). It is thus currently 
not clear as to how effective these new developments will be. 
201 
6. 3. Legal structure 
The main legal institutional structure surrounding international mine labour migration 
between Lesotho and South Africa revolves around the legal agreements of the classical 
migrant labour system, the mine worker union (NUM), and the SADC amnesty initiatives 
which fall under the broader SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons. 
The classical legal arrangements include the bilateral governmental agreements between 
the Lesotho ruling class and the South African officials, and the Aliens Control Act of 
South Africa. Migrants to South Africa are thus normally subjected to a "two-door" 
policy that refers to the dual nature of functions of the above-mentioned legal 
institutional representation. The effectiveness of this dual system appears to be 
diminishing, resulting in an increase in the numbers of undocumented migrants. 
At the same time, NUM perspective and the SADC alternative lack a comprehensive 
methodology of ways to adjust the classical legal institutional representation of 
international labour migration within the region, to the extent that the two instruments 
currently exist as visionary alternative solutions. This implies that actual legal 
representation to migrant mineworker seems to be lacking in the region, as the former 
agreements are increasingly pushing migrants into a position of illegal status, while the 
available alternatives remain subdued in nature. 
6.3. 1. The bilateral labour treaties 
In the 1974 a series of bilateral labour agreements between the Department of Foreign 
Affuirs in South Africa and the government of Lesotho were implemented (Ministry of 
Labour and Employment, 1998c). These accords granted the mining industry privileged 
recruiting access to Basotho labour outside the terms of the Aliens Act Control, but 
within section 41 of the Aliens Control Act. The bilateral agreements regulated the terms 
of employment and conditions of access to the South African labour market, including 
recruitment procedures, wages, mandatory remittance procedures, and the appointment of 
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labour officials to oversee and protect the interests of the foreign workers (Lucas, 1987). 
In addition, migrant mineworkers employed by mining firms in South Africa were 
protected from being randomly expelled from the country by the bilateral government 
agreements. The entire process was implemented by the privately run TEBA. 
As far as the bilateral agreements go, they are still operated and practically set the terms 
and conditions of access to South Africa's mine industry. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, the mining industry has increasingly employed sub-contractors (also outside the 
TEBA organization) to organize production sections and to do specialized tasks. These 
sub-contractors have a legal yet informal organization oflabour recruitment. Usually the 
sub-contractors will recruit labour from within South Africa but also from the former 
labour reserves countries, especially Lesotho and Mozambique (Rogerson, 1999; 
Fontana, 1997). In Lesotho, sub-contractors recruit labour with or without TEBA 
assistance (Foulo, 1996). 
Unlike in the other modem sectors in South Africa, temporary employment in the mine 
sector is still largely governed by the bilateral agreements and the contract system of the 
mining industry. Nevertheless, like the other modem sectors in South Africa, the mine 
sector is currently witnessing the explosive growth of informal labour broking. Whereas 
in the past labour broking was conducted under the formalized organisation of TEBA, 
currently the type of braking is usually informalised and left to the discretion of the 
employers. For example, in 1994 in Lesotho, out of a total of 112722 employed mine 
workers, 89076 temporary employees were hired through the formal broker, TEBA. The 
remainder, about 21 percent of the total Basotho mine labour employed in 1994, were 
hired through other informal channels.' 
Like the formal TEBA broker, informal labour brokers have networks that extend beyond 
the borders of South Africa, where they either perform the recruitment process 
4 As it has been established earlier own in the chapter, TEBA is the only fonnal recruitment agency of 
international mine labour migration from Lesotho and South Africa. All other recruitment outside the 
TEBA organization is thus classified as infonnal. But, presumably TEBA itself uses some of these sub-
contractors (Head, 1995). 
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themselves or they sub-let to recruiters (Crush, 1997). Although informal labour 
recruitment is legal, it makes the distinction between formally and informally recruited 
migrant labour difficult for government officials both in Lesotho and South Africa, 
particularly in terms of legal status of migrant workers, which in tum impacts upon the 
growing stream of undocumented migrant workers between the two countries.s 
Although the mining sector does not as yet display a large informalisation of Basotho 
labour in comparison to Mozambican labour for example, the recent rapid growth of 
informal sub-contracting in the mining sector is likely to impact on the still-formal 
Basotho labour recruitment. 
The current low numbers of informally recruited Basotho mineworkers in the mining 
industry suggest that the bilateral accords are most likely still functional in the 
recruitment ofBasotho miners. However, given the fact that the remittance and deferred 
pay scheme are collapsing (refer also to chapter 2), this may suggest that it is only a 
matter of time before the bilateral accorded recruitment also collapses. The recent rise in 
the number ofnon-TEBA Basotho mineworkers suggests that like in the agricultural and 
construction sectors, temporary employment in the mining sector in South Africa is 
increasingly becoming disorganized and informalised. The temporary employment 
scheme regulated by the bilateral accord is thus of declining significance in the mine 
sector. Even in this sector, informal access to temporary employment is becoming the 
order of the day. 
5 F or example, in the agriculture and construction sectors, recruiters in Lesotho, and labour brokers in 
South Africa, usually supply migrant workers to groups of fanners for seasonal contracts. The use of farm 
workers from Lesotho does not fall under the bilateral agreements and therefore remains exercised under 
the Aliens Act. In the past, various special arrangements, permissible under section 41 of the Act (known 
also as the Article 21), were put in place by the former Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to regularize 
the status of undocumented migrant furmlands by a\lowing post-hoc registration and the issue of temporary 
residence and work permit. However, currently such special arrangements are becoming overridden by the 
informal recruiters. Most migrant farm workers from Lesotho are therefore individual temporary workers 
outside any formal management scheme (Crush, 1997). The story is the same for Mozambican construction 
workers (Rogerson, 1999). The!LO continues to detect the growing informalisation of construction labour, 
through labour broking and own-account work in southern Africa (Crush, 1997; Rogerson, 1999). 
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6. 3. 2. The Aliens Control Act 
The Aliens Control Act is the principal government legislation controlling all fucets of 
individual immigration to South Africa (Crush, 1997; Reintzes, 1997). The traditional 
Aliens Act of 1969 provided specific exemptions, which made legal and administrative 
room for labour treaties with the regional labour reserve countries, and temporary 
employment schemes for non-South African migrant workers. The Act, however, did not 
prescribe or regulate the temporary employment schemes. Rather, it remained passive in 
its intent, allowing the mining industry, particularly the Chamber of Mines (COM) to 
apply their own discretion in the recruitment of migrant labour, through the use of the 
regional brokers, particularly TEBA. 
The conditions for exemptions were loosely defined, as long as the exemption was: a) 
accompanied by bilateral agreements with the government of a neighbouring labour 
supplying country; and b) in accordance with a "scheme of recruitment" approved by 
COM (Philips, 1991; Crush, 1997: 5). These clauses thus allowed the mining indust\)' an 
exemption from the Aliens Control Act and the right to employ non-South Africans under 
separate terms and conditions than those prescribed by the Act. The mine employers were 
also the ones with considerable political power in South Africa, thus they were the ones 
able to exploit this privilege the most, mainly by imposing involuntary employment 
conditions on migrant mineworkers. Since South Africa became democratic, the Aliens 
Act has undergone several alterations in an attempt to reduce the exploitation of migrant 
workers and decrease the growing numbers of undocumented migrants. 
Under the Aliens Control Act of 1991 , the South African authorities could repatriate to 
their countries of origin anyone who: i) entered South Africa clandestinely; ii) failed to 
leave the country when their tempoffil)' residence permit expired; and iii) breached the 
conditions of their visas by, for instance, taking up employment while classified as a 
holiday visitor or a student (Crush, 1997: 8). 
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In 1995, the South Afiican parliament approved a series of amendments to the Act that 
were designed to tighten and control the conditions for entry and reasons for visiting the 
country in the existing legislation (The Commission Report, 1999). The subsequent 
amendment implemented in 1996 explicitly envisaged the continuation of the status quo, 
particularly the historical exemption clauses of the Aliens Act and the bilateral labour 
agreements between the governments of South Afiica and the labour supplying regional 
countries (Reintzes, 1997; Mokoena, 1999). The only difference between the Aliens Act 
of 1995 and the historical Act is the categorization of the telll1s of entry and reasons of 
visitation (Reintzes, 1997). As mentioned earlier, the exemption clauses and bilateral 
accords allowed particular employers the right to recruit non-South Afiican labour for 
temporary employment from the regional countries, which automatically qualified the 
migrant worker for the temporary residence status. Under the amended Act, there are new 
categories for temporary residence, which include a work permit, workerseekers' permit, 
visitor's permit, business permit, study permit, and medical permit (Crush, 1997). 
The purpose of the entry requirements now makes it illegal for someone to enter the 
country for one-purpose (e.g., study or holiday) and switch categories of reason for 
visiting after arrival (e.g., take up employment). The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) 
justifies the amendment on the two grounds. Firstly, DHA argues that there are "large 
numbers" of people who wish to work in the country who enter on study or holiday visas 
and apply for work permits once inside. Secondly, DHA claims that such people are 
prepared to work for lower wages and that employers prefer to employ them to the 
disadvantage of the local labour (Crush, 1997: 3). Thus temporary workers currently 
entering South Afiica legally as individuals from the regional countries do so outside the 
sphere of the Aliens Control Act. 
Temporary workers in South Afiica largely remain at the bottom of the job market. 
Nevertheless, DHA and Immigration Board of South Afiica are not convinced by the 
justification given by employers that there are no South Afiicans who can do the jobs 
performed by migrants. As a result, neither temporary migrants nor their employers 
choose to engage in the official application for entry process, which is in any case, not 
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likely to produce their stated outcomes. Although, DHA claims that it is possible to 
calculate the total number of undocumented migrants as a simple multiplier of the 
overstay figure, the available research on the issue of the numbers of undocumented 
migrants in South Africa indicates that the approximate quantification of undocumented 
is highly problematic if not all together impossible (Crush, 1997; Fontana, 1997; 
Carim, 1995 ). 
To a large extent, the legal legislation under the Aliens Act has always treated the role 
played by employers very lightly in the matter of temporary work and undocumented 
labour in particular. Admission of guilt fines and payment for the deportation costs of the 
employees are the common charges passed to employers in the absence of legal 
prosecutions (Crush, 1997 Rogerson, 1999). According to Crush (1997:13), section 32 of 
the Aliens Act permits employers to argue that they acted in good faith when 
circumstances "were not of such a nature that they could reasonably be expected to 
suspect that the alien was in the Republic" in violation ofthe Act. 
In 1994 DHA declared that it would "start cracking down on employers," who use so-
called illegal migrants. However, the specific measures to be applied remain unsaid by 
DHA. Local DHA offices have reported not to going "out oftheir way" to imposing fines 
or round up "illegal" workers. They believe that such a task "is for the politicians" 
(Crush, 1997: 13). Crush explains that: 
"The Aliens Amendment Act contains "stringent provision" for employing "aliens" or 
entering into business with them or harbouring them. The Act provides for fines of up to 
R 40 000 and imprisonment for up to five years for providing work or aid to an "illegal 
alien" and makes employers liable for costs of repatriation." (Crush, 1997: 13). 
In reality the implementation of the legal provisions against employers remains to be 
seen. Current reports on the shameless manipulation of the Aliens Control system by 
employers dominate the research discourse on the topic of illegal migration (for example, 
Fontana, 1997; Reintzes, 1997; Rogerson, 1999). One of the most common ploys cited by 
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researchers is the hiring of migrant workers on a monthly basis, without registering them 
and just before payday, the employer makes a phone call to the police (Fontana, 1997; 
Crush, 1997; Rogerson, 1999). Such notorious practices are particularly rife in the 
construction and farming sector, which historically fell outside the Aliens Control 
system.6 
The result of the amendments to the Act has thus been increasing inconsistent application 
of the fotnlal legislation between DHA and increasing infotnlalisation of international 
migration. Employers and temporary migrant workers find the current regulation of 
modem sector employment in South Africa cumbersome and increasingly choose to 
bypass the formal regulations. Crush (1997: 4) points out that "migrants enter for non-
work related purposes and then take up or resume employment once there." Regularizing 
the temporary employment status was possible under the past Aliens Act, and often 
simply required a letter of proof of employment from an employer (Head, 1995). Crush 
(1997) explains that to a large extent, increasingly migrants find it less convenient to 
officially change the purpose of entry and simply work illegally. Thus the effectiveness 
of the Amendment Act in eliminating the possibility of a temporary migrant worker to 
alter their purpose of visit has remains doubtful in South Africa. Crush (1997) explains 
that it is clear that in the case of temporary worker, the purpose of entry clause makes 
little different to a de facto situation. The clause is more likely to affect professional and 
skilled migrant workers. 
6 For example, in the Western Cape, in 1996, it is reported that, "police raided several farms in the Boland 
and Ceres area and uncovered evidence of an organized trade in undocumented farm workers from 
Lesotho. Farmers allegedly "fetch" large numbers of migrants from the border with Lesotho and transport 
them down to the Cape where they are employed at wages ofless than RIO a day. Five Ceres farmers were 
charged with "aiding and abetting illegal immigrants" (Crush, 1997: 1 I). On this particular example, it 
appears as if the police are cooperating to break an illegal and exploitative trafficking of humans. However, 
most research continuously documents accounts of collusion between employers (especially farmers) and 
the local DHA. One recent case is in the Free State, where DHA officials and the police were reported to 
have "sold" Lesotho immigrants to farmers, who in turn were buying bonded labour and immunity from 
prosecution for employing immigrants. The farmers pay for the documents, which legalize the status of the 
migrant workers and bonds the migrants to the farmers as the farmers maintain the ownership of such 
documents. In this situation, if the workers leave the farms, they can be arrested, "dealt with as illegal" and 
deported, as they have no documentary proof of their legal status. The furmers on the other hand, easily 
evade prosecution as employers of illegal immigrants, as they can produce the documentation to prove the 
legality of workers (Crush, 1997: I I). The collusion between employers and the local DHA is similar to the 
old apartheid labour practices. 
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Under the amended Aliens Control Act, workers who have overstayed their temporary 
status and clandestine entrants are both classified as illegal aliens. They are not 
distinguished in the published or unpublished figures issued by the South African 
authorities (Crush, 1997). Consequently, as noted above, once inside the country, 
undocumented migrants seeking employment and the employer hiring them make a 
conscious decision to avoid the Act and its services (Rogerson, 1 999). Temporary work, 
especially in the metropolitan locations, is thus increasingly becoming an underground 
work scheme. The illegal nature of migrants makes them susceptible to the goodwill of 
their employers. This defeats the purpose of the amendments to the original Act that were 
designed so as to reduce the exploitation of migrant workers. 
Given the fact that the amendments to the Aliens Act are taking place in conjunction with 
the continuing operation of the bilateral treaties in South Africa, the effectiveness of the 
amendments to the Act are less, while the possibility of such amendments to push 
migrants into an illegal status are high. Table 6.2 indicates the number ofBasotho illegal 
immigrants repatriated between 1988 and 1995. There is no clear trend displayed by the 
table, which could indicate the current inability of DHA in keeping with accurate 
accounting of international labour migration. 
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Table 6.2 
Repatriated illegal Basotho immigrants from South Mrica, 1988 -1995 
Year Repatriated illegal Basotho immigrants 
1988 4400 
1989 4728 
1990 3832 
1991 4440 
1992 6235 
1993 2090 
1994 4573 
1995 4687 
Total 34985 
Sources: Crush, 1997; Matlosa and Pule, 2000. 
Given the growing bottlenecks encountered by the amendments of the Aliens Control 
Act, contemporary efforts to eliminate the employment of undocumented migrants as 
temporary workers South Africa, and particularly the mine sector, are largely organized 
by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and SADC protocol on the Free 
Movement of Persons. The growth of temporary work in the mines through sub-
contracting, especially of non-core workers has led to NUM and SADC to declare a silent 
battle against temporary work. Given the fuct that the new amendments of the Aliens Act 
are more likely to push migrant workers into an illegal position, and the fuct that the 
classical bilateral labour treaties are likely to be less representative of non-TEBA migrant 
mineworkers, NUM and SADC organizations see it best to put an end to the temporary 
employment of migrant workers as a means to reduce the marginalisation and 
exploitation of such workers. 
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6.3.3. The National Union of Mineworkers (NlJM) 
The national union of mine workers (NUM) came into existence in 1982. NUM is the 
largest recognised collective bargaining agent representing migrant workers in the 
Mining and Electrical Energy Industries in South Afiica and the largest affiliate of 
COSATU. NUM also represents the mine and energy workforce within all the South 
Afiican provinces (NUM, 1999). Internationally NUM is affiliated with the international 
federation of chemical, energy, mine and general workers' union (ICEM). ICEM is in 
tum affiliated with the international labour organization (ILO), which is the international 
institution responsible for maintaining workers' rights in the world (NUM, 1999). 
Accordingly, the main concerns ofNUM with the classical migrant labour system and the 
growing informalisation of migrant labour involve the iniquities performed on labour by 
the coercive approach of the system. For example, the degradation of adult male through 
the hostel system; the separation offamilies; the use of ethnicity to "dive and rule"; the 
computerized records of TEBA that mean that an active shaft steward could easily be 
blacklisted; the dumping of permanently disabled migrant workers back into the rural 
locations of the sending country with little economic prospects (Philip, 1991: 84); and the 
growing informalisation of migrant labour recruitment (Crush, 1997), are some of the 
common issues raised by NUM in its desire to see the termination of both the classical 
migrant labour system. 
The biggest concern of NUM with the current mine labour migration management 
between Lesotho and South Africa, however, revolves mainly around the larger issue of 
temporary employment and the annual, renewable contraction of migrant mineworker, 
with little or no job security. According to NUM perspective, the current one year 
contract recruitment of foreign mine labour degrades the value of human life and 
excessively exploits mine labour, which contributes to the growing trend in poverty 
generation, than wealth generation, between Lesotho and South Afiica (philip, 1991; 
COM, 1999; Mbendi, 2000). This, the NUM perspective holds, is evident in the positive 
relationship between the decrease in the price of gold and the rise in economic crisis in 
Lesotho (Philip, 1991). 
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In addition, NUM is also concerned about the rise in sub-contracting in the mining 
industry, and the threat such a move poses on the unionisation of mine labour. In 1995 
NUM and COM agreed that all subcontractors would, in future , be compelled to comply 
with applicable legislation, as a move towards the complete removal of all legal barriers 
to joining the union. However, since the raison d' etre of sub-contracting seems to be to 
subvert unionisation, sub-contractors discourage involvement in unions and set their own 
wages and employment conditions (Crush, 1997). From the South Afiican side, NUM has 
sought, and so fur unsuccessfully, to be involved in all mine decision-making about sub-
contracting (Crush, 1997). The union has also issued a set of guidelines on contracting 
out. The union wants each mine to provide reasons for contracting and to provide an 
explanation for why the work cannot be done by regular employees. It asks for details, on 
a mine-by-mine basis, of the numbers involved; the type of work; the extent of 
unionisation; and level of compliance with collective agreements. NUM also demands 
that wage rates and conditions of services should be no worse than those of ordinary 
employees and that sub-contractors be barred from hiring undocumented migrants 
(philip, 1991 ; Crush, 1997). However such demands are not likely to be feasible given 
the general rise in informalisation of international labour migration in the world (refer 
also to chapter 4). Thus, on the South Afiican side of the equation, NUM is more 
concerned with the maintaining the power of unions and the unionisation oflabour. 
From the Lesotho side, NUM is also concerned about the implication the gradual phasing 
out of the classical migrant labour system will have on the development of Lesotho, 
particularly given the recent rise in informal migrant labour recruitment in the region. 
According to NUM, the current proposal of stabilization in the mining industry, by COM, 
and SADC amnesty of granting permanent migration status to older-serving migrant 
mineworkers, do not offer a positive alternative for Lesotho in terms of economic 
development. To begin with, NUM perspective points out that the stabilization of the 
mine labour would lead to greater retrenchments of foreign workers and a deepening 
economic crisis in Lesotho, and greater numbers of undocumented migrant workers from 
Lesotho. Secondly, NUM argues that the permanent removal of the economically active 
labour force from Lesotho, brought about by the amnesty, would erode the country's 
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active manpower and thus undermine current development initiatives (Philip, 1991; 
Head, 1995; Crush, 1997). It seems that on the Lesotho side of the equation NUM is 
more concerned about the legal status of mineworkers 7 and the long-term implications of 
the new developments in the mining industry on Lesotho 's development. 
According to NUM perspective, the crucial factors regarding development-creation that 
surround the current official desire to terminate the classical migrant labour system 
should not be the long-term goals of its removal but rather the short-term consequences. 
NUM points out that the abrupt termination of the classical migrant labour system 
without any formal alternative being put in its place would lead to greater informalisation 
of migrant labour recruitment, greater numbers of undocumented migrant workers , and 
greater insensitivity being subjected to migrant workers (philip, 1991). Accordingly, 
NUM calls for the promotion of a comprehensive policy package that would address inter 
alia concerns on adequate housing; change in the involuntary deferred payment; mine 
remuneration; mine compensation in case of accidents, illness, etc (philip, 1991; Crush, 
1997). 
NUM perspective also acknowledges that parallel to the immediate concerns with the 
increasing demise of the classical migrant labour system is the need to address longer 
term concerns of resource inequalities as a result ofthe inception of the migrant labour 
system. Here NUM acknowledges the need to implement comprehensive land reform 
polices both in Lesotho and South Africa, that are more worker-fiiendly, particularly 
regarding the issue of adequate housing (both in Lesotho and in South Africa) (philip, 
1991 ; Head, 1995; Crush, 1997; Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c). 
Nevertheless, NUM perspective remains passive III proposing a comprehensive 
methodological approach on how such longer-term goals should be implemented. Thus, 
although this perspective maintains a pro-labour approach, it currently stands as a 
7 To a large extent this is expected. As mentioned in chapter 2, the NUM has been actively involved in the 
reintegration of returning Basotho mineworkers in the Lesotho economy, by setting the legal institutional 
structure of operation. However, these initiatives by the NUM have not been successful in Lesotho (refer to 
chapter 2). 
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visionary alternative to the two extremes of complete informalisation of migrant labour 
on the one hand and the (declining) legal and formal representation of the classical 
migrant labour system on the other. 
6. 3. 4. The SADe Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons 
The most radical and far-reaching vision for the transformation of Southern Africa's 
migration regime is embodied in the recent SADC Draft Protocol for the Free Movement 
of Persons within Southern Africa. The Protocol, which was designed in 1996, proposes 
progressively freer movement for all people, including work-seekers, within the Southern 
African Development Community and the eventual elimination of all border controls 
within a period often years (SADC, 1996). According to the Protocol: 
"Member States may, under this Protocol or in an appropriate protocol on employment 
and labour, make provisions for the transferability from one Member State to another of 
benefits and rights acquired by virtue of employment, with a view to promote the 
freedom of movement of workers," (SADC, 1996). 
If adopted, such a plan would have three main implications for temporary work by non-
South Africans within the country. First, it would mean open access to the South African 
job market for those from SADC states seeking temporary work in South Africa. Second, 
it would decriminalize the activities of undocumented temporary workers and bring 
temporary work above ground. Third, it would end the need for bilateral accords and 
temporary employment schemes since, in effect, there would be a single regional labour 
market open to all. However, SADC member states are deeply divided on the Protocol 
(Sachikonye, 1998). Crush (1997) reports that the South African government, In 
particular, is not in favour of the "open borders" concept behind the Protocol. 
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6.3.5. The 1996 SADC amnesty and the permanent residence status 
In 1996, the South Afiican government extended the permanent residence status to about 
90 000 foreign miners who had been employed in the mines since 1986 (MatJosa, 1998). 
This decision was the result of lengthy negotiations between NUM and SADC, 
particularly in 1994 and stemmed directly from SADC amnesty proposal of 1996 (The 
Commission Report, 1999). The general SADC amnesty approved by Cabinet in 
February 1996 was handed to the South Afiica DHA for implementation. According to 
this amnesty: 
"Anyone is eligible to apply for permanent residence who: 
a. Is a citizen or permanent resident of an SADC country; 
b. Has lived continuously in South Africa for longer than 5 years; 
c. Has no criminal record; 
d. Has been gainfully employed or self-employed since 1991; and 
e. Has a spouse or children born in South Africa." (Crush, 1997; Matlosa, 1998). 
Crush (1997) argues that although the decision by the South Afiican officials to grant the 
amnesty proposal appears to cut across the logic and thrust of an existing policy to isolate 
and deport all "iJlegals" irrespective of how long they have been in the country, what the 
amnesty does mean, at least in theory, is that long-time undocumented migrants reliant on 
temporary work can now come above ground, regularize their status in the country and 
seek employment without fear of harassment, arrest and deportation. Whether this will 
spell the end of illegal temporary work is doubtful, particularly since the decision does 
not affect migrants who have come to the country since 1991. But what it could mean is 
that policing will now be more intensely targeted at these post-1991 immigrants to South 
Afiica. The amnesty could therefore have positive consequences for some undocumented 
temporary workers at least in as much as they will move outside the sanction of the 
Aliens Control Act. In addition, the amnesty could also in theory be signifying the initial 
steps towards attaining the goal of the free movement of people within SADC member 
countries. 
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6. 3. 6. The response of Basotho migrant mineworkers to the permanent residence 
status 
According to the South African Identification Act of 1986, all persons from foreign 
countries who wish to become permanent residents of South Africa have to apply for an 
identification document (ID). Once a person is in a possession of an ill, that person is 
regarded as a pennanent resident of South Africa. An ill entitles its holder to a wide 
variety of privileges and benefits not normally available to persons residing in South 
Africa under an ordinary resident pennit. Pennanent residents can vote in the local, 
provincial and national elections.8 They can stand for public office at local and 
government level. They qualiJY for a wide range of government social programmes, such 
as subsidized medical treatment, school fees for children and welfare programmes 
(pensions). They can also seek work in other industries in South Africa (Foulo, 1996: 18). 
Theoretically, a miner once in a possession of a South African ill can take his family to 
South Africa. His wife and children automatically qualiJY for permanent status. They can 
live in South Africa without the problems of having to apply for study permits, for 
example. Although some of the social programmes are available in Lesotho, they are 
nevertheless not as lucrative as those offered in South Africa. Thus, theoretically most 
Basotho mineworkers may wish to get access to the social programmes by becoming 
South African permanent residents. 
In reality of course, there are more constraints on the miners' side to allow him to 
automatically take up permanent residence status in South Africa. Most of these are of 
short-term costs, related to general migration costs. But, some, particularly those linked 
to the provision of social security benefits extending to permanent residents are more 
longer term and related to changes in state policy in South Africa. 
8 This has led to some authors to speculate on the true motives behind the Mandela regime in granting 
pennanent resident status to foreign citizens without the prior consent of the governments of these foreign 
citizens (Sachikonye, 1998; Matlosa, and Pule, 2000) 
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The availability of adequate family housing in South Africa is a major determining factor 
in influencing effective permanent migration from Lesotho. Given the fact that the 
mining industry no longer has any legal obligations to provide accommodation to its 
employees, the costs of housing are entirely left to the mineworkers. Most mineworkers 
have displayed little interest in moving their families to the former mining hostels (Foulo, 
1996). It has already been reported that if adequate housing is not available in the 
destination location in South Africa, miners who wished to depart for an indefinite period 
have had to postpone their departure until they had secured suitable housing for their 
families (Sechaba Consultants, 1997: 30). In addition, 63 percent of intended migrants in 
1996 reported the desire to move if only they had ownership of a home in South Africa. 
22 percent reported that they would settle for rented accommodation (Foulo, 1996: 22). 
In addition to factors such as age, ownership of fields and dwellings, in influencing the 
decision to move for a migrant, the employment status of spouse is another very crucial 
consideration. Theoretically, if spouse is employed in the country of origin, the decision 
to move may mean that the family would have to survive on the income of only one 
member for some time. This could be a setback, particularly if the family does not have 
sufficient savings, or has long-term debt commitments. On the other hand, if only one 
family member has been employed, the decision to move may be encouraged by 
employment prospects of additional family members, ceteris paribus (Shields and 
Shields, 1990; Foulo, 1996). Interestingly, a lot of employed spouses in Lesotho 
expressed a desire to move to South Africa, regardless of the fact that they would be 
leaving their posts in Lesotho (Molapo, 1998). This is because wages in South Africa are 
relatively higher than in Lesotho for the same type of jobs, and thus, most emigrants are 
attracted by the income differential (Foulo, 1996). Additionally, as mentioned earlier in 
the thesis, women tend to be discriminated against in the Lesotho labour market. This is 
also likely to raise their choice for emigration if the opportunity should present. 
Nonetheless, in 1998, the Ministry of Labour and Employment (l998c) reported that 
most Basotho emigrants in South Africa not only have difficulty switching employment 
categories, but have difficulty finding higher grade jobs, and so most end up holdingjobs 
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in which they are more than qualified, such as clerical work, casual labour and farming 
(Ministry of Labour and Employment, 1998c). 
Ownership of a home in Lesotho appears to discourage migrant mineworkers from 
settling permanently in South Africa.9 According to a recent survey report by the Sechaba 
Consultants, miners who live in their own homes have indicated no desire to emigrate 
indefinitely to South Africa (Sechaba Consultants, 1997). On the other hand, migrants 
who live in their parents' premises indicated that they would move (Foulo, 1996: 24; 
Sechaba Consultants, 1997). But given the recent rising incidence of landlessness in 
Lesotho, particularly in the rural areas, more migrants from Lesotho are likely to 
emigrate. Between 1996 and 1998 a total of31 690 Basotho mineworkers had applied for 
South African permanent residence status, despite previous predictions by the Ministry of 
Labour and Employment that Basotho miners are less likely to take up the offer of 
permanent residence in South Africa (Foulo, 1996: Matlosa, 1998: 43). This accounts for 
about 28 percent of all employed Basotho mineworkers. 
Irrespective of the current factors influencing the decision to move, the general 
conclusion is that there will be a tendency of category-switching by migrant 
mineworkers,from temporary to permanent migration, following the extension of the 
permanent residence status to foreign mine workers. This is because for the first time in 
the southern African region, migrants now have a choice to emigrate or not to the country 
of destination. Under the classical migrant labour system, migrants were forced to 
temporary and even seasonal migration by state polices both in the labour sending 
countries and in South Africa. Hence, migrants in the southern African region today face 
a freer labour market, and the prospect of category-switching are thus similar to those 
observed in any other region of the world with migration flows. The prospects of a freer 
labour market nevertheless raises serious policy references with regards to the regulation 
oflabour flow within the region that the current recruiting, financial and legal institutions 
are not set out to cope with. 
9 Chapter 2 established that the ownership of land and home in Lesotho is closely associated with the 
traditional institutions of wealth and traditional power relations between Lesotho and South Africa. 
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6. 3. 7. Criticism of the SADC Amnesty and SADC Protocol on the Free Movement 
of Persons. 
The SADC amnesty programme assumed that migrants would all automatically want to 
become South African citizens once the extension of pennanent residence was 
completed. In reality of course, migrants who apply for pennanent residence in South 
Africa would have to incur costs associated with the migration, which involve both 
monetary (actual moving costs, possibility ofleaving a better job/ home/ land at home) 
and non-monetary losses Ooss of fumily and friends support networks at home). The 
amnesty programme however did not take any steps to provide adequate housing 
locations for migrants wishing to take up pennanent residence status in South Africa. 
This is a burden that add to the migrants' costs, and that is likely to leave them vulnerable 
in the destination country (Sachikonye, 1998). In addition, the proposed rational 
migration policy of the Free Movement of Persons within the SADC region cannot work 
in isolation. 
The Protocol assumes that migrants are a group removed from the labour markets of 
original countries. In reality, and as was established in chapter 5, migrants are identifiable 
within the larger regional labour market, including the infonnal sector. Chapter five 
established that there is a positive relationship between the infonnal sector and migrant 
pool in Lesotho. The migrant pool originates from the informal sectors of the urban areas. 
Most of these migrants are traders who migrate for temporary periods, and do not wish to 
remain permanently in the destination area (Gaidzanwa, 1998). Infonnal workers 
currently remain outside any legal representation at home and within the legal. The 
SADC protocol needs to initiate a comprehensive policy for infonnal workers prior to 
addressing any policy on migrant workers. Once all the regional countries develop legal 
representation for the informal sector, then the problem of (il)legality of migrants would 
diminish within the region. 
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6. 4. Conclusion 
International labour migration between Lesotho and South Africa is clearly linked to 
broader issues of regional integration and South Africa's economic hegemony. The 
institutional analysis of the legal and financial organizations surrounding international 
mine labour migration between Lesotho and South Africa conducted in this chapter has 
shown that the formal institutional organization surrounding international labour 
movement between the two countries is currently on the decline, and is being replaced by 
a more informal organization of international labour migration. The informalisation of 
international labour migration in the regions has serious implications in terms of creating 
the ability for policy and government officials to distinguish the migrant categories. 
The current legal subset of the institutional infrastructure surrounding international mine 
labour migration between Lesotho and South Africa remains inappropriately determined 
by power relations rather than development goals. This has resulted to the increasing 
inefficiency of the legal institutions at the expense of migrant mineworkers. A recent 
analysis of the history of temporary migration in Southern Africa argues that the current 
legal institution surrounding general international labour migration in southern Africa is a 
product of the past apartheid legacy of South Africa, and therefore is not best designed to 
meet the interests of international migrants, particularly temporary and category-
switching migrants. As Klotz (1997) put it: 
"Recent immigration legislation, notably the Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995 and 
the South African Citizenship Act of 1995'°, modifies the Government's powers to deport 
illegals and alter the rules of residency. Despite government claims, these new laws 
strengthen the state's powers and further limit the possibility of migrants gaining legal 
status. Furthermore, the administrative framework for implementing immigration policy 
- a system of regional committees appointed by the minister - remains fundamentally 
'0 The South African Citizenship Act of 1995 was initiated so as to fonnally integrate the fonner 
Bantustans into the Republic of South Africa. This Act also penn its dual citizenship by South Africans 
(Klaaren, 1999). 
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consistent with initial Union institutions. Thus, South Africa's current policy is a legacy 
of apartheid" (Klotz, 1997). 
The legacy of apartheid is evident in two ways with regards to international mine labour 
migration between Lesotho and South Africa. Firstly, the continuing involuntary 
requirement of contribution to the deferred pay scheme by Basotho migrant mineworkers 
benefits the interests of the Basotho ruling class over those of migrant mine workers and 
their families. The rigidity of the Lesotho Bank to release funds to needy relatives of 
migrants is a clear example of the continuing marginalisation of migrant mineworkers in 
the country. Secondly, the lack of an organized migrant worker's union, except through 
the national union of mineworkers of South Africa, implies the lack of human rights 
extending to these workers, which represent one aspect of the apartheid legacy. 
More importantly, while South Africa and the rest of the southern Africa countries are 
currently overturning apartheid legislation right and left, there is a curious silence about 
migrants. The criterion of (il)legaJity is another apartheid legacy. The "illegal" status of 
many temporary undocumented migrant workers in South Africa makes them vulnerable 
in two ways. First, undocumented migrants have no rights and protection under the law. 
Second, employers can easily exploit undocumented migrants due to their illegal status. 
There has also been a recent rise in xenophobia in South Africa that is positively linked to 
the poor categorization of migrant mineworkers as illegals or criminals, by state officials, 
employers and the general public. The SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons 
and the NUM's perspective on human rights, both lack a comprehensive methodological 
proposal of how to transform the current xenophobia surrounding the migration 
institution and thus both remain as subdued and visionary alternatives to the classical 
migrant labour system and the increasing informalisation of international labour 
migration in the region. As the Lesotho case study has shown, under the current legal 
uncertainty, the extension of permanent residence to older migrant mineworkers is 
unlikely to benefit either the migrant workers or their countries of origin, which lose out 
on remittances. 
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In summary, the above institutional analysis of international mine labour migration 
between Lesotho and South Africa points out that Lesotho 's modernization is firmly 
situated within the modernization of the South African economy. Under the apartheid 
legacy, migrant mineworkers were the main losers within a migration institution that was 
largely detennined by power relations between the Lesotho ruling class and the South 
African officials (including the mining industry). The position of Basotho migrant 
mineworkers appears to have changed little in the post-apartheid era. On the one hand, 
the decline in the involuntary deferred pay scheme on the South African side (through 
TEBA) implies that migrants can now benefit more (financially) from the migration 
process. On the other hand, the rigid response of the Lesotho Bank to withdrawals from 
the Fund continues to marginalize Basotho migrant mineworkers and their fiunilies. More 
importantly, migrant mineworkers remain exploitable under the increasing 
infonnalisation of the migration institution. 
Although both economies have clearly changed and with them international labour 
migration, the institutional framework surrounding that migration still needs to follow. 
The perspectives ofNUM and DHA are reactionary in the sense that they are trying to 
stop the change. The SADC protocol on free movement of persons and various regional 
initiatives are ad hoc and not very representative of all parties. Lessons from the 
Philippines and the U. S. (analysed in chapter 4) infonn that too much "inherited" control 
on international migration is likely to lead to greater numbers of undocumented migrant 
workers. This suggests that given the new global division of labour perhaps there is a 
need for a more holistic and multilateral approach towards the regulation of international 
labour migration. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
7. 1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to show how the southern African regIon is becoming 
increasingly associated with the orthodox functionalist approach to development, even 
when attempting a structuralist (regional) approach to international labour migration. 
As pointed out in chapter 4, the problem with international labour migration today is that 
it lacks a coherent regulating institution at the global level. Most migration transactions 
are left to the unilateral decisions of self-seeking nation states. Such a policy approach is 
increasingly proving to be costly, particularly to international migrants who are 
increasingly becoming pushed into illegal and criminal positions. 
This thesis has pointed out that the origins of unilateral policy decisions are largely 
situated with the orthodox "functionalist' approach towards dual labour markets. 
However, today, even multilateral institutions such as SADC and NAFT A are becoming 
increasingly polarising institutions, suggesting adherence to the status quo, i.e., 
"nationalistic" functionalism. These institutions, although in principle remain 
multinational, in reality they tend to behave as if they are separate national entities, 
paying lip service to multilateralism within a multinational consortium. Thus it is clear 
that functionalism and nation-states are still very much a part of the new international 
division oflabour. The important question today then is what is the position of non-state 
actors (of which economic migrants are a part) in the new international division of 
labour? 
The orthodox functionalist answer seems to diverge. On the one hand, the de Jacto 
Lewisian model seems to suggest a justification for international labour migration within 
the status quo, as long as it is welfare enhancing. On the other hand, the Todaran 
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framework sees internal and international labour migration as responses to distortions 
within national boundaries, and thus the policy response here is to remove the distortions 
that are causing migration, or, failing to do this, then restrict internal and external 
migration altogether. 
Heterodox responses seem to be somewhat more unified. The structuralist theories more 
or less seem to recognise that within the new international division ofiabour, are systems 
of production, each operating with its own rules and regulations in an increasingly 
integrating global economy. International labour migration is thus here regarded as part 
and parcel of the world systems of production, and to the extent that systems of different 
levels of integration are operating within a unified global economy, there is a strong 
suggestion that the paths of growth and development are more likely to be diverging than 
converging, resulting in the underdevelopment of some actors (including state and non-
state actors). As the systems of production develop and mature and become replaced by 
new systems, the position of the global actors is thus seen as being in continuous 
adjustment (revision). The suggested policy tool here is to increase multilateralism and 
minimise unilateral and ad hoc policy actions. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section one is this introduction. Section two 
explains the functionalist policy approach to international labour migration. Section three 
examines the structuralist policy response, and finally section four analyses the post-
apartheid southern African policy response to international labour migration. It is 
interesting to note that post-apartheid southern Africa seems to be closely associated with 
the functionalist perspective, even when attempting more of structuralist regionalism and 
adjustment. 
7.2. Summary of "de facto" Lewisian and Todaran framework 
As explained in chapter 3, classical models of the functional approach, such as, Lewis 
(1954) and Fei and Ranis, (1964), based on classical orthodox economics of wage 
equalisation and resource utility maximization, conceive of migration as the means by 
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which surplus labour in a large agricultural economy is transferred to the urban industrial 
sector. The transfer provides for economic growth and a "psychosocial reorientation of 
the migrant in the process" (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). The model is strongly associated 
with the dual sector paradigm, in which surplus labour (labour which does not make a 
positive contribution to production, including domestic labour) is transferred from the 
"subsistence" or "traditional" agricultural sector of the economy to the "capitalist" or 
"modem" industrial sector, fuelling growth and structural transformation (Lewis, 1954). 
The model thus assumes a smooth transition of labour from the traditional production, 
into the modem. The transition is enhanced by the fact that during the migration process, 
the migrant becomes re-oriented, with skill, wage decreases in the capital rich sector, 
together with remittances all working to stimulate economic growth, eventually 
eliminating spatial inequalities and wage differentials that drive migration. 
The World Bank view, for example Workers in an integrating world (World Bank, 1995) 
seems to adhere to this framework. The general development model of the World Bank 
is closely associated with national identities as opposed to an international identity. In the 
LewislWorld Bank perspective, there is no particular role for international migration. 
Development and urbanisation are national concerns. This basic assumption in this 
framework is much a fault of history as it is a conscious decision of classification. 
Classical orthodox reasoning rarely had to worry about global issues or cross-border 
identities. The model was developed to address pure economic interactions between two 
sectors with wage and resource differentials, with the goal of equalising resources and 
minimising wage differentials. Although the classical model was not designed to really 
engaging in international concerns, it nevertheless regards international labour migration 
as functional, to the extent that international migration can be seen as welfare enhancing. 
Thus, any attempts to block international labour migration are here perceived as 
inefficient, xenophobic, or "protectionalist." The only justification of restricting 
migration is thus "status quo." In the log-run of course, migration is assumed to be 
minimal (as resources get reallocated). 
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In the Todaro framework, migration is perceived as a response to distortions in either 
rural or urban areas. The model characterizes migration as an individual decision in 
which a person compares herlhis expected income in two sectors or geographic areas 
over a given time horizon. Expectations are based primarily on the probability offinding 
employment in each sector, although other factors such as crop risk (in the case of 
agriculture) and the existence of social networks (in the case of urban employment) may 
also be influential to the migrant's decision. The key result of the model is that, if urban-
rural income differentials are high enough, people will migrate even if their chances of 
actually gaining urban, formal sector employment in the short run are quite low. This 
model is neoclassical, in the sense that it sees migration as functional in the absence of 
distortions, but that given the reality of distortions, it starts to recognise the "Third 
World" sector. Thus, the Third World sector is here perceived as an offshoot of the status 
quo. 
The principal policy implication here is thus that without raising rural incomes, urban job 
creation, at wages above market clearing levels, will only attract more migrants, further 
contributing to urban unemployment, and because the marginal product of labour is 
greater than zero, rural underdevelopment. The Todaran answer to increased urban 
unemployment and rural underdevelopment is not to stop migration, but rather to try and 
reduce the pressures in the rural areas that lead to urban migration. Although migration is 
also viewed as bad under the Todaran framework because of the distortions it creates in 
both rural areas (which lose productive labour) and urban areas (the concept of over-
urbanisation and its problems), it is also seen as resulting from distortions in the economy 
that stem from poor economic practises. The Todaran framework thus advocates 
correcting the bad economic practises (particularly in the rural areas I) as the starting 
point for correcting rural-urban migration. Thus, in countries faced with high urban 
unemployment and rural underdevelopment, there seems to be justification for policies 
that attempt to reduce migration. 
I Examples of poor economic practices in rural areas include among others traditional land policies that 
marginalize women and the youth, and lack of paid employment opportunities for women and the youth in 
rural locations. Others are the pervasive role ofthe government in rural development projects, lack of ski lis 
and education to rural dwellers, poor physical and capital infrastructure in rural areas, etc (Chapter 2). 
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Second, the Todaro model does not see any need to address urban poverty directly: i.e., it 
does not emphasis the kinds of urban infrastructural policies directed at for instance, 
developing the urban informal sector.2 The Todaran policy advocates that the markets 
should be left to create market-clearing wage jobs. The urban informal sector only exists 
because markets are prevented from doing this by distortions: public sector and lSI 
employment at high wages. The efficiency and functionalist assumptions in this model 
are thus similar to Lewis case, but here, the answer to distortions and income differentials 
is to create many jobs with low wages and low costs. On the one level, this is fitting to 
the EPZ model adapted in Lesotho, On a different level, the Todaro framework seems to 
be consistent with the neoliberal agenda: low wages, no union power, easily exploitable 
cheap labour, etc., that guarantee that markets function efficiently in the global economy. 
Generally, Todaran policy tools thus seem to suggest reduction of distortions (including 
government action in the domestic economy) and reliance on trickle down. The Todaran 
model thus sees the urban Third World sector as a relic ofthe modernisation process. 
Thus, in terms of policy, both de facio functionalists seem to suggest a "return to the 
market" approach towards development. The policy implications for international labour 
migration under this framework in that international labour migration should only be 
pursued when it is welfare enhancing, otherwise, it should be minimised. The problem 
arises when the reality in many countries with high-out-migration rates (such as in Egypt, 
Sudan, Lesotho, Mozambique, the Philippines, Mexico, etc) is that migration is 
increasingly a result of push distortions in the origin, rather than pull, welfare enhancing 
factors in the destination. In this scenario, both the Lewisian and Todaro models would 
adhere to minimal international labour migration: firstly, because it is not likely to be 
welfare enhancing, and secondly, because resources would need to be spent to eliminate 
the distortions that are causing the mass migration. The suggestion here is that in the 
above scenario, the functionalist approach seems to propose an ad hoc response to 
international labour migration, whereby winners are picked and losers are created (e.g., 
Saudi Arabia preferring Egyptian migrants to Sudanese; South Africa preferring Basotho 
2 See Sen, 1981; Lisk, 1985; Rogerson, 1996; Streek, 1999; Hough, 2000 for detailed readings on micro 
and macro level development polices. 
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migrants to Mozambicans; the United States preferring Filipino migrants to Mexicans; 
and so on). 
7.3. Structuralism and the new international division oflabour 
The main features of the structuralist approach are that firstly, they draw on the new 
international division of labour in which increasingly the systems of production "looks 
beyond national boundaries." Under this scenario, firstly, the structuralist assume that 
developing countries with high unemployment, who are found lower down the global 
power ranking, do not choose their development policies, but that adapted such policies 
as a direct order from higher ranking international institutions (e.g., the World bank, 1MF, 
etc.). Whereas the World Bank (classical) and IMF (neoclassical) views argue that EPZs 
are useful in countries faced with employment constraints as they create many jobs at low 
wages, the structuralist argue that it is not the creation of jobs that is important here but, 
the type of jobs and employment that become created under the EPZ model that are of 
major concern. 
The structuralists see the low-wage, low-skill types of jobs associated with the EPZ 
model of development as a cause of the low growth paths that many developing countries 
sae currently experiencing. One example of this critique is the emergence of the Third 
World sector in the urban areas of less developing countries (LDCs), which the 
structuralist argue is not an off-shoot but a different system within the status quo. The 
suggestion here is that Third World sectors are thus just as likely as the existing status 
quo, to evolve as new status quo. The rapid expansion and prevalence of the Third World 
sector in LDCs in the late 20th century, as outlined in Chapter 4s 4 and 5, clearly seems to 
reflect this somewhat radical perception. The bottom line implication here is that LDCs 
are likely to evolve as the global slums of the 21 st century. 
Secondly, the structuralists recognize that migration is increasingly becoming a push 
phenomenon. The implication here, and what we have identified as the "Third World" 
sector is not likely to disappear as predicted by the functionalist approaches. The policy 
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lesson drawn from this perspective is that there is a need to develop regional ifnot global 
and multilateral policies to deal with the new emerging international division oflabour. 
The structuralist perspective seems to suggest that unilateralism and ad hoc policy 
decisions are increasingly contributing to the rise of "negative" labour flexibility, that is, 
exploitation. 
In terms of migration, the structuralists recognise that migration is just another system of 
production in the world with its own rules and regulations (social networks) directed to 
the flow and distribution of resources. According to this approach, given the fuct that 
international labour mobility is inevitable under the new international division oflabour 
with increasing "negative" flexibility directed towards labour from the LDCs, the main 
policy implications here seem to suggest the need to develop micro-level policies that can 
complement the broader macro-policy framework, and that can be applied at the 
multisectoral level. The structuralists also seem to adhere to non-criminalisation of 
international migrants, by suggesting regional and multilateral approaches to managing 
international labour migration. This model thus recognises that markets are not always 
perfect, and suggests second-best alternatives to the status quo. 
The functionalist and structuralist models are thus the main two policy tools available for 
development in the global economy. Section four will now examine how the post-
apartheid southern African region has applied the above tools in responding to increased 
and less formal international labour migration within the region. 
7.4. International labour migration in post-apartheid southern Africa 
Unsurprisingly, the southern African labour market is characterised by distortions and 
inequalities. These distortions are especially becoming an urban phenomenon where 
poverty and unemployment are increasingly rising. Chapter 5 established how the major 
towns in Lesotho such as Maseru, are developing urban corridors where new migrants 
into the towns settle. Such areas are however inadequately planned, have few basic 
infrastructures and hose most of the informal or Third World sector. Employment 
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opportunities also tend to be limited around such areas. Surprisingly, policy regulation in 
the post-apartheid southern African region is still largely a functionalist application. 
Whereas in the past, unilateral policies to address international labour migration were 
largely undertaken within structured formal institutions that called for binding rules from 
all parties involved (except the migrants), increasingly today, such rules and regulation 
are no longer binding, and are in tum dissolving the structure of the formal regulations. In 
the case of Lesotho, the main response to the increased pace of migration by government 
officials in the country has been implementing institutions that at least attempt to slow 
down the out-migration of labour to urban Lesotho. Whereas in the past out-migration 
was perceived as welfare enhancing, and thus encouraged, increasingly in the late 1980s 
to present day, it is regarded as an "economic bad". Second, Lesotho's switch to EO! at 
low wages indicates the desire to reduce the pressure of probabilistic migration. Third, 
there is no particular emphasis on urban infrastructural and poverty programs in Lesotho, 
or even within the region, suggesting that the regional economies regard the informal 
Third World sector as an offshoot of trade liberalisation, and something laying out of 
their policy reach. These measures are unsurprisingly fitting with the Todaro perception 
of migration. 
Similarly in South African, the government has adhered to unilateral attempts to reduce 
internal migration (i.e., apartheid, etc) and external migration (Aliens control). The 
classical migrant labour system was seen as functional in the sense that it could draw 
from foreign cheap labour which could easily be discarded at the end of the contract, as 
well as restrict the movement of most of the local Black labour through the pass system. 
Urban growth was thus sufficiently slowed down during the functioning of the migrant 
labour system. Nonetheless, past apartheid policy regulations to controlling the 
movement of labour both within the country and within the region are increasingly 
becoming ineffective.3 
The emerging pattern of migration in the region, associated with increasing 
informalisation of migrant workers seems to suggests the decline of the classical 
'One can think of the DHA as a remnant of the apartheid system (Chapter 6). 
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institutions surrounding international migration in southern Africa. However, the 
emergence of unilateral and ad hoc policy decisions suggest that the functionalist 
approach is still very much alive in South Africa's policy application in the region. 
First of all, South Africa increasingly acts individually and in an ad hoc manner. A clear 
example of this is the 1996 amnesty by South Africa government. The decision to extend 
permanent residence status to Basotho miners, for example, was solely undertaken by the 
South African government, under the SADC hat, without prior negotiations with the 
Lesotho government. The result of the extension has thus met mixed sentiments from the 
Lesotho nation-state. While most mineworkers seems to be glad of the option to remain 
in South Africa, most are still constrained by lack of proper housing in the destination, a 
point which the Amnesty forgot to include in the planning stage of the policy. As a result, 
so far, not many miners have responded to the amnesty. At the same time, the wave of 
illegal migration to South Africa from Lesotho has picked up substantially. The 
suggestion here is that the ad hoc policy regulation in South Africa is increasingly 
pushing migrants into an illegal status. Even less surprising is the reaction of the Lesotho 
officials to the amnesty. The typical reaction of the Basotho has been mounting feelings 
of antagonism and frustration directed towards the South African government. This is 
because the Lesotho officials feel "cheated" out of negotiating the future of their 
nationals. But, in the mean time, the antagonistic sentiments between the two 
governments hinder any future prospects of developing a coherent policy to manage the 
new migration pattern. 
Such reactionary policies are, however, not unique to the southern Afiican region. 
Chapter four discussed the mass repatriation of Egyptian, Ghanaian, Sudanese and 
Filipino migrant labour from the Middle East and Nigeria, following the collapse of oil 
prices in the early 1980s, and the Gulf war in the 1990s. As in the case of the South 
Africa's amnesty decision, unilateral ad hoc polices from the destination countries and 
the international cornmunity were used to manage the mass exodus of labour. This 
situation was perhaps even worse than the South Afiica-Lesotho case, in the sense that 
here, over 1 million people were sent home in one year. This produced immediate 
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population and unemployment pressures in the source country that contributed to the 
spread of illegal migration back to the destination countries. The suggestion here is that 
the current harsh "alien control" policy in South Africa is a possible catalyst of future 
increased illegal migration in the region. 
Given the fact that migration cannot be "stopped," South Africa alone cannot be expected 
to accept poor people from the whole region, and it is not surprising that it is attempting 
to tighten alien control. However, this points to the other important lessons: firstly, that 
migration cannot be looked at in isolation. SADC is essential, not only to govern the 
movement of workers, but also to ensure that there is a regional development policy that 
reduces the flow of "economic refugees": i.e., South Africa needs to recognise that it 
cannot directly stop, for example, Mozambicans coming into the country. All this does is 
criminalise the process. The best policy response is to try to maximise Mozambique's 
development. 
Secondly, the suggestion here is that international labour migration does not necessary 
need radical policies: it simply needs a SADC regional development policy of which 
migration policy is a part. 
This point however, brings us to another important observation of regionalism in 
southern Africa. Clearly the merit of such a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, suffice it to point out here that the current regionalism in southern Africa 
appears to be plagued antagonism and unilateral ism among the member nation-states: 
The SADC unit as a group thus appears to be highly polarised and fragmented. It would 
thus seem wise for any future regional development plans to first address the issue of 
polarisation within SADC before attempting any regional development policy. The 
bottom line here with regards to international labour migration is that unilateral (i.e., 
nationalistic) and ad hoc polices are increasingly criminalizing migrants. In tenns of 
policy implications, the answer appears to lie within a broader multilateral and regional 
perspective. SADC is thus a crucial tool for successful development in southern Africa. 
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